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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to understand the process of situational awareness
(SA) in multi-casualty incidents (MCI). This study is significant because SA provides
information on which critical decisions are made during emergency events. The literature
concerning SA is mostly drawn from the domains of aviation, military operations and
business and not nursing. Current conceptual and theoretical development is insufficient
for application to the domain of MCI. MCI occur daily across the United States, yet a
literature review revealed no studies involving SA in MCI. Limited issues that are
possibly related to SA in MCI have been researched such as triage, scene safety and
patient disposition, but none identify or integrate concepts important to SA.
The lack of developed theory in this domain, let to a grounded theory approach to
explore, identify and relate concepts that emerged from the data in order to uncover the
process of SA. Interview transcripts from 15 emergency responders constituted the bulk
of the data. Participants had various professional roles and diverse experiential levels.
The data were managed using the software program NVivo 8.
Findings suggested that ―establishing and maintaining control‖ of the scene was
the core category, with other categories interacting with and being mediated by this core.
Rescuers, given experiential and educational preparation responded to contextually-based
situations. By appreciating the context and complexity of the event, rescuers handled
information, managed resources, used roles and relationships and dealt with the
emotional responses to the actions and interactions on the scene to establish and maintain
control of the situation. By establishing and maintaining control, rescuers provided a
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relatively safe environment in which to provide emergency healthcare. The substantive
theory, the ―Busby Theory of Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents‖
resulted from this study.
Future research should refine this model with eventual theory testing. This theory
may prove beneficial in studying larger-scale events, such as mass-casualty situations and
disasters and possibly different managerial hierarchies related to emergency response
efforts. It should also serve as an educational tool for emergency responders and may
prove helpful in the clinical practice of emergency responders from diverse disciplines.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction
Imagine two emergency workers in an ambulance hearing the crackle of a call
coming over their radio. The dispatcher advises them that there is a multi-vehicle
accident and a passerby reports that one vehicle is on fire. No more details are known at
this time. As the crew races through the city, different scenarios are running through their
minds. When they arrive on the scene, they see that a fire crew has extinguished the blaze
and is feverishly caring for a critical patient who is trapped in the previously burning car.
As they are taking in the scene, they hear the loud whir of a medical helicopter above,
and they see two people with obvious injuries sitting on the ground waiting for help. A
police officer is directing traffic and the fire captain comes over to update the arriving
emergency workers on the situation.
The possible scenarios they were mulling over now turn into assessable data. How
many vehicles and people are involved? How serious are the injuries? Will they need
additional units? Are there electrical power lines down? Are rescuers at risk? These
thoughts they are having are not random anxiety-induced concerns. They are the
contemplations of experienced providers. They are considering the possibilities, many
times based on pattern-matched past experiences, with the intent of compiling and
processing information for use in critical decision-making. These responders may have
never utilized, or even heard the term ―situational awareness‖, nevertheless they are
developing it.
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Situational (or situation) awareness (SA) is an important concept to understand in
the management of multi-casualty incidents (MCI), including small and large-scale
incidents, and can have a serious impact on public health on a daily basis. In this chapter,
I will briefly describe SA and its application to multi-casualty incidents, introduce the
research problem and question, discuss the significance and utility of the concept of SA
to healthcare delivery and nursing, and provide some important conceptual definitions.
Finally, I will introduce the philosophical orientation and the research assumptions
derived from that orientation and provide the limitations and delimitations of the study.
Endsley (1996, p. 159) referred to SA as a ―mental model of the current state of a
dynamic environment.‖ The word ―dynamic‖ indicates constant actual or potential for
change. Therefore knowledge about a situation is virtually never terminal as long as the
situation is ongoing. Situational Awareness is a concept composed of many sub-concepts
or categories. SA is used to determine what is happening in a particular set of
circumstances for the purpose of projecting possible outcomes and thus action to be
taken. Grasping exactly what constitutes SA is in large part a function of the particular
circumstances in which it is being developed. SA has been studied mostly with regard to
aviation, but has also been investigated with regard to business and industry, military
operations, and others. SA has been described both as a product, or the knowledge about
a situation at any given time within a critical activity, and a process of how that
information develops. Both descriptions are critical to understanding how SA may be
utilized for the benefit of those on whose behalf decisions are being made.
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Multi-casualty incidents, emergency events endangering more than one patient at
a time, occur daily around the nation. Yet little can be found in the literature with regard
to the application of SA to multi-casualty situations. Application of the principles of SA
to multi-casualty incidents may improve the care provided in these situations, and lead to
a better understanding of larger scale events in the future. The time has come to further
explore this concept and its potential impact on public health; especially in an era where
MCIs and even larger-scale events are ever looming.
Research Problem
SA is critical to multi-casualty incidents that occur daily nationwide. Yet SA in
MCI has not been studied or widely written about in the literature. A search of common
healthcare databases revealed one article that explicitly included situational awareness
and either multi or mass casualty in the title (Demchak, Chan, Griswold & Lenert, 2006).
That article involved mass, not multi-casualty incidents. Early, accurate SA development
can have beneficial effects on the management of multi-casualty incidents. However, the
process by which SA develops, its subsequent categories, properties, and the dimensions
of those properties and the usefulness of SA in MCI are not clearly understood.
Literature includes concepts such as triage, patient disposition, scene safety, the
need for communications and terms like scene size-up (Augustine, 2006; Cotter, 2006;
Johnson & Calkins, 1999; Limmer, Mistovich & Krost, 2006; Zoraster, Chidester &
Koenig, 2007). In addition, on a more macro-level, courses such as Advanced Disaster
Life Support (ADLS) offer acronyms such as d-i-s-a-s-t-e-r. The letters stand for detect,
incident command, support, all-hazards approach, scene safety, transport, evacuation,
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recovery (American Medical Association & National Disaster Life Support Foundation,
2004). These are clearly pieces of information that constitute the essence of SA, but do
not describe it entirely. What we do not know is how SA develops, what factors facilitate
or hinder development of SA, and if the timing of those particular happenings matters.
These questions require answers.
The problem driving this research project was that there is little if any literature
concerning the process of SA development in multi-casualty incidents. The process of SA
development uncovered in this study may inform SA development in disaster situations.
However, SA development in disasters may be quite different than that found in multicasualty incidents. The purpose of this study was to determine the process of individual
SA development in multi-casualty incidents from the perspective of the emergency
responder. Grounded theory methodology was used to develop a theory of situational
Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents for this study.
Research Question
The purpose of the study was to uncover the process of situational awareness in
multi-casualty incidents. Therefore, the research question was:
What is the process of individual situational awareness development in multicasualty incidents?
The resulting theory that emerged from this study enlightens our understanding of
situational awareness in multi-casualty incidents.
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Significance to Healthcare Delivery and Nursing
SA has utility for healthcare delivery in general and nursing specifically. The
study of multi-casualty incidents affects most healthcare workers, since they will be
involved at some point in the process of caring for patients. SA affects every aspect of a
multi-casualty scene. Nurses are becoming ever more involved in all types of healthcare
including that provided in the field. Development of the science of SA in relation to
nursing is important to me as a nurse, and I believe, the profession of nursing as a whole.
Healthcare
Situational awareness is critical for healthcare delivery, because it is necessary if
appropriate decisions are to be made. This is true for emergency events both large and
small. In addition, the highly complex environments in which healthcare provision occurs
require a high level of SA. Adequate SA in these multi-dimensional situations also
depends on the adequate perception and comprehension of information that can be used
for good decision-making.
SA can be applied generally to healthcare in a variety of circumstances. An
operating room, an ICU, the scene of a motor vehicle accident, a natural disaster, or a
terrorist event would all be examples of situations in which SA development would
clearly be applicable. Reports of the application of SA to healthcare situations in the
literature is limited. With regard to multi-casualty incidents, it is non-existent. Because of
the complex nature of multi-casualty incidents, the numbers of patients involved, and the
numbers and types of healthcare providers involved, accurate development of SA is
important yet not addressed adequately in MCI literature. The nature of the times in
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which we live is also a compelling factor for the development of accurate, actionable
information for the purposes of health care. Natural disasters, terrorist events and
everyday community emergency incidents could be more effectively addressed if
healthcare workers had a better understanding of SA and its application.
Nursing
It is critical for nurses to have an understanding of the process and product of SA.
This knowledge has particular salience for nurses in the 21st century. Gathering and
processing data is important for all aspects of nursing care. Therefore, SA has
implications for nurses in all settings, not just emergency preparedness.
Nursing is the largest single healthcare discipline in the country (The Nursing
Shortage, 2001). When one considers the fact that there is virtually nothing accomplished
in healthcare today that can be done without the input of a nurse at least somewhere along
the way, the importance of nurses to anything remotely related to ―healthcare‖ becomes
undeniable. We now have nurses heavily involved in the political process. This
involvement cannot be considered direct patient care, but it does affect how care is
delivered. In the same way, a nurse‘s understanding of the development of SA in multicasualty situations may be at times indirectly and at other times directly related to the
care that the nurse provides.
Nurses also have a unique healthcare perspective. We are experts in advocacy,
care management, leadership, patient and family education, multi-disciplinary
coordination and many other areas necessary for the provision of healthcare. In many
hospitals, the case managers are nurses.
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Nurses currently use a form of SA, when they use the acronym SBAR (Situation,
Background, Assessment, Recommendation). SBAR represents information for reporting
to each other, physicians and other healthcare providers (Guise, 2006; Rodgers, 2007). It
is a way of appreciating a situation, making sense of the assessment, and making a
recommendation concerning the patient‘s care. Advanced practice nurses have additional
skills that may be of benefit in multi-casualty situations, including knowledge about some
aspects of the medical model that may be of use particularly under the circumstances of
MCI.
While multi-casualty victims may be initially treated outside of hospitals, the care
that they receive is virtually never devoid of nursing care. Emergency medical services
providers typically provide the initial healthcare to victims outside of a healthcare
facility. However, they will in many cases have radio communications with, and will
certainly deliver their patients into the care of nurses. Additionally, some nurses do
respond to multi-casualty incidents as part of EMS teams or flight crews. Some
healthcare providers today are being cross-trained as EMS providers and nurses.
Many nurses returning for graduate education, are currently, or have been, past
EMS providers. The literature reveals several examples of joint training between nurses
and EMS providers, and even nurses training EMS workers for their primary roles
(Dufflin, 2005; Horrocks, 2004; Jenkin & Endacott, 2002; Melby, 2000; RNs Can
Participate, 2005).
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Nurses‘ (and nursing students‘) intuition, information processing, and decisionmaking have been the focus of multiple naturalistic inquires (Brooks & Thomas, 1997;
Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993).Those studies also inform this research project.
We live in a global community and on some level this fact will affect all that we
do, including healthcare delivery. As healthcare personnel attempt to deal with issues
such as large-scale natural disasters and terrorism, providers from different countries will
need to collaborate if comprehensive solutions to these issues are to be found. In doing
so, all aspects of healthcare will need to be included. In some countries, such as England
and Australia, it is commonplace for nurses to respond to multi-casualty scenes with
ambulance personnel. In several articles, authors discussed ―ambulance nursing‖ which
occurs mostly in European countries (Suserud, Bruce, & Dahlberg, 2003a; Suserud,
Bruce & Dahlberg, 2003b; Suserud & Bruce, 2003). Therefore, the placement of multicasualty SA development should not be excluded from nursing epistemology. If nurses
are to be at the planning table in terms of preparation for multi-casualty and larger scale
incidents, they must have an understanding of SA and other important issues that may not
be presented in basic nursing educational programs.
For too long, nurses have been seen by some as having a limited scope of practice
with little decision-making ability. It is necessary for nurses to have increasing influence
in all aspects of healthcare delivery. The status of nurses is changing from bed-side caregivers to high-level decision makers. These changes are slow to come (Mechanic &
Reinhard, 2002), but are seen in articles such as that offered by Anderson and Rorty
(2001) referring to international stances taken by nurses on issues such as ethics,
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genetics, and other public policy needs such as those concerning emergency preparedness
(Public Health Policy, 2004). Nursing has much to offer all types of healthcare including
emergency preparedness. Therefore, the future of nursing must include an understanding
of why and how nurses should be involved in emergency preparedness and the
contributions that nursing can make to management of multi-casualty incidents, including
SA.
Concepts and Definitions
Situational Awareness
Although there is not clear agreement on the definition of SA, one is cited more
frequently than others. Endsley (1988, 1995a, p. 36) began developing her
conceptualization of SA in the mid-1980s and she states that SA is ―the perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of
their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.‖ At the core of this
definition are the concepts of perception, comprehension and projection.
Endsley‘s definition is highly descriptive and useful; however there may be some
components that are necessary for application to circumstances concerning healthcare
delivery, such as MCI, that are not represented in her definition. Multi-casualty incidents
may include a single event, or a series of events. In addition, not only response, but also
planning is necessary for the accurate handling of emergency responses. Finally, though
technology has increased the amount of information available, it is important to be able to
determine what information among that which is available, is useful, and what is
available but extraneous. These components and others are important aspects of
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healthcare-driven SA. Discovery of a theory led to the development of a definition of SA
in MCI that is presented in the chapter five.
“Experienced” Healthcare Providers
The eventual purpose of this study was to provide emergency workers with
improved understanding of the process of SA development in MCI. ―Experienced‖
healthcare providers have been found to make more rapid assessments and decisions than
do novices (Klein, 1998, p. 4). These providers are also likely to be responsible for the
decisions that result from the SA developed. It was felt that some minimum level of
emergency response exposure was necessary. Among my participants, I chose to include
providers with at least one year of professional response background. The views of less
experienced responders were important and provided variation in the data. However,
those with less than one year as responders may have very little familiarity with actual
response efforts in MCI. Including only highly seasoned providers of, for example 10
years or more, could have over-estimated the capacity of providers to develop SA.
Therefore, those with at least one year as responders with no upper limit of years of
experience were included.
Multi-Casualty Incidents
For the purposes of this study, MCI was considered any incident that involved the
need for healthcare delivery for between two and 25 persons as a result of an event or
series of related events, occurring in an emergency field-level setting outside of a medical
facility.
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Individual SA is the concept of interest. Team SA is sufficiently different and is
dealt with as such in literature. Individual SA, which contributes to team SA
development, is antecedent to team SA and therefore requires explication.
Philosophical Orientation
Underlying this study is the philosophical paradigm of pragmatism as put forth by
John Dewey (1929). This approach is important in that it allows practice to inform basic
knowledge, and vice versa. All practice interactions occur between humans who live and
operate within their own contextually-based reality. Because each person‘s particular
reality is informed by his/her own personal interactions, a lens of symbolic
interactionism, which provides the philosophical basis for grounded theory, was also used
(Blumer, 1969).
I also employed the approach of naturalistic inquiry as discussed by Klein (1998)
in Sources of Power: How people make decisions, and in Naturalistic Inquiry (Zsambok
& Klein, 1997). Naturalistic decision-making and naturalistic inquiry were important to
the study because the research aim was to uncover the process of SA development as the
participant recalled it naturally occurring in real, not simulated situations. This approach
permitted the essence of the process to emerge in a way it may not have if the process
were being evaluated in a simulated situation.
Most actual measurement of SA has been done in controlled laboratory settings.
This study illuminated the natural process with regard to not only determining what
helped in SA development, but also, through the recollection and analysis of actual
events, what did not.
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Research Assumptions
The following assumptions were accepted by the researcher. Some related to the
study with respect to design, while others pertained specifically to the methodology.
1. Pragmatism as a scientific philosophical stance allows for knowledge to inform
practice and vice versa.
2. Practical application of research techniques to naturalistic settings provides
unique insights into practice.
3. Meanings and word symbols are important in the interaction that occurs between
individuals.
4. The development of SA, like other human interactions, requires the use of
contextual meanings, and those meanings are developed and modified through
human interaction.
5. The product of SA is insufficient on its own to determine the benefit of SA in
multi-casualty incidents.
6. Process is separate from the product of SA, but also constitutes critical
knowledge.
7. Process may be different in certain situations, but will have enough consistency
within varied MCI and among providers to support transferability.
8. Responders to multi-casualty incidents are able to inform the researcher about the
process of SA development.
9. Situational awareness is a necessary strategic component of multi-casualty
incident management.

13
Limitations
Several limitations could affect the data, analysis, and subsequent results of this
study. The known or suspected limitations of the study included the following:
1. The interviewees were all from one general geographic region of the southeast.
2. The limited experience of the researcher.
3. The possibility of the social desirability effect during participant interviews.
All participants were from one single southern United States region which could
limit the transferability of the information to other regions. Response resources could be
different in different parts of the country. Some participants were from small volunteer
organizations with little funding for equipment or training. Others were from large
metropolitan departments that were well funded. Theoretical sampling assured
representation of the varied nature of responders in the region.
My experience in qualitative research is also limited. This was the researcher‘s
first qualitative research project, and may have had an impact on the quality of data
collection and analysis. My entering into a mentorship relationship with experienced
qualitative researchers as well as securing an expert external auditor mitigated some of
the effects of my inexperience.
In the case of social desirability, the concern is that, if SA development in a
particular situation did not occur adequately, and subsequent decision-making resulted in
less than optimal care for patients, the participant may have been less likely to report this
for fear of judgment by the researcher. On the other end of the spectrum, there may have
been attempts to embellish the story in an effort by the participant to cast himself/herself
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in a more positive light than was actually warranted. The researcher avoided indications
of approval or disapproval during interviews to lessen chances of this occurring.
Delimitations
Several points of delimitation for this study include the following:
1. The constraints placed on the sample, including experience and the requirement
for minimum professional training to the level of EMT.
2.

The use of MCI as the contextual unit of analysis. MCI was defined as an
emergency involving between 2 and 25 victims.

3. Individual SA as the process being studied.
4. No limit on how long in the past the experience conveyed could have been.
5. No requirement for the emergency worker to currently be involved in emergency
response work.
SA has been utilized in many contexts and clearly delineating the context in
which it was studied was important. In this project, the process of SA development was
studied within the contextual boundaries of MCI. This was done for two reasons. First, no
literature was located specifically with regard to SA development in MCI and therefore
studies in this area are necessary. Second, the findings could prove very useful in terms
of the intended larger research trajectory of the investigator which eventually includes
larger-scale events.
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Summary
In light of the current global environment that includes both the possibility of
terrorism and natural disasters with increasingly devastating impacts, improved outcomes
driven by a new understanding of SA development, will be increasingly beneficial in
emergency healthcare delivery. Catastrophes like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
and Hurricane Katrina showed that the need for improved SA exists. These horrible
events have established the need for new ways of thinking about, assessing, and applying
SA. In testimony before committees of the House of Representatives, improvement of SA
in these large-scale incidents has been recommended as a national goal (Larence, 2007).
The federal government expects local responders and emergency managers to be
able to mount a sufficient response to threats to public health and safety. It is only when
those resources are overwhelmed and at the request of a state‘s governor that the federal
government responds at all. Every day, many MCI occur around the country. Therefore,
an understanding how SA develops at the local level is important to the management of
such everyday events. An improved understanding of SA development could reduce
mortality and morbidity in these instances. In addition, fundamental studies determining
the development and use of SA in smaller incidents may provide a vehicle for learning
more about SA development in larger events, thus eventually having a national impact.
This research project can provide the catalyst for a research trajectory including
multiple studies aimed at different hierarchical levels of emergency management and the
inclusion of larger mass-casualty incidents and disasters. Nursing is well suited to plan
for these occurrences both large and small. In addition, I plan a research trajectory that
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includes an arm that is more specifically related to nursing, such as SA and decisionmaking in the ED, ICU, medical surgical care areas, or other highly nursing specific
settings.
Examples of SA occur in everyday circumstances, as well as extraordinary ones.
For example, one may simply be aware of one‘s surroundings in a dark parking lot in an
effort to be sufficiently cautious, or one may be an operations center manager in charge
of a large-scale disaster. In either case, whether consciously or not, we continually
perceive the conditions within our environment, consider their possible outcome and use
that information to decide on appropriate action.
SA is utilized everyday in MCI across the country. Yet very little literature exists
regarding the process of SA development in multi-casualty situations. Understanding the
process of SA development may assist a broad variety of healthcare providers improve
casualty care in MCIs. Additional research in the area may eventually have an impact on
disaster management. This research project was necessary due to the lack of research
covering this topic and because of the potential benefit to healthcare disciplines in
general and nursing specifically.
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CHAPTER TWO

Framing Literature
The purpose of this study is to discover a theory of SA in MCI. Grounded theory
methodology was used to discover the emerging theory. There is a knowledge gap with
respect to SA in MCI. Topics in this review of the literature consist of SA core concepts,
contextual application, measurement techniques, healthcare application and the multicasualty incident SA literature.
Since the primary focus of Situational Awareness (SA) is ―knowing what‘s going
on around you‖, (Endsley 2000a, p. 5) its development would be of benefit in most any
situation where there are multiple data from which one must make critical decisions.
Though the phenomenon of SA can be said to be at work in situations from the most
mundane to those of most critical importance, it was not written about extensively until
the late 1980s (Stanton, Chambers & Piggot, 2001). For this review, no limit was placed
on the age of the literature. Rather, salience to the discussion and the addition to
understanding of SA were compelling factors in decisions concerning inclusion of
literature. In addition, technical and non-technical literature was reviewed, as they can
both inform the research proposed for the comparative analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
Multiple databases were searched. These databases included CINAHL, PubMed,
Business Source Premier, PsychInfo, and Science Direct. Keywords searched were:
situational awareness, situation awareness, situational awareness and theory, scene
management, scene size-up, situational awareness and multi-casualty, situational
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awareness and mass casualty, and situational awareness and disaster. While the focus of
this research project was the process of SA development in multi-casualty incidents, the
larger scope of mass casualty and disaster were included to allow for any overlap that
may have occurred in those areas with that of multi-casualty incidents.
SA Core Concepts
Grounded theory intentionally avoids application of theory from one area, even if
similar in nature, to an area where it has not been developed. The concepts and theories
presented here offer a basis for discussion rather than a particular guiding model.
Conceptual definitions of SA have been ―highly variable‖ (Rousseau, Tremblay &
Breton, 2004) and difficult to define as they tend to be ―dependent on the situation and
the context‖ (Patrick & James, 2004).
SA has been described as a construct, a phenomenon and a concept (Bedny &
Meister, 1999; Endsley, 1995a; Smith & Hancock, 1995). It has been the subject of
considerable debate. In spite of the differing opinions, some primary themes have
emerged in the literature in the last 15-20 years. Endsley (1995a) provided the most
widely cited model of dynamic decision-making. She described the core components of
SA as consisting of three levels. They are perception (level I), comprehension (level II)
and projection (level III). In addition, her model includes system/task factors and
individual factors that produce effects on the development of SA and thus the decisionmaking process.
System/task factors include system capabilities, interface design, stress and
workload, complexity and automation. Individual factors include the agent‘s goals,
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preconceptions/expectations, information-processing mechanisms, long term memory,
automaticity, experience, training and abilities. Endsley (2000a) acknowledged that SA
development is not just about acquiring information. She states that more data is not
equivalent to more useful information. The information must be found, sorted processed
and integrated. In Endsley‘s model, decision-making and the subsequent actions taken are
dependent on, but separate from perception, comprehension and projection. In cyclic
fashion, the development of SA leads to decisions, resulting in behaviors or actions, and
those actions subsequently result in feedback, which provides new perceptions.
In light of the complexity of the concept of SA, dissenting positions exist. Two
authors make the argument that Endsley‘s model doesn‘t completely capture exactly what
SA is, and how it is obtained. In an article that focuses more on the impact of the
environment, Smith and Hancock (1995) suggest that it is not just knowledge, but
behavior toward a certain goal that generates SA. In addition, they state that the agent‘s
perception-action cycle supports skilled performance and that the surrounding
circumstances determine the knowledge needed to accomplish the goal. This view makes
their concept of what SA is and how it develops, ―a more ecological approach‖ in that it
is more concerned with the agent-environment interaction (Smith & Hancock, 1995, p.
145). They suggest that SA is adaptive and externally directed. These authors reveal the
importance of the adaptability of the agent to the situation. I agree that the response to
conditions is critically important, however I disagree that Endsley‘s (1995a) model does
not consider it. In fact, the perceptions obtained in Endsley‘s model are obtained from the
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environment. However, the importance placed on the fact that the demands of the
surroundings drive the adaptation of the agent is acknowledged.
Bedny and Meister (1999) offer another conceptualization of SA, utilizing the
underpinnings of activity theory. They claim that Endsley‘s assertion of the independence
of the three-level SA core model is not operationally possible. Bedny and Meister suggest
that cognitive and psychic processes play a more important role than that assigned by
Endsley. Endsley places these functions in the information-processing mechanisms
section of her model, where they influence, but are outside of the core of SA. Bedny and
Meister (1999, p. 65) suggest that Endsley‘s model reduces the importance of the
―thinking processes‖ without which ―there can be no meaningful and dynamic
comprehension of the situation‖.
In an article evaluating these three views of SA development Stanton et al. (2001)
suggest that each of these perspectives has an important contribution to make and that the
root of the argument is whether SA is seen as a process or a product. Stanton and
colleagues state that Endsley along with Bedny and Meister are referring to the product of
SA development, whereas Smith and Hancock are referring to the process of
development. Each of these positions is important and adds to the whole of SA.
Some authors have suggested that the interdependence of product and process
requires that they be understood together and that separation is not possible. Patrick and
James (2004, p. 63) make this point when they say, ―attempting to separate processes
from products in a rigorous manner is not feasible…any useful understanding of SA has
to embrace not only a person‘s knowledge of a situation but also the processes
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responsible for producing such knowledge, which will depend on the situation and its
context.‖ In responding to misinterpretations of her model suggesting that she is focused
more on product and discounted process, Endsley (2004, p. 322) herself states that she
does not believe that ― an artificial line has been drawn stating that only one is important
or that they don‘t intricately affect each other.‖ So SA may necessarily include both
product and process. However, it may be that process is simply harder to measure
because of the complex cognitive and psychological processes involved. However, it has
been shown that even process can be considered in multiple ways.
The ways in which process has been framed have two main foci; the cognitive
processes used to develop and maintain SA and the process that an operator in a
particular context goes through to achieve it. Rousseau et al. (2004, p. 5) described the
difference in these two positions as being: ―Operator-focused‖ SA, which is concerned
with the ―cognitive processes supporting the production of the mental representation of
that information within the agent‖, and ―Situation-focused‖ SA which is concerned with
―mapping of the relevant information in the situation onto a mental representation of that
information within the agent.‖ The situation-focused type of SA is more domaindependent. This study is clearly domain-dependent. Accurate SA development is a
dynamic process that may lead to adequate SA, the product from which critical decisions
are made. The obvious complexity of the topic and the breadth of its applicability require
that SA be discussed among a variety of disciplines.
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Contextual Application of SA
An overview of the areas in which SA has been addressed is offered in order to
provide a contextual framework for uses of SA in the literature. Initially found mostly in
aviation literature, SA is finding its way into many other arenas, such as commercial and
military aviation, military troop operations and in business (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994;
Matthews, Strater & Endsley, 2004; Miller, 2006; See & Vidulich, 1997). A large part of
the research conducted and published concerning the development of SA as a
phenomenon has an aeronautics focus (Endsley, 1993; Endsley & Bolstad, 1994;
Endsley, 2000b; O‘Hare, 1997; Proctor, Panko & Donovan, 2002; See & Vidulich, 1997).
The emphasis has not been solely on SA needs in the sky, but on the ground, in terms of
ground control of air traffic (Esler, 2006). The literature is also replete with examples of
SA application and evaluation in military situations including those involving ground
troops, armed forces aviation and team situational awareness needs specifically with
respect to combat operations and training (Artman 1999; Artman, 2000; Eid et al., 2004;
Matthews et al., 2004; United States Coast Guard, 2007).
In the business sector SA has been applied as a risk management tool, a way of
handling corporate governance, and as means of responding to competition (Luzwick,
2000; Miller, 2006; Siemieniuch & Sinclair, 2008). SA information related to military
operations also includes business functions. Industry develops SA technologies for the
military, and this is reflected in news articles and product briefs (Lockheed-Martin, 2007,
McHale, 2006, Raytheon awarded, 2006). In terms of budget control, the Department of
Defense is equal to a Fortune 100 company and employees SA for defense acquisitions
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(Myers, 2007). Various other uses for SA can be found in the literature including
preparing and training police officers for the possible use of deadly force, operating
motor vehicles while using a cell phone and even SA with respect to utilizing the internet
(Ma & Kaber, 2005, Saus et al, 2006; You & Pekkola 2001).
Because of the technology boom, there is an increasing interest in technological
support for SA development. I have been privileged to work as a student with the creators
of a visual 3-D mapping tool, accentuated by many layers of information, which has been
developed in my home state. This program known as Virtual Alabama, was designed to
improve state wide SA for a variety of reasons to include disaster management (Norven
Goddard, personal communication, January, 2007). Other examples of high technology
application to SA are present in the literature including satellite navigation,
telecommunications, GPS and other wireless technologies (Garshnek, Shinchi & Burkle,
1998; Koudelka & Schrotter, 2006; Moss, Kaufman & Townsend, 2006; Oloufa, Ikeda &
Oda, 2003). In addition, unmanned aerial and ground robotic devices have been
employed in military and disaster situations (Adams, 2007; Feibush, Gagvani &
Williams, 2000; Rhea, 2004). The literature addresses unmanned aerial vehicle models
with application to multi-casualty scene management, and the utilization of real-time
video provided to incident commanders (Rodriguez et al, 2006). Testing has been done
with video cameras mounted on the helmets of hazardous materials first responders in an
effort to provide real-time video inside the scene to commanders who can remain safely
outside of the scene (McCurdy, Griswold & Lenert, 2005). These examples of technology
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not only offer hope for future application for SA needs, but also vastly increase the
amount of information that those responsible for SA must evaluate.
Grasping exactly what SA is, what technical and human factors may be at work,
and how SA may be put to use, is difficult. Knowing how SA has been assessed in the
past, helps provide direction for future research needs. To provide additional
understanding of this complex concept, an overview of how SA has been measured
follows.
Measurement of SA
An explanation of how SA has been previously measured generally, allows for
further framing of research needs concerning SA, provides a means of comparison in
terms of measured concepts, and provides support for the need for this study. SA has
been researched, but it has not been studied in the same way, in the same context, using
the methodology of this research study.
This section provides an overview of some ways that SA has been measured
generally and is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the individual cognitive
and psychological components of SA. The meanings of the complex concepts of
cognition such as long-term memory, spatial ability, pattern-matching, attention, stress,
workload ( Endsely 1995, Endsley, 2000, Smith & Hancock, 1995) and so called
―psychic processes‖ (Bedny & Meister, 1999, p. 65-66) such as reflexive functions
(goals, significance, motives, behavior) are not fully explained in the SA literature, but
incorporate ―many existing theories in the cognitive literature‖ for explanations (personal
communication, Mica Endsley, February 20, 2009). The purpose here is to suggest that
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SA has been measured in terms of product in many ways, but much less frequently in
terms of process. The fact that SA is seen as a process and a product is particularly
germane to SA measurement. The purpose of this study is to develop theory that is
situation-focused rather than operator-focused. Endsley states that the process of
achieving SA, what she calls situational assessment, is in her view, not the same as the
end product of situation awareness (2000a). This important point separates assessment
and awareness or process and product.
Flach (1995) would dismiss the ability to measure SA, by suggesting that the
concept itself is so elusive in terms of definition, as to make measuring it somewhat
superfluous. Flach states that one cannot appreciate the end result of SA by attempting to
understand isolated processing stages. The point is that the cognitive, psychic and other
mental modeling necessary is simply too complex to understand, and may differ person to
person. Those who see SA as a measurable product, even if occurring in a moment of
time, eventually proceed to measure what they believe to represent SA.
Three types of SA measurement have been discussed in the literature. These are
observer rating, subjective measures and direct measures (Pew, 2000). Each of these
types has both advantages and disadvantages. In some cases batteries of tests were used,
and in others, overall measures of SA were taken.
Aviation SA has commonly been studied in an effort to measure the end result of
SA, that is, the operator‘s knowledge and the use of that knowledge to make good
decisions. In a relatively early study measuring SA, Endsley (1993) utilized a
combination of unstructured interviews, goal-directed task analysis and structured
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questionnaires to assess SA requirements for pilots engaged in air-to-air combat. Subject
matter experts (SMEs), all former pilots were interviewed to determine what might
constitute good SA. Then through the review of over 175 simulated air-to-air combat
missions, a goal-directed task analysis was developed. The goal tree from the analysis
was then reviewed by the SMEs. From this information, a 278 item structured
questionnaire was developed, with an ordinal rating of 1-3 corresponding to, not
important, somewhat important, and very important for SA. Four distracter items were
developed that were not found to be critical in SA. Questionnaires were sent to 30 former
military pilots. Twenty surveys were returned. Findings revealed that what was
previously identified by the SMEs as important in SA, generally scored high in the
returned questionnaires. Many of the high-ranking items were those corresponding to
Endsley‘s three levels of SA. While this work was encouraging, some important
limitations were noted. There was no penalty for suggesting that everything was
important, and scoring everything high. The study also did not take into account the
temporal importance of information. Endsley described this concern as the fact that
―some elements are more important at sometimes‖ (1993, p. 166). The implication is that
some information would be more important to a pilot at some points in the mission, while
other information may be more important at other times. This idea suggests that there is a
temporal aspect to SA at any given time. This is an important theme.
Other studies, in keeping with the early focus on cognitive measurements as
determinants of SA achievement, looked at individual abilities through a battery of tests.
Endsley and Bolstad (1994), in attempting to determine individual differences in pilots,
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measured pilots‘ spatial abilities, memory, attention, perception and cognition. Subjects
were 25 former military pilots employed at Northrop at the time of the study. These
scores were then compared to a well-validated and reliable test of overall SA called the
Situational Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT). The SAGAT is an
example of a direct measurement technique, allowing for either real-time probes or freeze
probes. Evaluators can stop the simulation and administer questionnaires (freeze), or
conduct them in real-time within the on-going simulation. The comparison technique
used in this study allowed the authors to compare the individual batteries to an overall
assessment. In addition, since the pilots were assigned to teams, an ANOVA was
performed to ensure that the differences found were not related to the team to which
individuals were assigned. The team that participants were on did not significantly impact
each pilot‘s score. Battery scores were then compared to the SAGAT score. The authors
concluded that spatial and perceptual skills had particular importance to adequate SA
development and determined that some pilots were better at arriving at SA than others, all
variables considered. A strength of this study was that the authors were able to determine
which portions from the battery of tests had particular salience to SA development.
Additional studies have been aimed at recognizing the particular cognitive skills
responsible for a person‘s ability to develop and maintain SA. Cognitive abilities may be
improved by exposure. Some tests such as Work Observation Method by Activity Timing
(WOMBAT) have been used in clinical settings as well as aviation (Westbrook & Ampt,
2009). O‘Hare (1997) utilized computer-based, joystick panel testing using the
WOMBAT Situational Awareness and Stress Tolerance Test. Individuals were tested on
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pursuit tracking, pattern recognition, mental rotation, and working memory. Elite pilots,
based on predetermined operational definitions, scored significantly higher on these tasks
than other age and occupation matched individuals who did not meet the definition of
elite pilot. This may lend support to Endsley‘s finding, though not fully explained, that
some people are better at arriving at and maintaining SA than others. The study lacked
resolution as to whether or not these elite pilots had some innate SA ability, whether their
experience improved SA ability, or if both were true.
As Endsley (1995a) suggested in her model of SA, mental workload is a
systems/task component, the level of which can affect SA. Several studies have attempted
to ascertain the effect of mental workload in combat situations and determine whether or
not it can be sufficiently modeled. See and Vidulich (1997) utilized two different
subjective scales, the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT), and the
Situational Awareness Rating Techniques (SART) to determine ability to accurately
computer model the mental workload and level of SA in pilots. Workload, which in turn
affects SA development, was considered multi-sourced. The authors were attempting to
determine that computer modeling of mental workload could be validated. Outcomes
suggested that with peak workload effort, stress, understanding and SART rating were
significantly correlated. SWAT ratings were not correlated with overall workload or peak
workload. Therefore, understanding and SA may be reduced in the face of increased
workload, even if not subjectively reported. This was an example of multiple subjective
models being utilized. One of the weaknesses associated with subjective measures such
as the SART and SWAT, is the potential for biased self-reporting.
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In a more simplistic, yet tangible model, the operation of a motor vehicle and the
effect of using a cell phone were studied in terms of their combined effect on SA (Ma &
Kaber, 2005). In this study eighteen college students were recruited and randomly
assigned to a group who would utilize the automatic cruise control on the simulated car
and simultaneously have cell phone conversations, thereby increasing mental workload.
SA was measured using the SAGAT with respect to Endsley‘s three primary levels of
SA. As was hypothesized, under non-threatening driving conditions, the automatic cruise
control reduced workload and improved SA. The use of the cell phone was negatively
associated with SA. Further testing concerning mental workload has been accomplished
using both subjective mental workload assessments and physiologic measures such as
heart rate and videotaped eye movements. These measures can reveal physiologic
response, and patterns of perception and understanding respectively (Svensson,
Angelborg-Thanderz, Sjoberg, & Olsson, 1997).
SA is affected not only by the human factors involved, but also by the
technological interfaces employed by humans. As we move further into the age of
information and technology, research in this area advances. Sarter and Woods (1991)
suggest that there is insufficient research to suggest that increased automation is
somehow better for developing SA.
A study attempting to determine the effects of automation on air traffic control
functions found that automation was helpful in terms of the lower level functioning of
information acquisition and action implementation. However, automation increased
workload with respect to information analysis and decision-making (Kaber, Perry, Segall,
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McClernon & Prinzel, III, 2006). In this case, more information did not necessarily result
in better outcomes. This study seemed particularly significant because automation is
increasingly applied in our world today. Understanding its effects on SA development
and use provide beneficial information.
Included in these technological advances, are advances in SA measurement. In a
pair of papers, two authors looked at what is termed judgment analysis (Kirlik & Strauss,
2006; Strauss & Kirlik, 2006;). Advanced methods for experimenting with and
statistically analyzing the use of information for SA involving work environments and
technological interfaces, decision-making and in this case, judgment are offered.
Improved analysis may result in improved measurement, and thus better results. These
companion articles are heavily engineering geared, but offer new ways of considering the
breakdown of SA into measurable pieces.
Salmon, Stanton, Walker, and Green (2006) have used the term C4i to signify
large systems which may be in need of SA, such as the military, emergency services,
police and other large infrastructures. C4i stands for command, control, communication,
computers and intelligence and indicates the main components in providing for SA in
these large operations. This type of large-scale SA provides a tremendous challenge to
professionals known as human factors scientists. These researchers are typically
ergonomists and industrial engineers. More research in these areas will be helpful as to
what constitutes adequate SA for an individual pilot. However, this SA may not be the
same as that needed for a large manufacturing plant with heavy automation. Often these
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types of organizations require the assessment of SA on many fronts simultaneously and
with teams of people involved.
The measurement of team SA, a distinct version of SA that is highly utilized in
military and other large-scale operations, has been studied. In an example of an observer
rating method of evaluation, five shift teams from a nuclear control room were provided
with three different scenarios (Patrick, James, Ahmed & Halliday, 2006). Results were
videotaped and scored using a rating scale. Social interaction with team leader
coordination, planning, problem solving and contingency planning were all found to be
important factors in team SA. Communications was also found to affect the level of SA
development, with higher levels of effective communications resulting in higher scores.
Importance of verbal communication in team SA was also emphasized in a study by
Lampton et al (2005, p. 9) when they stated, ―Some of the best data for assessing SA,
decision-making, and leadership in team settings are also the least used‖. These studies
indicate the need for additional research concerning verbal team interactions in SA.
Measurement of SA after training can also improve cost effectiveness. Proctor et
al. (2002) discussed the cost effectiveness of team SA training in helicopter pilots
through the use of off the shelf PC gamers. The research involved two sets of helicopter
pilot volunteers, eight in Georgia, and twelve in Kentucky. A pre and post-test was
administered reflecting the needed knowledge for mission success for the team. After
training with a simple off the shelf device, results revealed a statistically significant
improvement for posttest assessment outcomes. In addition, there appeared to be
individual as well as team learning even though the training only involved team training.
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A study weakness was the small cohort and the lack of diversity with respect to
geographic location. However, this study revealed a novel and cost effective way to
improve SA in teams.
Observer rating, subjective assessment, direct measurement, or a combination of
these methods has typically measured SA. Each method has distinct strengths and
weaknesses. Subjective measures are inexpensive and easy to use, but have the limitation
of potentially biased self-report (Endsley, 1995b). Observer ratings are field friendly and
non-intrusive other than the possible impact of the observer (Salmon et al., 2006). Global
direct measures, those that measure overall understanding of a situation with specific
questions, are advantageous in that they directly measure SA and thus avoid the
difficulties of subjectivity and collection issues, but lack sensitivity to individual factors
because of the global nature of the measurement (Endsley, 1995a; Salmon et al., 2006).
This measurement section serves as a basic description of ways in which SA has been
viewed in terms of measurable factors. An explanation of healthcare delivery uses of SA
is provided next in order to further frame the current study, and provide support for its
need.
Healthcare Application of SA
Some literature was located that not only had a healthcare focus but was also
directly related to the intention of SA. While the words ―situational awareness‖ were not
necessarily in the title, terms were found in the introduction or abstract, or were clearly
related to public health surveillance and therefore were included in this review.
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The particular use of SA with respect to direct healthcare application tended to be
associated with the size and complexity of the organization utilizing it. Articles were
written from the perspective of either large-scale application and surveillance (Bradley,
Rolka, Walker & Loonsk, 2005; DeFraites & Chambers, 2007; Reis et al, 2007), or from
a smaller, more focused, unit-specific perspective (Bond & Cooper, 2006; Gaba, Howard
& Small, 1995; Levine, Meyer, Brzezinski, Robbins & Sanberg, 2005). The literature in
this area was virtually all descriptive or literature review in nature.
Two articles were located regarding overall surveillance with respect to SA. One
study discussed a program introduced by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) concerning national biosurveillance, called Biosense (Bradley et al., 2005). A
description was provided including its purpose which was the collection of real-time data
from government treatment centers such as Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals and
from one of the major laboratory services providers, Labcorp. When syndrome-type
conditions are reported in clusters, or requests for lab tests suggest a concentration of
these conditions, Biosense is able to analyze and integrate that data. The information is
collected at a Biointelligence Center at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). This information is obviously very helpful for national SA with respect to
Biosurveillance.
Massachusetts has implemented a similar state level program. It is called the
Automated Epidemiological Geotemporal Integrated Surveillance (AEGIS) system (Reis
et al., 2007). This initiative is similar to Biosense, but receives reports only from
―participating‖ facilities (Reis et al, 2007, p. 281). As with Biosense, AGEIS will be
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helpful with respect to state-level SA in terms of biosurveillance, but is limited to those
facilities that choose to be involved.
The Department of Defense (DOD) performed an exercise concerning avian flu
pandemic outbreak using standard military architecture, their current level of capability,
and a management system designed for users within the community (DeFraites &
Chambers, 2007). The platform provided geographical information, medical information
such as, unit readiness, personnel and bed status, critical supplies information along with
epidemiological information, patient tracking and environmental conditions. The scenario
concerned an outbreak of avian flu in Thailand and those displaced in Thailand, the
United States, and Singapore. This exercise is an example of application to a very largescale SA need. It is limited to military infrastructure and limited in scope in terms of the
event. The most helpful aspect of the study was the fact that avian flu is a (potentially)
highly propogatable situation, increasing the scope of the needed awareness.
Literature also provided three examples of SA requirements applicable to
healthcare that were very situation and setting specific. Gaba et al. (1995) applied the
concept of SA to the practice of anesthesiology. Anesthesiology is a high risk healthcare
service and requires physicians, nurses and other healthcare providers to have a shared
awareness of patients under their care. These authors applied the principles of an
anesthesiology decision-making model to provide overall SA in a particular medical
situation. This article provided support for application to healthcare settings. Gaba and
colleagues applied SA knowledge to several case situations and made further
recommendations concerning how SA could be applied more readily to anesthesiology
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through case review, real-time observation, and simulation and briefing techniques
among physicians and nurses.
Levine et al. (2005) made the case that team situational awareness in the operating
room could be improved through the use of complete data capture, integrated data
displayed and augmented team vigilance and decision-making. A large screen displaying
data in a room would allow viewing of the data from particular vantage points that would
not be possible with current surgical draping procedures. Though primarily concerning
decision-making models, Bond and Cooper (2006) determined that critical healthcare
decision-making, including decisions by nursing staff was affected by the level of SA.
Brooks and Thomas (1997) used content analysis to advance King‘s Interacting
Systems Framework by beginning the explication of their own theory called Brooks‘
Theory of Intrapersonal Perceptual Awareness. In this work, the authors showed that
perception and judgment interact in a way that affects decision-making in nursing care.
This study provides additional insight of how the phenomenon of SA may impact nursing
care. One major notable difference between Brooks and Thomas‘ study and this one, is
the experience level of those being studied. While these authors were studying senior
baccalaureate nursing students, who have little experience, this project studied
experienced healthcare responders.
Contrast of large-scale SA needs and the more limited scope of situation specific
articles allowed a view of SA from two extremes, thus providing additional
understanding of the breadth of the potential information, systems requirements,
technology and personnel potentially involved in SA development. This provided a

36
broader understanding of the meaning of SA, which was particularly helpful in an
exploratory study such as the one conducted.
Multi-Casualty Incidents and Scene-Specific SA
Multi-casualty scene SA development was chosen as the area of focus because it
was important in its own right and also is the most fundamental aspect of the application
of SA to disaster preparedness that is a part of my research trajectory. Understanding how
SA develops initially is critical not only to an eventual understanding of larger scale
events, but also to an appreciation of the difference between field-level and upper-level
managers‘ SA needs. Only one article was found in which the combination of situational
awareness and either multi-casualty or mass casualty appeared in the title (Demchak et
al., 2006). However, terms that are keyed in alone like mass casualty, multi-casualty,
casualty, triage, scene management, scene size-up and disaster are salient to this topic.
Therefore using those keywords additionally in the search engines for this section of the
review allowed for the location of many articles, some of which were particularly helpful.
However, the fact that an emerging concept like SA and the terms mass or multi-casualty,
did not appear in literature titles together indicated the need for further research in this
area.
Multi-casualty or mass casualty scene management with regard to SA is sparsely
found in the literature but there are articles that incorporate portions of what an
understanding of SA from the field may require. Therefore issues related to field level SA
in multi-casualty incidents may have salience to the larger concept of SA.
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Many concepts that are possible pieces of the field-level SA picture are located in
literature. These include triage and communications (Johnson & Calkins, 1999), and
patient distribution (Zoraster et al., 2007). Zoraster and colleagues determined that
victims from a mass casualty incident were sent to different hospitals in basically
equivalent numbers regardless of their acuity, indicating the lack of matching hospital
capability to patient condition. Johnson and Calkins (1999) mention that multiple
communicators from the scene, and lack of clarity in terms of patient numbers and types
led to only 38% accuracy in pre-hospital triage information. This article raises the
concern that what and how information in the field is developed can be problematic. The
authors were physicians who did not work in the field and may not understand some of
the implications for the measures they used. For example, multiple communicators meant
that more than one person from the scene was providing information. As higher-level
commanders arrive at a multi-casualty scene, they may take over communications, which
may be a completely acceptable practice, yet result in confusion on the part of those
receiving communications from the field. The incidents that were reviewed were termed
―small mass casualty incidents (MCIs)‖, meaning that they were mass casualty incidents
involving 3-50 people. It may not be reasonable to term an incident involving three
people ―mass‖ casualty, even with the ―small‖ qualifier.
Another part of the SA puzzle especially with regard to high casualty numbers, is
patient tracking. Alm, Gao and White (2006), researchers at Johns Hopkins University,
have developed a GPS aided electronic triage tag that will track the patient after triage,
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even if he or she leaves the scene on their own. This could be helpful in tracking patient
information as a part of SA.
Some studies referring to field-level incidents use the word ―scene‖ to signify the
area involved in the incident indicating location of patients, damage as a result of the
incident, treatment and adjacent areas such as landing zones and staging areas
(Augustine, 2006, Cotter, 2006, Limmer et al., 2006). Much data may be taken in or
acquired concerning the scene including visual and auditory cues, communication, victim
and worker safety, triage, treatment and personnel consideration. While victim safety and
care is a top priority, worker safety is also important. Limmer et al. (2006) reported that
more public health providers die in the line of duty related to heart attack and traffic
accidents than violence. However, these authors also reported an exception in 2001, when
the World Trade Centers were attacked and many emergency responders perished in that
one incident.
In a particularly pertinent article, Augustine (2006, p. 1) discusses ―organization‖
of the scene. In this example, organizing represents what has been referred to as the
process, while organization represents the product of situational awareness. The findings
addressed in this section lend support to the need to develop SA as a process.
Even dispatchers require good SA to do their jobs. Blandford and Wong (2004),
extended scene SA to include the assistance that dispatchers can provide due to being free
to focus their attention on what is happening on the scene, without being directly
involved in the scene operations. They suggest that there is a mental model that consists
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of static information that does not change but is applied to a changing dynamic
environment.
The literature concerning multi-casualty incidents has been non-specific defining
field-level multi-casualty incidents and how SA is developed. Studies conducted have
dealt with parts of SA. However, they have failed thus far to determine the integrated
process for SA.
Summary
This literature review serves to frame the knowledge that was used to approach
the problem of how SA develops in multi-casualty situations. Because of this study‘s
methodology, it was not intended to lead to prescribed hypotheses, but to inform the
research. Conceptual and theoretical traditions with regard to SA, the contexts in which it
has been employed in the literature and a review of how the complex phenomenon of SA
has been measured in the past, have been discussed. Examples of SA literature that is
healthcare specific and information concerning the literature gap with regard to SA and
multi-casualty incidents were offered.
I believe that Auf der Heide (2006, p. 34) said it best when he stated, ―Knowledge
based on systematically collected data from field disaster research studies might help
planners avoid common disaster management pitfalls, thereby improving disaster
response planning.‖ The methodology chosen for this study is that of grounded theory.
Endsley (1995a, p. 60) one of the most prolific writers concerning SA, although she
appears to be nearly an exclusively quantitative researcher, suggested that, ―Research is
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also needed to better understand the processes operators use to achieve SA.‖ Her own
comments suggest that grounded theory may be helpful in determining how SA develops.
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CHAPTER THREE

Methodology
Much more is known about SA as a product than as a process, mostly because the
product is more readily measured. The product of SA can be considered a particular
amount and/or type of information being known to the operator at a given point in time.
On the other hand, the process utilized for developing SA is thought to be primarily
cognitive. This is what Bedny & Meister (1999, p. 65) termed the ―thinking processes‖ of
SA. The product of SA has been tested using self-report, observational and direct
measures mostly in aviation models (Jones, 2000). The process on the other hand seems
to have undergone little measurement. Neither the product nor the process is sufficiently
covered in the literature with regard to the domain of multi-casualty incidents. Therefore,
the lack of knowledge in this domain with regard to emergency preparedness is notable
and guided the need for this study. The purpose of this study was to discover and
explicate substantive theory concerning the process individual emergency responders use
to develop and maintain SA in field-level MCI.
The choice of grounded theory methodology for this research project was driven
by many factors. Among them were the requirements for obtaining the evidence sought,
what is and is not known about the phenomenon, the philosophical foundations of the
method, and the moral and professional responsibility to perform the research. Consistent
with grounded theory methodology are the inclusion criteria for participants, along with
methods for recruiting participants, the methods for obtaining and analyzing data, and
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maintenance of rigor. I will cover each of these aspects of this research project in this
chapter.
Not only is a theory of SA in MCI needed, but also because SA, the process, is
fundamental to SA the product, the methodology of grounded theory was selected.
Grounded theory is a good fit for determining process (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory
means that the findings of the study are ―grounded‖ in the data collected. In this case,
data include interviews of participants, field notes and memos. Grounded theory is both
rigorous research and because of theoretical sensitivity, ―fluid‖, ―dynamic‖, ―flexible and
driven by insight gained through interaction with the data‖ (Corbin & Straus, 2008, p.12).
The Corbin and Strauss (2008) method was utilized, with additional perspective
on the process of grounded theory offered by Charmaz (2006). These two approaches are
different but complementary. In Corbin and Strauss‘ (2008, p. 9) book, The Basics of
Qualitative Research, Corbin comments on her appreciation of how Charmaz has,
―applied postmodernist and postconstructivist paradigms to grounded theory
methodology.‖ Charmaz brought a unique focus to grounded theory by conceptualizing
it in terms of modern thinking (Juliet Corbin, personal communication, April 1, 2008).
This is additionally important in that the latest book by Corbin & Strauss (2008) is less
focused on the idea that qualitative research must end in theory, although they continue to
suggest that it certainly may.
Charmaz (2006) offers additional perspective which was of benefit to me. For
example, Charmaz (2006, p. 57) suggested the intermediate step of ―focused‖ coding,
which assisted with managing the most ―significant or frequent earlier codes, to sift
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through large amounts of data.‖ The additional step of focused coding not employed by
Corbin and Strauss, helped bridge the gap between ―breaking data apart‖ (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008, p. 195) and the need to ―put it back together again by relating those
concepts.‖ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 198)
Theoretical Sensitivity
A critical aspect of qualitative research is the ability of the researcher to add
insight to the study through his/her own unique view. It is the sensitivity of the researcher
to subtle cues in the data that create what Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 41) referred to as
―theoretical sensitivity‖. The researcher illuminates the data and explicates the meaning
found therein by becoming an instrument in the analytic process. My involvement in
many types of healthcare delivery environments, including providing care after MCIs,
provided the basis for my theoretical sensitivity.
Theoretical sensitivity may be found in such sources as literature and life
experiences, both personal and professional. Literary and experiential exposures provide
background and a frame of reference from which to view the data. However, it is equally
important that the researcher avoid imposing his/her own view of experiences on the data.
Bracketing is one way to avoid this situation. The balance necessary for accurate
assessment of the data is also maintained by interacting with the data, maintaining
healthy skepticism and considering categories, hypotheses and questions provisional until
they are truly ―played against the actual data‖ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 45).
I became interested in SA development in a way that has coupled my professional
experiences with my doctoral studies. My first experiences in the healthcare field were as
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an emergency medical technician (EMT), and later a paramedic in emergency medical
services (EMS). As I worked daily, I cared for many people in various circumstances,
many times working on multi-casualty scenes involving car accidents, assaults,
shootings, stabbings, and the plethora of typical medical calls that EMS personnel
encounter such as the exacerbations of heart and respiratory conditions, diabetes, seizures
and many other medical situations. Having an appreciation of the clinical aspects of
patient care was certainly necessary, but insufficient alone. More information was
needed. I was occasionally in the unpleasant position of being in some degree of danger
myself due to car fires, flying debris from extrication procedures and even the occasional
threat to my safety from the intentional act of some other person. Patients themselves
may be in danger even after rescuers have arrived, due to fires, equipment utilized for
extrication, threats from those with whom they may have been involved in a previous
confrontation, and for many other reasons. Although I did not always acknowledge it as
such, this contextual awareness is what has been referred to by Endsley (2000a, p. 5) as
―knowing what is going on around you‖.
I learned about such concepts such as triage, patient disposition, scene safety and
others. Even though I had over seven years experience in EMS service to apply those
concepts and hone my skills, I never really considered them to be one continuous
information-processing technique. Rather, I saw them as many small assessments and
decisions that happened to be linked together. When, for example, we declared a scene
safe and began caring for those on the scene, I knew that at any moment the scene could
become unstable. However, my attention was no longer focused on initial scene
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assessment, because that had been accomplished. My attention was focused on the next
bit of information processing necessary in order to care for those in need. In the years I
spent in EMS, I never recalled hearing the term ―situational awareness‖ used. We were
simply making a series of decisions necessary to control an out of control situation in the
lives of a person or persons. These experiences informed my research.
Later, I continued in healthcare as a nurse working in intensive care units (ICU),
and the emergency department (ED). The circumstances in these settings differed from
the EMS setting in many ways. It was certainly a more controlled environment. However,
the intensity of information processing and the use of multiple pieces of data to make
decisions that were critical to health remained. Situations that must be handled properly
and are critical, require the rapid retrieval, review and processing of information to be
used for decision-making. Working as a nurse simply forced my information-processing
concerns to change with the situation, but did not allow them to be disregarded. Yet, it
was not until I was a hospital nursing educator that I heard the term nursing would
seemingly embrace for taking accurate information and making good decisions in
nursing--critical thinking. Critical thinking carried with it a very clinically focused
connotation. But many factors contribute to the environment in which patient care is
delivered. These factors then contribute to over-all SA.
As a nurse educator at a healthcare facility and as a faculty member at a
university, I found that the educational needs of nurses varied. Some were new nurses
and required orientation to the hospital and unit to which they were assigned, fire safety,
and other basic education and training. In other cases nurses needed advanced training
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such as: Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS); Pediatric Advanced Life Support
(PALS); monitoring of critical equipment such as pulmonary artery catheters, intra-aortic
balloon pumps; twelve-lead electrocardiogram interpretation; and other function-specific
education and training. Therefore, assessing which nurses needed what type of training to
operate safely was another example of understanding the information needed in a given
set of circumstances.
Finally, during my doctoral studies at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in
the Homeland Security Nursing program, I was privileged to have been provided the
opportunity to work on a unique program designed specifically to improve SA on a state
level. A cooperative program between the Alabama Department of Homeland Security
and the United States Space and Rocket Center was developed to be used by emergency
managers on a statewide basis for all types of information gathering and decisionmaking. This unique and the first of its kind in the country initiative is called Virtual
Alabama, or Virtu-Al. It‘s most obvious use, though certainly not program limiting, is
improved coordination among jurisdictions in an emergency event. The program is based
on a purchased Google Earth platform, onto which higher resolution imagery is stitched.
This improves resolution of images dramatically.
Other important information has subsequently been layered into the program
including flood plains, video of the inside of critical infrastructure, connectivity with realtime traffic cameras, 3-D sketch-ups for virtual building tours and many others. I have
spent many hours learning about the system, assisting with implementation and even
being present during presentations to Alabama state departments and officials of other
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states who are interested in possible implementation in their own jurisdiction. I assisted
with the presentation of the program to a particular emergency preparedness group. I
continue to be involved in the Virtual Alabama program and it has been a catalyst to my
appreciating the need for improved SA in many situations and on many different
hierarchical levels. The opportunity to work on this initiative provided to me in the
Homeland Security Nursing program, along with my specific healthcare background and
interests were germane in my decision to conduct this study.
I have completed a fundamental course in qualitative methods that included a
grounded theory project. I have met with the grounded theory group on the University of
Tennessee campus, and met personally with the grounded theory specialist at the
university. The specialist agreed to mentor my research project, and I took actual research
transcripts for analysis to the grounded theory group that meets at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville, College of Nursing. In addition, one of the foremost grounded
theory experts in the nation, Juliet Corbin, reviewed some of my data to offer insight,
direction, and help improve my skill as a researcher. These experiences have shaped my
interest in SA, provided me with a high level of theoretical sensitivity for the domain and
the subject in this study, and improved my skill as a researcher.
The Philosophical Underpinnings
Philosophically, grounded theory is driven by pragmatism and symbolic
interactionism. The writings of John Dewey and George Meade concerning philosophical
pragmatism have heavily influenced the epistemology of grounded theory (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008). Grounded theory is also based on symbolic interactionism, because the
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meaning that something has for a particular person impacts their view of and interaction
with it (Blumer, 1969). Naturalistic inquiry is beneficial in attempting to determine a
particular process that occurs in naturally occurring human experience (Zsambok &
Klein, 2007). Each of these concepts will be discussed in this section as they pertain to
grounded theory methodology.
Pragmatism
Pragmatism states that knowledge and practice are both critical for the
advancement of science. This philosophical viewpoint does not recognize practice-based
knowledge over contemplative, but the need for both in solving practical problems. An
excellent representation of this point is found in a footnote quote from John Dewey‘s The
Quest for Certainty (1929), where he states:

In reaction against the age-long depreciation of practice in behalf of
contemplative knowledge, there is a temptation simply to turn things upside
down. But the essence of pragmatic instrumentalism is to conceive of both
knowledge and practice as a means of making goods—excellencies of all kinds—
secure in experienced existence.

Dewey (1929, p. 106) suggests that there are problems with accepting
―knowledge‖ (experimental science) as being ―superior to practical activity.‖ Dewey‘s
point was not that practice is superior to knowledge, but that both are necessary. Charmaz
(2006, pp. 6-7) commenting on the development of the original grounded theorists
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Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, claims that it was the marriage of Glaser‘s ―Columbia
University positivism‖ which was grounded in empiricism, with Strauss‘ ―Pragmatism
informed symbolic interactionism‖ that led to what grounded theory was in its initial
development.
Practice as an activity can lead to discovery. As Corbin & Strauss (2008, pp. 2-3)
said, ―Typically the activity is precipitated by a problematic situation.‖ Therefore,
philosophical pragmatism supports the selection of research design that is most well
suited, and therefore ―pragmatic‖ under the particular circumstances being studied. The
conclusion is made that pragmatism supports the idea that knowledge based on the
experimental model is important for informing practice, but equally, that evidence found
in daily practice informs and constitutes research as well.
Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic Interactionism supports and combines with pragmatism to further
inform grounded theory and claims that human beings act toward things on the basis of
the meaning it holds for them (Blumer, 1969). Further, the meanings that things have for
human beings are ―derived from‖ and ―modified through an interpretive process with the
objects or ideals they encounter‖ (Blumer, 1969, p. 2). Meanings may be acted on in
many ways, but without context, meaning is meaningless. Corbin and Strauss (2008),
state that to avoid a cycle of absolute relativism, one must accept the assumption that
knowledge gained is temporal, applicable to a given point in time, and may not hold true
in the future. Therefore, by studying action and interaction in daily contextual meanings,
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one can increase the epistemology of a particular field or discipline for some unspecified
period of time.
Where human interaction takes place as part of the research, then context, and
thus interaction, matters. Since that is the case in this study, the problem was viewed
through a lens of interactionism. When contextually-based human-to-human interaction is
being studied, interactionism carries a necessary set of assumptions and is especially
critical in highly charged environments, where meaning has ultimate importance.
Naturalistic Inquiry
Since one of the basic premises of this project is that context matters, naturalistic
inquiry was appropriate for the study. Naturalistic inquiry dictates that the data is
collected in or at least concerns the natural setting in which the happenings occurred.
Much work done concerning decisions made in highly stressful environments, has
utilized cognitive task analysis. (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006: Zsambok & Klein,
1997). Klein (1998) developed the recognition-primed decision-making (RPD) model
which he used for high stakes decisions made by experienced providers in uncertain
conditions. However, a difference between this study and Klein‘s work is that the effort
here concentrated on the information development phase, rather than the resulting
decisions. Naturalistic inquiry informed this project because data was collected
concerning actual high stakes events.
For this study, the focus was process. Therefore, grounded theory was a good fit.
Process involves and represents action, interaction, and emotion in a given set of
circumstances. It also involves ―individual‘s, organization‘s, and group‘s ability to give
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meaning to and respond to problems and/or shape the situations‖ that are being studied
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 98). Processes and sub-processes were reviewed, categories
established and theoretical integration undertaken. Theoretical integration provided an
overall unifying explanatory theme that constituted the eventual substantive theory.
Theory development concerning the process by which individuals develop and maintain
SA was the focus of the study.
In summary, grounded theory was pragmatically applied to the highly
contextually-based problem of developing SA in MCI. The process required human-to
human interaction, used derived meanings and had the potential for dire outcome. SA
was used by responders to work toward a successful resolution to a significant problem.
Grounded theory as an inductive methodology, offered the best means of understanding
the process. While each participant‘s SA experience is unique, there was sufficient
collective commonality of experience to identify the process.
Moral and Professional Responsibility
Nurses and other healthcare providers have a moral responsibility to carry out
research that will benefit public health. In an age of devastating natural disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina and terrorist attacks such as that carried out on September 11, 2001 at
the World Trade Centers, research improving planning and response efforts is no longer
in the margins. It is a timely and necessary area of inquiry and there is a moral
responsibility for those who are qualified, to act to improve response efforts. Although
there have been claims that the devastating incidents previously mentioned could not
have been foreseen, so planning for them was impossible, we now know that these
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incidents probably will occur again on the United States mainland and around the world.
Therefore, planning and response efforts must be improved and will require solid
research upon which to build.
Nursing has a tradition of meeting the healthcare needs of society and nurses are
in a unique position to impact many areas of healthcare. Emergency preparedness is one
such arena. While many non-nurses constituted a major portion of the participants in this
study, the fact that nurses are the largest single healthcare provider in terms of numbers,
makes it critical that emergency preparedness clinical response as well as management
and planning be placed clearly within the purview of nursing.
Definition of Multi-Casualty Incidents
Many different situations, such as motor vehicle accidents, shootings, assaults,
chemical exposures, fires and others can cause multiple individuals to become victims.
This type of incident may be termed a multi-casualty incident (MCI) because multiple
people can be harmed at once as a result of one incident, or several close time-related
incidents. The development of SA in multi-casualty incidents is very important in its own
right. A full appreciation of how SA develops in this setting could improve multi-casualty
incident response for many daily occurrences. Because multi-casualty incidents are in a
sense the micro version of a community disaster an understanding of multi-casualty
incident SA may in some way inform future research involving larger scale incidents.
Many organizations discuss the need for preparedness with regard to multicasualty incidents. The problem is getting a clear definition of what it is. Further
compounding the confusion is the use of the term, mass casualty incident in place of, or
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interchangeably with, multi-casualty incidents. Some writers use the acronym MCI,
which is the acronym for both multi-casualty incidents and mass-casualty incidents.
Unless the writer is very clear, the reader may be unsure of which terminology is being
used, and the intent of its use. For example, the CDC has a web page that discusses mass
casualty incidents but does not provide a definition of the term (Mass Casualty Event
Preparedness and Response, 2008). The writers of the book entitled, Advanced Disaster
Life Support, use the acronym ―MCI‖ on page 2 of chapter 1, without ever having even
defined the acronym (American Medical Association, 2004, pp. 1-2). It is not clear
whether they mean mass, or multi-casualty and how many victims are being inferred.
The word ―mass‖ intuitively seems to indicate a higher number of anything than
the word ―multi‖, a fraction of the word, multiple. On a web site designed to assist with
triage of multiple victims called JumpSTART (Simplified START/Jumpstart algorithms,
2008), there is a page that defines mass-casualty incidents as having multiple levels
depending on the number of victims. These levels follow: Level 1 = 5-10 victims, Level 2
= 11-20 victims, Level 3 = 21-100 victims, Level 4 = 101-1000 victims, Level 5 = over
1000 victims. An article by Johnson and Calkins (1999, p. 148), calls an incident with
between 3 and 50 victims a ―small mass-casualty incident.‖ It is clear that there is not
agreement on what constitutes a mass-casualty, or multi-casualty incident.
Neither of these definitions sufficed for my purposes. The range of potential
experiences with regard to these numbers was too broad. For example, using the Johnson
and Calkins (1999) definition indicates that 3 victims, or up to 50 victims, constitutes a
similar experience. While these numbers are admittedly pragmatic in terms of simple
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definitions, they were not sufficient to provide any consistency for the purposes of
research. Three is not a mass event, and neither is 50 a small event, yet both fit into
Johnson and Calkins definition of small mass-casualty.
Clarity is critical concerning my use of the term ―multi-casualty incident‖. The
definition needed to offer enough flexibility to provide for theoretical sampling, and yet
enough delimitation to avoid a large degree of ambiguity. Therefore, for the purposes of
this research study, the following definition applied:

A multi-casualty incident (MCI) will consist of an incident occurring outside of a medical
facility that produces physical injury to between 2 and 25 people.

This definition was not designed to discount the psychological injury that may
occur in an MCI, but to suggest that it may be more difficult to quantify, and therefore
was beyond the scope of this definition. It is also noted that if one has sustained physical
injury, one may also have sustained psychological injury, and they are not viewed as
mutually exclusive. These two types of ―injuries‖ may co-exist.
Conceptual Definition of SA in MCI
Following the review of the literature and after considering the view of SA from
the perspective of a healthcare provider, a conceptual definition was developed to provide
a basic understanding of SA in MCI prior to conducting the study. It was expected that
the definition would be refined based on the study findings. The definition is as follows:
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SA is the ability to accurately identify, perceive and comprehend the multi-source,
relevant information pertaining to a particular emergency event or series of events,
thereby producing the ability to mitigate current conditions and/or project future impact
sufficient to facilitate effective action in planning for or responding to, public health and
safety needs.
Participant Inclusion Criteria
Participant inclusion criteria for this study were:
1. Healthcare workers trained to at least the emergency medical technician (EMT)
level at the time of the incident that they chose to convey.
2. Those who have responded to an MCI in the field.
3. Those with at least one year of experience.
4. English speaking and at least 18 years of age.
5. Those willing to discuss an MCI to which they responded.
The participants for this project were drawn from the community of healthcare
providers who have responded to multi-casualty incidents in the field. The participant
pool included responders to multi-casualty scenes, who were trained to at least the basic
Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) level. Included in the study were firefighters who
were cross-trained medical providers, EMTs, paramedics who were trained to beyond the
EMT level, nurses, and a physician who responded to field-level scenes. They were all
from the southeast region of the United States.
There was no requirement with regard to the time that elapsed since the
occurrence of the emergency response that the participant chose to convey. Flashbulb
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memory research suggests that important and powerful memories are typically recalled
well by those who find an event in some way distinctive (Edery-Halpern & Nachson,
2004). While Marsh (2007) suggests that the retelling of a story may be impacted by the
social context in which occurred, grounded theorists accept this and acknowledge that
participants ―construct meanings and actions in specific situations‖ and therefore study
―how‖ and ―why‖ this occurs (Charmaz, 2006, p. 130). It was felt that limiting what
participants may discuss, could have the effect of mitigating the richness of the findings
and was therefore avoided.
If the response the participant conveyed occurred many years before the
interview, technologies may have changed in some fundamental ways and these were
pursued with the participant for clarity. However, it was felt that the overall situationfocused theory was not affected in ways that would lessen the usefulness of the theory for
current responders.
Participants were not required to be currently active in emergency response work.
However, only one participant was no longer an emergency responder. In this case, the
responder‘s departure from field-level healthcare delivery had occurred just months
before the interview for this study.
Those who have less than one year of experience would provide additional
variation in terms of their approach to SA development. However, I chose to exclude
them to avoid their complete lack of response experience. In highly charged
environments, circumstances may simply overwhelm the novice provider, who may in

57
any event be in an assistive or probationary role, and may be less exposed to the innerworkings of the scene.
Literature is available that address not only highly stressful conditions of fieldlevel providers (Federico, 1995; Klein, 1998; Klein, 1993), but that also discusses how
experienced nurses might make decisions and utilize intuition in doing so (Benner, 2001;
Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993). While these authors‘ writings are extremely
informative, and have value for this study, they focus on the decision-making process
rather than the information development and processing that is the focus of this theory
development study and so were of very limited value in determining what experiential
level of provider should be included. There was no upper limit placed on experience.
Theoretical sampling for experiential level and professional discipline was carried out.
Theoretical sampling was used to provide variation in the participant pool, to
avoid premature closure of the process and insure saturation of categories. Variation
theoretically sampled for included; experience level in years, context of the incident
conveyed, the professional discipline of the provider and whether providers were
volunteer or paid personnel. Theoretically sampling for professional discipline was
particularly important in this study because nurses are a minority in terms of emergency
response, and having their view represented in the data, while avoiding overrepresentation, was critical to me as a nurse. Theoretically sampling in these ways,
provided means ―to identify those variables that make the difference in finding as much
variation as possible‖ (personal communication, Juliet Corbin, June 8, 2009).
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To avoid blunting the full saturation of any uncovered concepts, it was not only
the experience of the seasoned, well-equipped provider that was sought, but also those
with less training and equipment. Many responding personnel were from agencies with
varying resources. Some were from volunteer agencies where no remuneration was
provided for the services rendered. I felt it was critical to capture these variations within
the sample. The allowable experiential level ranged from a well-compensated and trained
paramedic responder with thirty or more years of experience to that of a volunteer EMT
with one year on the job, to a nurse responding as part of a flight crew. The sample of
participants allowed for sufficient variation providing rich data with fully saturated
categories.
The experiences analyzed were those occurring outside of a healthcare facility.
This response requirement was intended to capture the nature of emergency response that
typically occurs where there are not trained personnel ready to handle the situation. This
permitted looking inside the process of grasping a situation totally out of control and
bringing it under control.
Participants were asked to convey the story of a particular emergency response
effort to which they responded. The memories and experiences shared by the participants
may have reflected conceptual discussions or even actual references to other events.
While general references to other events that may have shaped their frame of reference of
SA were permitted, attempts were made to prevent participants from blatantly discussing
incidents of scale larger or smaller than the MCI criteria required in this study. To
prevent contamination of the data, responders were informed in the preliminary stages of
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recruitment about the research criteria, were redirected during the interview if clear
reference to incidents of scale other than that which met criteria were discussed and the
extraneous information was isolated in the transcript and excluded from analysis.
Participant Enrollment
Fifteen participants were recruited through the process of word of mouth
communication, flyers placed in regional EMS stations, fire stations, flight crew
headquarters and through personal contacts by the researcher (see Appendix A). The
researcher‘s contact information was provided on the flyer so that those interested could
contact the researcher. Potential participants were spoken to by phone, in person or by
email and were provided a verbal explanation concerning the purpose of the study and
their involvement. In the event that the person was interested in learning more or
participating in the study, a personal meeting was arranged. At this meeting, having
received a complete explanation of the implications of their participation, potential
participants were free to choose whether or not to participate. They were also advised that
they were free to change their mind about their decision regarding participation at any
time. Initial contacts resulted in some snowballing in participation. I also received oral
and written support for the research study from emergency response supervisors in the
area and I attend the local emergency planning committee meetings, which provided
additional opportunities for making contacts and obtaining participants.
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Data Collection and Analysis
Data Collection
One pilot interview was conducted for the purposes of trialing the semi-structured
questions, providing researcher experience and identifying other possible interview
questions. Following the interview, field notes were written and the transcript was coded.
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Tennessee approved the study
(Appendix B). Data collection continued from September 2008 through January 2009.
Data analysis occurred during data collection and continued after collection was
complete, until theory development was complete.
In grounded theory, concept saturation determines sample size. It was anticipated
that as few as 12 and as many as 30 participants would be required. Saturation of
concepts was achieved at 15 total participants. Data were managed using the qualitative
software program NVivo 8 ®.
Face to face digitally recorded interviews which ranged from just under 30
minutes to over an hour, constituted the bulk of the data analyzed. Participants were
provided a detailed research information sheet that explained the research and their
potential participation (see Appendix C). The participant had the opportunity to ask
questions, and have any concerns addressed. Participants‘ questions concerning the study
and their involvement were answered to their satisfaction and confirmed on the digital
audio recording.
Having had their questions or concerns addressed, and upon agreement to be
included in the study, written informed consent was obtained by signature (Appendix D),
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and the participant was asked the complete a basic demographic sheet (Appendix E). The
data collected from the demographic questionnaire were reviewed, analyzed and
compiled in table form in the findings section. Participants were provided with a copy of
the information sheet and a copy of the informed consent form. Participants were
informed of their right to discontinue the interview or their participation in the project at
any time. One consent form was given to the participant; the other signed consent form
was maintained by the researcher. A file that includes the signed consent forms, the
demographic sheets and the participant identities is maintained in a locked file cabinet in
the locked single-user office of the researcher. Data will be saved according to the
policies of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
Interviews were conducted in a location convenient for the participant. The
participant‘s home or the researcher‘s offices were most commonly used. A few
interviews were conducted at an office belonging to the participant. To avoid
interruption, the interviews were conducted at times when the participant would not be
required to respond to an actual emergency. I also insured that the environment was quiet
and encouraged the interviewee to make all possible arrangements to avoid interruption
during the interview. The data was saved as transcripts containing no identifying
information and in the NVivo 8® program on the researcher‘s password protected office
and personal laptop computer to provide backup of the data.
The transcribed interview text served as the primary data. Participants were
instructed to be honest and forthright to avoid the potential impact of social desirability
on the data, and therefore, the findings. To protect the confidentiality of each participant,
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only the researcher has a list of participants, and this information is maintained separately
from the data. The participant was asked for permission to contact them after the
interview for clarification purposes. This request was also in the information sheet, on the
consent form and was confirmed on the digital audio recording. The transcriptionist
signed a pledge of confidentiality (Appendix F).
Interviews consisted of semi-structured questions which allowed the story to be
told from the perspective of the participant, but still allowed follow-up purposeful
questions to be asked. Charmaz (2006, p. 28) spoke about this when she said that
grounded theory interviews are ―open-ended but directed.‖
The opening statement and question were:

―I would like for you to tell me about a time when you responded to a multicasualty incident to provide care. From the time you were sent there, to the time that you
left the scene, how did you go about knowing what was going on around you?”

Follow up questions designed to illuminate the process of SA development
included:

“How did you maintain updated information about what was going on around you?”
“What elements of the scene improved your ability to maintain or develop knowledge of
what was going on around you?”
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“What elements of the scene detracted from your ability to maintain or develop
knowledge of what was going on around you?”
Variations of the last two questions were included in which the word ―most‖ was used to
determine what improved SA the most and what detracted the most. Many other
questions were posed to participants in response to issues and concepts that emerged
during the interviews.
Memos and field notes also provided important sources of data. Field notes were
created during interviews as a way of insuring follow-up of important questions without
interrupting the participant‘s thought process and as a way of capturing an intangible,
such as a perceived mood or emotion. They were continued after the interview to
document the interview circumstances and any additional information that may have been
important to remember for the next interview. Many times ideas that occurred to me
concerning theoretical sensitivity and questions that I may have wanted to include in the
next interview, were first documented in field-notes, and later found their way into
memos. An example of my theoretical sensitivity was the use of more intensive
questioning concerning the differences between responders‘ perceptions of general
preparation for response, those post-action activities which were the result of a particular
response and the role of experience in preparing providers. Drawing upon a high level of
theoretical sensitivity and using critical analysis allowed me to differentiate between
these subtle, yet very important distinctions.
As a nurse practitioner trained in family healthcare, I was prepared to intervene in
the event that a participant became emotionally distraught during the interview. In this

64
event, the interview would be discontinued temporarily or permanently at the discretion
of the interviewee. I was prepared to refer to the local county mental health facility if
needed. Fortunately, no interviewees became distraught or expressed any degree of
discomfort during any of the interviews.
Data Analysis
Mixing the two complementary approaches of Corbin and Strauss (2008) and
Charmaz (2006), I used multiple steps in the coding process. Coding is ―deriving and
developing concepts from data‖ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 65). These concepts are
words or phrases of interest, which were coded or given a name that described each
particular phenomenon. The types of coding used were, open, focused and axial.
―Open coding‖ (Corbin & Strauss 2008, p. 195), or ―initial coding‖ (Charmaz,
2006, pp. 48-60) was used to break apart data in the first steps of analysis. ―Focused
coding‖, a term used by Charmaz (2006, p. 57) was useful for identifying and sorting ―the
most significant and/or frequent earlier codes to sift through large amounts of data.‖
Combining the techniques of open and focused coding was useful in this study because of
the large volume of rich, relevant data. Axial coding provided the means of reintegrating
the categories by appreciating and explicating the relationships that drove the textual and
diagrammatic depiction of the eventual substantive theory.
Combining these techniques added something important in terms of
understanding of the grounded theory process and smoothed analysis. In vivo codes,
which are words or phrases specific to the culture of the participant and required
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interpretation, were also coded. The ―culture‖ in this case was emergency healthcare
workers.
In keeping with grounded theory methods, data analysis was accomplished while
data collection was on-going. This was a significant benefit since interview questions and
techniques evolved as the data emerged. Responses to questions, created other questions,
which fine-tuned the process in order to obtain needed information and fully describe
categories. This was an opportunity for ―situational awareness‖ in data collection. I was
able to evaluate what was effective, consider what may be more effective, and alter
techniques to improve the collection of data.
Transcript interviews were coded using a line by line coding technique throughout
the study. This technique allowed for close scrutiny of the content which was especially
important for remaining open to what may be found in the process. Open coding provided
the means to name each section of data in the interviews that appeared relevant, through
the use of theoretical sensitivity.
Once patterns of activity were identified, incident to incident coding was added to
line by line coding. Continuing the line by line coding prevented missing important data.
Adding incident to incident comparisons allowed a more global view of how similar
activities were handled by different participants. I like to think of line by line coding as a
close-up photograph of data and incident to incident comparisons as the view of a section
of data through a wide-angle lens. The technique of constant comparison was also used
for the purposes of comparing incident to incident for identifying frequent and relevant
focused codes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
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As the number of participants increased many open codes were subsumed by
focused codes. Focused codes were fitted and sorted through theoretical sampling and
questioning until categories emerged which were then established, confirmed and
abstractly named. The frequent and relevant focused codes became the properties which
comprised and defined the category. The categories developed are composed of these
properties and the properties themselves have dimensions. The dimensions describe the
variation in, or the borders of the property.
In grounded theory analysis, categorical saturation occurs when no new data are
emerging. During this study, it became apparent that theoretical and categorical
saturation occurred with participant 12. I continued to sample through participant 15 to
assure saturation of all categories. In allowing categories to emerge, it was important that
they be sufficiently abstract to have the ability to encompass the meaning of the
properties that comprised them. Axial coding was then used to realign the categories
based on goodness of fit. Over 575 open codes were generated from the data with many
more references to them. From this data, 11 categories (explained in findings) emerged
that were used in the theoretical model (see audit trail, Appendix G).
I used the paradigm model of Corbin and Strauss (2008) to analyze conditions,
actions, interactions and emotions representing the responses of individuals to the
situations encountered, as well as the consequences of these actions interactions and
emotions. Within a given category, questions related to each of these paradigms
classifications may have been answered. However, once the category was established and
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the properties and dimensions discovered one or more of the paradigmatic classifications
was assigned to the overall category to assist with integration and theory building.
Memos were important pieces of data and proved extremely helpful during the
analysis process in capturing and maintaining the line of thought about something in the
data. There were many memos concerning thoughts, actions participants took, focused
codes, categories, follow-up questioning, phenomena of interest along with many others
things that served to remind me to re-address something important. The most beneficial
use of memos in this study was the ability to have an on-going dialogue with myself
concerning a concept or category, its properties, dimensions and relationships. During the
course of such intense immersion in the data, it was difficult to remember every helpful
thought or good idea that came to mind during the study. Memos helped to archive my
thoughts for later use. Memos also provided the opportunity to relate components to each
other in an on-going fashion, rather than attempting to visualize them all at the end of the
analysis. This continuous reflection allowed categories and relationships to truly emerge,
rather than being created or forced at the very end of analysis.
Theory integration was carried out throughout the analysis, beginning with the
identification of a core category, which represented the main theme. Axial coding
including multiple iterations of sorting and fitting used to identify categories, locate
properties within categories and to relate categories to other categories was also used.
Through these activities, the process of SA emerged.
The aim of the study was met in the development of a substantive theory related
to SA development in MCI. The final storyline was developed in the move from
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description to explanation, which is the difference between rich description and theory
development (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This theory was then textually and
diagrammatically depicted.
Rigor of the Research Study
Qualitative research does not concern itself with validity and reliability in the
quantitative sense of the words. However, that does not mean rigor is absent. There are
several methods that are recommended to improve credibility (Creswell, 2003; Stommel
& Wills, 2004) that were employed in the present study. They included taking part in a
bracketing interview, the obtaining of rich data, peer-debriefing, member-checking, and
utilization of an expert external auditor.
Prior to data collection, a bracketing interview was carried out to identify personal
assumptions and biases. This was accomplished with a qualified researcher, who was my
mentor on this research study. While my experiences should inform the research, they
should not drive the results. The bracketing interview was transcribed and analyzed by
both my mentor and myself and assumptions and potential biases were identified. I
completely reviewed the summary of the bracketing interview multiple times before data
collection began.
Every effort was made to prevent the premature closure of concepts prior to
saturation. This was accomplished through sufficient engagement in the process and
immersion in the data. Obtaining rich data was supported by an on-going fidelity to the
particular methods that are unique to the research design, in this case grounded theory.
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This included keeping complete records of interviews, an audit trial of coding, memos
and field notes.
I used peer-debriefing by taking selected transcripts to a grounded theory group at
the University of Tennessee, College of Nursing, headed by the person serving as the
mentor on this research study. In these meetings transcripts were read and analyzed and
coding suggestions offered. In addition, methods of interviewing, data collection and
analysis were scrutinized. In at least one case, a transcript that I had previously coded
was taken to the grounded theory group. The group then coded the transcript to provide
my mentor and myself with a comparison of the group coding and my own. There was
strong consistency between the group coding and my own. At another peer-debriefing
meeting, my mentor and chair of this study, another of my dissertation committee
members and the nationally recognized expert external auditor, Dr. Juliet Corbin, were all
in attendance either in person or by teleconference. Taking part in peer-debriefing
improved the mentoring process, the rigor of this study and my development as a
researcher.
The nationally renowned grounded theorist, Dr. Juliet Corbin, served as an
external auditor on this research study. She attended a transcript peer-debriefing and
coding session via teleconference. She has also provided feedback on memos, storylines
and models, as well as interpreted information concerning the application of her methods
and clarified comments from her previous writings. We shared many conversations that
improved my understanding of grounded theory methodology and data analysis.
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Member-checking was used in an effort to get a sense of the theory fit from those
who were actual participants in the study. Participants were contacted and offered the
opportunity to participate in member checking. Seven participants agreed to participate.
Member-checking requests were based on gaining a variety of viewpoints from diverse
participants, similar to those outlined in the theoretical sampling description. Included
were nurses, fire fighters, EMTs, and paramedics all with a wide range of experiential
levels.
Member-checking was carried out by phone after the participants agreed to take
part. They were sent the final theoretical diagram and during the telephone interview
were provided with a relatively extensive explanation of the final theory. These sessions
were approximately 30 minutes each. Several points were clarified and at least one
change was made to the theory following a checking session. All participants felt strongly
that the theory included their view of SA development in MCI. In an electronic
communication with Juliet Corbin, she stated that in her experience participants were
interested in ―telling their stories, but are not so interested in developing the theory with
you‖ (personal communication, April 1, 2008). Therefore member-checking was
conducted for the purposes of assuring overall fit
Summary
Because the process of SA development was the focus of this study, grounded
theory was the appropriate methodology for explicating the emerging process. The
philosophical stance of pragmatism supported utilizing methods that practically resulted
in uncovering the data, and provided evidence of that which was sought. Symbolic
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interactionism posits that there are meanings conveyed in the personal action and
interaction of individuals. Interaction seemed particularly salient to the situation at hand,
and was therefore employed as a lens through which to view this research problem.
Multi-casualty incidents were defined for the project as those that occurred
outside of a medical facility and that had injured between 2 and 25 persons. Participants
for the project were responders educated and trained to at least the EMT level and who
possessed at least one year of practice experience. Data collection included semistructured interviews and used grounded theory techniques as posited by Corbin and
Strauss (2008) and Charmaz (2006).
Interview transcripts, memos and field-notes comprised the data. Open and
focused coding were used to develop categories which encompassed properties and
dimensions. Saturation of the categories was insured. Memos and axial coding assisted
with explicating the relationships between categories resulting in a substantive theory.
Finally, research rigor was maintained by a combination of data immersion, thick, rich
description, peer-debriefing, member-checking and through the use of an expert external
auditor.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Research Findings
This study sought to determine the process of SA in MCI. Grounded theory
methodology was used for this purpose. This chapter constitutes the findings of the study.
In this chapter I will describe the participants, provide the storyline and discuss the
research paradigm used. Each major category (higher-level concept) will be described
including the properties and dimensions thereof. The relationships that exist between the
categories will be described. A textual and diagrammatic description of the resulting
theory will be provided. An attempt to illuminate the analytical thought processes that
shaped the decisions made will be offered during the course of the discussion. Words of
the participants themselves will be used as powerful evidentiary support.
The process that emerged from this study is complex and cyclic. The process of
SA occurs during an actual emergency response; however, it is always on-going on some
level, even between responses. All of the activities that occur, both those during actual
events and those in between emergencies, impact the development of adequate and
actionable situational awareness, which leads to competent and safe scene management
and patient care.
Participants
The participants were 15 emergency responders form the southeastern region of
the United States. They were from multiple different jurisdictions in one state and from
one emergency response organization with large regional jurisdiction in another state.
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There were 12 male and 3 female participants and at the time of the incident that they
chose to convey, all were trained to at least the emergency medical technician (EMT)
level. All participants were Caucasian despite flyers being distributed to departments in
which minority populations were well-represented.
Some participants were paid emergency responders, some were volunteers and
some were both. Those who were both paid and volunteer were working for a paid
department while volunteering with a local organization, typically a volunteer fire
department. All but one were still working in emergency services at the time of the
interview. One participant remains a firefighter but is no longer EMT certified. Some
were dually licensed and/or certified. For example, some were both nurses and
paramedics. The sample included a wide range of experiential levels and ages. The mean
participant age was 37.13 years with a range of 22 to 52 years. The mean experience level
in years was 15.46 with a range of 2 to 34. The names used in this study are pseudonyms
to protect the identity of the participants. Table 1 summarizes the participant
demographics.
The Storyline
The storyline is a narrative description of the theory. It provides an overview of
the core phenomenon and the associated categories. The process of SA that emerged in
this study is cyclic and has no clear beginning or end.
The story about the process of situational awareness in multi-casualty incidents is
a story about establishing and maintaining control of dynamic, contextually-based
situations, in an effort to provide safe conditions in which to provide patient care to
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Table 1 Participant Demographics
N=15
Pseudonym

Age

Gender

Ethnicity

Full years of service

Type of Professional

Volunteer/
Paid

Mark

42

M

W

22

EMT/FF

P

Currently
working in
emergency
response
Y

Ed

27

M

W

3

EMT/FF

V

Y

John

43

M

W

25

Paramedic

P

Y

Jane

43

F

W

13

Paramedic

P

Y

Frank

52

M

W

34

FF/previous EMT

P

Y

Mike

49

M

W

34

EMT/FF

P

Y

Kyle

36

M

W

17

Nurse/Paramedic

P/V

Y

/FF
Jason

28

M

W

2

EMT/FF

V

Y

Dawn

36

F

W

7

Nurse/Paramedic

NA

N

Seth

38

M

W

18

Nurse/Paramedic

P

Y

Diane

30

F

W

4

Nurse/Paramedic/

P/V

Y

VFF
Jack

33

M

W

12

EMT/FF

P

Y

Dan

34

M

W

14

Paramedic

P

Y

Stan

22

M

W

3

EMT/VFF

P/V

Y

Bill

44

M

W

24

Physician

V

Y

Note. M= male; F = female; W = white; FF = firefighter; V= volunteer; P = paid; Y = yes; N =no
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victims. Situational awareness (SA) in Multi-Casualty Incidents (MCI) is an on-going
process.
There is preparatory activity for action that is relatively constant. What occurs in
the interim between rescues or the ―interval action‖ can be broken down into activities of
two types. There are actions that may occur at any time, such as the formal educational
preparation of responders, training sessions or drills attended by professionals, as well as
simple discussions among responders (Interval Action – Ongoing). There are also more
proximal interval actions that occur after a particular event such as personal and
professional critiques, self-questioning and critical incident debriefing (Interval Action –
Proximal). Both types of interval action, as well as experience derived from actual
response efforts, the most highly valued experiences among responders, results in the
accumulation of knowledge and experience that can be integrated into actionable plans.
Against the backdrop of experience, rescuers prepare for and respond to many
types of contextually-based situations that place the health and lives of people at risk.
Examples of these situations are motor vehicle accidents, shootings, structure fires,
weather events and others. With the help of initial and updated information including
many types of communication (Handling Information), rescuers appreciate the context,
complexity and dynamic nature of a specific situation by anticipating and eventually
perceiving the scene (Appreciating Context and Complexity). These scenes are further
complicated by geographic and environmental factors.
Rescuers attempt to achieve and maintain a measure of control over the scene
within their own situational world (Establishing and Maintaining Control). This core
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phenomenon or category, serves as intermediary to the other categories and it is the
category around which the primary activities of the response revolve. The mechanisms
through which the rescuers establish and maintain control are establishing priorities,
coordinating the efforts of multiple agencies and making decisions.
Information handling is an important aspect of SA throughout the response.
Responders receive updates, collect information and disseminate information from a
multitude of sources, and communicate with various persons and agencies. These
mechanisms of communication include radio, face to face, hand signals, body language
and others.
Responders have expected roles to play in the response effort. Roles include not
only professional roles such as emergency medical technician (EMT), paramedic, nurse
and others, but also the roles that a professional may play on their particular team.
Policing agencies, the media and bystanders play important roles in the response effort as
well. In addition personal and professional relationships impact the quality of the
response. These relationships developed among rescuers impact the response effort in a
positive way according to participants.
Responders manage resources, which may include personnel, supplies and time.
They manage resources by assessing, calling, deploying, staging and sometimes declining
the use of resources. On-scene resources must be balanced to provide sufficient
manpower and avoid insufficient supervision and duplication of services or worse.
Responders recognize and feel the emotion that may be elicited when responding
to scenes involving human suffering. They may be saddened, angry at the actions of
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others or feel pressure to perform well (Human Element). They must detach themselves
and compartmentalize those feelings in order to successfully perform their jobs. Most
conveyed the need to deal with the emotional aspects of difficult calls after the response.
Therefore, this category relates to the actual response and to the interval action.
The shared, common goal among rescuers is to insure the safety of all involved
while providing care to victims of the incident. Safety risks are those that responders
have traditionally been exposed to and newer threats posed by modern ideologies and
technology. The safety of responders and non-responders alike are of utmost importance.
Patient care involves assessing the mechanism of the injury, triaging, caring and the
disposition of patients. Safety must be balanced with the risks of providing care. Safety
and patient care also feed back into the core phenomenon of establishing and maintaining
control through the assessments and decisions that are made. Therefore, experienced
responders attempt to establish and maintain control of their situational world by
appreciating the context and complexity involved, managing the available resources and
handling and sharing information among the responders performing particular roles,
while compartmentalizing the human emotions experienced, all in an effort to insure
scene safety and provide patient care to those victimized.
The degree to which responders perceive that they have provided sufficient care
while maintaining the safety of all, results in additional interval action; the proximal
interval action which involves self-questioning and debriefing after the incident and
contributes further to the background of knowledge gained from experience. Thus more
experience is added to the background for future incidents. This experience along with
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the activities accomplished during both stages of the interval action lead to additional
preparedness. The process repeats itself in cyclic fashion.
The Paradigm Model
The paradigm model recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008) was selected for
use in this study. The model consists of conditions, actions/interactions/emotions and
consequences. Conditions are ―circumstances or conditions that lead‖ those involved ―to
a particular response‖ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 89). Actions/interactions/emotions ―are
the responses made by individuals or groups to situations, problems, happenings and
events‖ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 89). Consequences are ―outcomes of inter/action or
of emotional responses to events‖ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 89).
These paradigmatic classifications allow the researcher to place codes or
categories into each classification, based on the questions they answer, thus assisting with
analysis. The final theoretical categories were assigned a paradigmatic classification.
However, codes within the theoretical category may have answered questions in multiple
paradigmatic areas. The names of theoretical categories do not necessarily denote their
classification within the paradigmatic model. According to Corbin and Strauss (2008), it
is up to the researcher to explain the paradigmatic classification assignment to each
theoretical category. For example, the core category, establishing and maintaining
control, was the category around which all other theoretical categories revolved and with
which they all interacted directly or indirectly. Because the primary properties of this
theoretical category were establishing priorities, coordinating efforts and making
decisions, it was assigned to the paradigmatic classification of action/interaction/emotion.
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Open, focused and axial coding were utilized to determine codes, to refine them
and to sort them according to best fit. Sorting and fitting went on throughout the research
process. In some cases properties of one category were broken out and became a category
unto itself. In other cases, categories were collapsed and became properties of other
categories. The qualitative data management software program NVivo 8 ® from
Qualitative Solutions and Research (QSR) international was utilized to assist with data
management. Theoretical sampling allowed for the saturation of categories, thickness of
description and for increasing variation among properties and dimensions. Table 2
provides a brief overview of the categories, properties, dimensions and paradigmatic
classifications that emerged, comprised the theory and were then used to depict the theory
diagrammatically.
Theoretical Categories
The theoretical categories represent the higher-level concepts comprising the
theoretical model. They possess properties that vary along certain dimensions. The
dimensions explain the variation within each property. I will now explain the theoretical
categories before moving on to the relationships found amongst them.
Experience
Experience is defined as the culmination of knowledge and ability derived from
actual emergency response efforts. The properties of the category include; the
significance of experience and the benefit a responder derived from experience. While
the process of SA is continuous, for explanatory purposes the experiential background of
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Table 2 Categories, Properties, Dimensions and Paradigmatic Classifications
Category

Properties

Dimensions

Paradigmatic
Classification

Experience

Significance of
experience

Unparalleled in terms
of preparation

Condition

More important than
classroom education

Benefit derived from
experience

Can be of utmost
importance, but only as
a ―frame of reference‖
Necessary experience
Prevents ―tunnel
vision‖

Interval Action
Phase I - on-going

General preparation

Formal education

Condition

Training, drills
Event pre-planning
In-service training of
fellow professionals
Interval Action
Phase II – proximal

Actions based on
particular response
efforts

Formal Critical
Incident Stress
Debriefings

Condition

Formal performance
debriefs
Informal performance
critiques
Self-questioning
Contextually-Based
Incident

Mechanism of Injury

MVA
Shooting
Weather Event
Heat –Related Injury
Multiple poisoning/
Overdose

Numbers injured

2-24

Location

Roadway, home,
business

Condition
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Table 2 cont.
Category

Properties

Dimensions

Paradigmatic Classification

Appreciating Context
and Complexity

Dynamic nature of
events

Chaos and confusion
vs. routine

Action/Interaction/Emotion

Unexpected occurring
Anticipating and
envisioning the scene

―preparing in my
head‖

Perceiving the scene

―scene triage‖

Geographic and
environmental
conditions

Scene spread out,
hindering assessment
―muddy‖, ―dark‖,
―cold‖
―Smoky, very hot‖

Establishing and
Maintaining Control

Degree of control

―Well controlled‖ vs.
―no control at all‖

Accepting
responsibility

The burden of control
IC vs. patient care
(role) (situational
world)

Establishing priorities

Safety, patient care,
resources

Coordinating efforts

Agencies, personnel
Cooperation vs. ―two
different purposes‖

Decision making

Affected subsequent
decisions
Pressured, timeconstrained, rapid,
incomplete
information
Gravity of

Action/Interaction/Emotion
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Table 2 cont.
Categories

Properties

Dimensions

Paradigmatic
Classifications

Handling Information

General

Too much vs. too
little

Action/Interaction/Emotion

Multi-sourced
Timing

Initial information

Changing, conflicting,
unclear, intentionally
misleading
Dispatch, ―still alarm‖

Receiving updates

Radio updates en
route

Communications

Timing
Inhibiting and
facilitating
Proximity of
providers
Busyness
Radio, face to face,
hand signals body
language

Roles and
Relationships

Managing Resources

Professional roles

EMT, paramedic,
nurse, doctor

Team roles

IC, patient care

Interaction roles

Media, bystanders,
witness, policing
personnel

Relationships with and
among providers

Established and nonestablished personal
and professional
relationships
Sufficiency,
deploying, assessing,
distributing, calling
for additional,
canceling, matching,
utilization of

Personnel
Equipment
Time

Condition

Action/Interaction/Emotion

83
Table 2 cont.
Categories

Properties

Dimensions

Paradigmatic Classification

The Human Element

Emotions experienced
and the impact on
responders

Sadness, anger
frustration, desire to
help, empathy, shock

Action/Interaction/Emotion/

Methods for
managing emotions

Compartmentalizing,
―crying after the call‖
Clicked into a mode‖
―flipped a switch‖
―block it out‖
Positive and negative
coping

Safety

Goals and Priority of
Safety

―safety is the first
priority‖

Condition

―make sure everybody‘s
going home‖
Balancing safety vs.
―I‘m gonna take care of
myself‖
Threats to safety

Traditional vs. newer
threats

Actions to provide
safety

Assessing, blocking
traffic, reflective vests,
placards
―not being too quick‖

Patient Care

Triaging

Differences in MCI
―you‘ve got to move
on‖
Assessing numbers and
priorities
Initial and reassessment
Mechanism indicating
injury – patient specific
Shooting,1blunt and
penetrating trauma,
poisoning/overdose

Consequences

84
Table 2 cont.
Categories

Properties

Dimensions

Caring

Locating patients
a priority, not
necessarily the priority
Treatment of injuries
Releasing or
transferring care
Matching provider to
patient condition
Seeking Advice
Discontinuation

Disposition

Mode of transport
Transport time
Being overwhelmed
Transporting in a truck
bed
Setting up central
location for
Matching to facility
capability

Paradigmatic
Classification
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the individual involved serves as the starting point. It is the background category against
which the other activities of SA occur. Experience is highly valued by the participants
and is therefore fundamental in terms of its impact on the action of the individual
responder during actual response situations.
Significance of experience. Participants did not respond to emergency situations
as blank slates. They were shaped by their previous response experiences. Experience
was seen by providers as being unparalleled in terms of its ability to impact how a
responder performs. Participants did not ascribe the same weight of experiential benefit
to formal education and training programs as they did to emergency response experience.
It was the actual exposure to emergency situations that they saw as improving their
abilities and honing their skill. Speaking to this very issue while discussing a valuable
patient care lesson, Diane, an EMS provider said, ―that‘s not something that you teach in
school.‖
Experience was seen as more than sitting in a classroom and learning about
responding. It was achieved by responding. Supporting this idea is a quote from Jack, a
firefighter who was entered a burning building in an effort to rescue a family reportedly
inside. He was driven back by a flashover, a fire that engulfs the whole room. He
described how only experience could teach him about a flashover when he said, ―Like a
flashover….there‘s nothing you can read that can prepare you for that.‖ His experience
taught him like nothing else could.
Formal modes of training were seen more as preparing one to experience, rather
than providing direct experience. Seth, a flight nurse was comparing formal education to
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experience. He said that experience was worth twice what education was worth. The
following is a portion of his actual response to a question about the impact of experience
on the ability of one to achieve and maintain SA.

I think experience um, probably is at least, you would double the amount of
education. I think you give me somebody that graduated top of their class that
made 100 on every one of their exams and you give me somebody that has five
years‘ experience and you say you‘re about to go on one of the worst calls you
ever went to, I would take the person with five years‘ experience I think.

Another participant, Jason, a young EMS provider, added another dimension by
suggesting that the value of a response experience can only be measured against another
actual incident. He found himself in the middle of a very chaotic situation initiated by a
weather event. He said, ―This is probably the first mass-casualty incident real-time that
I‘ve ever experienced. So I…. until another one happens I won‘t have much to compare it
to.‖ This last comment strongly indicated that the life experience of actually responding
to an emergency is more highly valued than simulated training for improving rescuer
performance.
Darrell, an EMS provider offered an explanation for the fact that experience
influenced responders like nothing else could. In a member-checking session he told me
that in a drill or simulated event, the rescuer knows in the back of his or her mind that it
is not real. It may be an excellent exercise, but is none-the-less simulated. However, in a
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real emergency the sense of urgency and the knowledge that the decisions made really
count in someone‘s life, made the difference. Actual response efforts solidify experience
and allow more influential integration into the cognitive response model of the rescuer.
Benefit derived from experience. Not only was an actual response the benchmark
of experience, but it was universally seen as very helpful to the response effort. There
were enough commonalities among contextually similar situations, that when one
experienced them, it improved a provider‘s performance on the next similar event that
he/she encountered. Mark, a well experienced fire captain, said simply,‖ been there, done
that,‖ to suggest that common situations will be similarly approached and therefore
experience with a similar situation was very helpful.
However, a variation on this theme that provided dimension revealed itself during
questioning about experiences in some of the latter interviewees. Some providers felt that
while it was important to appreciate experience and that it is indeed helpful; it is helpful
only to the extent that the provider recognizes that it is a useful ―frame of reference.‖
Participants did not feel that previous responses efforts provided an absolute pattern that
could simply be followed blindly every time they responded to a contextually similar
event. In fact, one responder warned that trying to pattern match to the point of not
appreciating the nuances of a particular event, would be like ―trying to plug that square
peg in a round hole.‖
So while there are definite similarities among responses, many rescuers warned
that there is also sufficient difference among even similar situations, so as to require
discrimination of the particular circumstances of an event and the actions that follow.

88
Mark said, ―there‘s no way that you can be prepared for everything and anything that
you‘re going to encounter in the field,‖ Experiences, while offering a mode for interresponse comparison, must still be approached individually. Relying on one‘s
experiences entirely, could nullify the very impact of experience, by preventing the
gaining of new ones through a close-minded approach.
Some basic experience was actually necessary in order to gain additional
experiences. A flight crew member told me that they only accepted crew members after
having had a certain amount and type of experience. Paramedics needed three to five
years experience to join a flight crew, while nurses needed the same, but it had to be in
critical care. In this case, experience could not be gained unless other foundational
experiences already existed.
Experience also helped providers to see the big picture and avoid getting ―tunnel
vision.‖ According to some, one had to work for some years in order to develop a ―multidimensional‖ view of the scene before them. Part of the avoidance of an overly narrow
focus, was the ability to anticipate, which many providers suggested came with
experience. A lack of experience led to the inability to anticipate worsening conditions
and therefore reduced effectiveness. Another young responder, realizing he didn‘t have
something he needed during an emergency said, ―So, that‘s something I put in the back of
my mind for next time.‖ Some younger less experienced providers may even place
themselves and thus the entire response at risk for lack of this ability. Within the
paradigmatic model, experience is a condition that exists at the time an incident occurs.
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Interval Action
The category of ―interval action‖ is defined as the action and interaction occurring
between emergency calls carried out for the purposes of improving response or those
actions that are the direct result of a response. These activities, when combined with the
experiential history of a provider result in a basic level of preparedness that a provider
brings to an emergency call. This category is divided into two distinct phases. One is
―interval action – ongoing‖ and the other is ―interval action – proximal.‖ These two
phases began as one simple phase in which all inter-response activity occurred. However,
as interviews and analysis went on it became obvious that the actions were varied based
on whether or not they occurred randomly without respect to particular emergency calls
or whether they were occurring as a direct result of an actual response effort. The
properties of each phase of this category describe the actions taken.
Interval action – ongoing. The primary property of this phase of interval action is
formal efforts not based on a particular call or random preparation designed to improve
response. These random actions included formal educational and training activities such
as those that generally prepared one for the particular job function that they perform
(EMT, paramedic, nurse etc.) and those that are inter-professional and cooperative
training that might occur between sister volunteer fire departments. Another example
mentioned by multiple flight nurses was the training that they conduct for volunteer and
paid fire departments on helicopter safety, including how to set up and command an
adequate landing zone. There were also activities that were undertaken in planning for an
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event. Pre-planning was distinct from interval action-proximal because an event may be
planned for, but with no assurance that any particular emergency may occur. While it
may seem that pre-planning for an event is not so different from dealing with the
aftermath of an event, the difference is that with pre-planning, there is the lack of event
type specificity that can be known. Planning had more to do with where to locate
emergency responders. A participant suggested that he planned ahead whenever he was
going to be at a large public event by carrying gloves or other supplies. The pre-planning
in this case is not done with the knowledge that a particular event would occur, but was
accomplished as a means of being generally prepared.
Interval action – proximal. The primary property of this phase of interval action
was action which occurred in close proximity to and was the direct result of particular
response efforts. The first of these were formal debriefings where crews or individuals
would get together to formally discuss what had happened with each other, with
superiors, or both. These activities could be standard procedure or they may be driven by
the potential of the event to cause emotional suffering among rescuers.
Attendance at these formal debriefings seemed to be affected by cultural and
political implications. In the case of voluntary critical incident debriefing, when younger,
impressionable responders saw more experienced providers choose to either take part or
not take part in them, it impacted the younger responders. This was the impression of
several participants. Darrell, an EMS worker expressed it this way, speaking about an
emotionally difficult call in which a fellow emergency responder was killed.
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Well, my partner and I, the others were invited. The other fire department that
was there, they were invited. Um, the other police officers had a separate one. But
the fire department was invited to come to ours, but I‘ve always noticed with the
critical incident stress debriefings from other bad calls, the fire departments don‘t
come. I think it‘s a cultural machismo ……you know, big man the firefighter
can‘t cry, can‘t get upset……Um, I‘ve been to quite a few CISMs and they, if
they do come they don‘t participate.

In discussing the impact of cultural norms even within his own department, he went on to
say,

And I said yeah, I want to go. And my partner‘s like, well should we go? And
even my supervisor, again, he‘s, you know, I hate to use the term old-school, he
is. He‘s been in the field 25 years. And he looked at him as for advice. Kind of the
older ……and said, would you go? And he said naw, I wouldn‘t go to that.

One responder expressed concern that the political ramifications of debriefing
may have prevented it from happening. The incident involved a relatively popular tourist
destination. The circumstances, had they come out in the media, could have cost the
particular location tourism income. He said, ―you honestly think that they‘re gonna
expose a problem with their cash cow?‖ So, there are factors other than the need for
quality assurance at play in terms of debriefings actually being conducted.
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Critiquing and self-questioning were informal mechanisms by which providers
examined themselves and their close professional peers. In some cases they would make
plans for how to improve their performance the next time. Mike, a well- experienced fire
fighter said this about these informal meetings.

Regardless of how large or how small. Uh, one of the things that I did building a
crew that I was one at the fire station, and I think I‘ve done pretty much all
through my career that I found that works, is like I said earlier the only way
you‘re gonna get better is identify stuff that didn‘t go well and be able to make
that better. The stuff that you got right you don‘t need to improve on. It‘s the stuff
that you didn‘t get right, and on this particular incident I remember walking back
in the station after everybody‘d left and saying, okay, what went right, what went
wrong, what do we need to do better? And the crews that I‘ve, I guess managed,
and most of them been on, even as something as simple as a car fire, we come
back and say what went right, what could go better. And we developed a lot of
stuff, little stuff, from that.

Another responder said:

I‘m overly hard on myself after a scene. When I go home after a fire I play it
through my head. I‘m sure most responders do this, and after a good size wreck I
go through my head and see if I think I did everything right. And after, I still go
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through that and I still say what could I have done different, what didn‘t I do?
What did I forget to do?

There were many more examples of these informal critiques and self-questioning
sessions. This was a strong reason to separate interval action – ongoing, from interval
action – proximal. The separation of these phases of the category of interval action
helped to locate the activities, or properties of each phase in time and space in relation to
the response activities. The actions during the interval, both on-going and proximal, led
to conditions of preparedness against which providers responded.
Contextually-Based Incident
This category is defined as the context of the emergency to which the provider
responded. The properties of this category are the mechanism of risk or injury, the
number of patients and the geographic setting. The onset of an actual emergency call is
triggered by circumstances that are highly contextually-based and therefore result in a
condition to which rescuers respond.
Mechanism of injury or risk. Emergency events can take on any number of
dynamic contexts based on the mechanism of risk and/or injury, how many are injured
and how severely, the number and type of responders, the geographic area in which the
event occurs and innumerable additional factors. Theory can only be based on the
contexts about which participants spoke. However, multiple types of events were
theoretically sampled for to provide dimensions and thus as much variation as possible.
While participants were asked to tell the story of a particular event that stood out for
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them, they were free to discuss any event or concept that they felt may be helpful, and in
some cases they strayed from a particular event to more general application of concepts.
Table 3 summarizes the type of events participants discussed and the number of
casualties that were involved.
Number of patients. The number of people injured or potentially injured affects
the type of response that is mounted. The number of those reported injured and the
number actually injured were in some cases different. The mean number of patients per
incident was 6.20, with a range of 2-24.
Location. Where an emergency response occurred affected the context of the
emergency call. They occurred in homes, businesses and on the sides of busy roadways.
These properties were taken into account in the response effort.
What participants said about the situation to which they responded was often very
dramatic. The fact that the particular situation stood out for the participant seemed to
infuse the story with a helpful dose of detail, that made the story come alive. The
circumstances to which the participants responded many times conveyed the drama that
would await them upon their arrival to the scene.
Frank, a long time fire fighter and former EMT, responded to a triple shooting. He
related:

He shot one person inside the building, uh, came out and somebody else had
gotten in a car, he shot – the person in the building was dead – shot the guy in the
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Table 3 Contextually-Based Situations Related by Participants
Type of Situation

Number of Casualties

MVA

4

MVA

4

MVA

24

MVA

2

MVA

5

MVA

2

MVA

2

MVA

8

Shooting

4

Shooting

3

Weather Event

11

Weather Event

11

Heat Related Injury

2

Fire

4

Multiple Poisoning/Accidental

11

Overdose
Note. MVA = motor vehicle accident

M = 6.20 casualties/situation
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car on the left side, uh, right about his kidney level, uh, he was still alive, shot him
through the window, and he shot himself right in the sternum.

Jack, a young fire fighter told of a particularly intense situation to which he responded
saying:

So we got on our gear, jumped on the truck and immediately upon pulling out of
the station we could see the red glow of the fire. So we knew we had something
working. So we get to the fire and my partner and I that are in the backseat
jumped off the truck and um, there was a man standing outside. He happened to
be an off-duty police officer. And he said I know the people, and they‘re still
inside.

Dawn, a flight nurse who is dually certified as a paramedic, flew to a scene only to be
presented with the following:

And we were told that it was two approximately 17 month old infants. One female
and one male. Um, the quick story that we were given was that the father had
been working night shift, came home, um, to take the kids to daycare for mother
while she went to work, and somehow the twins were left in the SUV that was
parked in the hot sun, um, in the driveway. And when daycare called
approximately around 12:00, 12:30, to - wanted to know where the kids were,
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where the twins were, he went out to the vehicle and found the babies in the car,
still strapped in their car seats and the female was unresponsive.

Kyle, another flight nurse/paramedic responded to the scene of a particularly
gruesome accident. He said, ―we were responding to a pickup truck, uh, mid-size pickup
that ran off the road and ended up with the passenger impaled on the horizontal portion of
the chain link fence.‖
The contexts of the situations to which responders were called were extremely
challenging and incredibly varied. This context drives much of the response effort. It also
had a tremendous impact on how responders went about appreciating the contextual
complexities of a particular situation.
Appreciating Context and Complexity
The category of appreciating context and complexity is defined as the actions
taken by the participants to grasp the meaning of the situation and to begin to appreciate
how the situation may be controlled or may become out of control. Properties that lead to
a greater awareness of what was happening on the scenes and thus comprised this
category were; appreciating the dynamic and many times chaotic state of the event, the
responders‘ anticipating and envisioning the scene before arrival, perceiving the scene
upon arrival and the geographic and environmental considerations of the scene.
Dynamic nature of the event. One of the more important properties of this
category was rescuers appreciating that multi-casualty scenes are dynamic. Situations
continued to evolve on their own and in response to rescuer influence. On their own, the
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scene tended to degenerate as more people could be injured or exposed to whatever the
mechanism of injury was originally, the influx of bystanders and the uncontrolled setting.
However, each case may also be influenced by the attempts to appreciate the context,
because early decisions that were made impacted the ability to appreciate and ultimately
control the scene (see discussion on establishing and maintaining control).
Situations were dynamic. Being prepared for change meant expecting the
unexpected. Even when one felt prepared because of pre-planning, there were factors that
could alter the situation dramatically. Jane a high-level supervisor was involved in preplanning for an event which would draw upwards of 80, 000 spectators to an air show.
She acknowledged the risks of this type of event. However, what actually ended up being
the mechanism that injured 11 victims and caused the death of another, was the very
thing that had not been planned for; a weather event. She expressed it this way:

You know, in my mind a crop duster‘s going to come out of the sky possibly and
take out a large group of people. I certainly wasn‘t expecting a weather event. We
weren‘t really expecting any weather that day.

There were no warnings for a weather event in the area that day until the storm
actually began to stir minutes before it struck. So, although she had prepared for the
event, and her team was responding to other various medical requests for care due to the
large crowd, the overall situation remained highly dynamic.
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Because of the dynamics, responders frequently cited that these scenes, when first
approached, seemed overwhelming. Several responders suggested that they seemed
―chaotic‖, and many references were made to either chaos or confusion with regard to an
emergency scene. It was clear that some responders had to admit this even though they
were uncomfortable saying so. Jason revealed this when he said,

I knew that this number of tents blew over, there‘s people walking around, the
rain is pelting you, it‘s, it‘s just, I don‘t want to say chaos because I didn‘t feel
like it was chaos. I knew what was going on, but it was a chaotic scene I guess.

Jason suggested that his actions in understanding and acting on his environment were not
chaotic, but that the scene was.
Other providers described this issue of chaos and confusion by saying the scene
was ―surreal‖, that they had their attention divided many ways and that there were many
considerations that had to be taken into account; all at once. One participant even spoke
to the fact that the passage of time may be altered because of the confusion saying, ―time
kind of gets skewed when you‘re in the middle of that.‖ Many participants clearly saw
these responses as disorienting and complex.
A negative case provided dimension. John, a well experienced EMS provider
responded to a shooting in which four people were injured. He calls the scene, ―pretty cut
and dry.‖ Part of the reason for this was, he was appreciating the context early through
the dispatch information provided him. When he responded to the scene it offered him
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few changes from what he had anticipated. He expected something and that is what he
got.
Other participants suggested that the dynamic nature of an MCI means that at
times, the last thing you expect to happen, may happen. Most responders expected that
those who had been victimized by an event would welcome help. This was not the case
with Ed, an EMT who responded to a single vehicle accident in which multiple people
were injured. He reported this: ―I would have never thought somebody that went through
a car wreck would have ran off in the woods, especially a car wreck that severe.‖ His
patient not only didn‘t want the care he offered, she didn‘t want to be found. He
explained further: ―she was hiding ‗cause she was scared, number one. Number two she
was intoxicated and number three she had a warrant out for her arrest.‖ When these
rescuers were on scenes, at times what actually happened, was not what they anticipated.
This leads to what rescuers expected to find. Another major property of appreciating
context and complexity turned out to be ―anticipating and envisioning.‖
Anticipating and envisioning. The rescuers were able to anticipate and mentally
visualize the event before actually arriving on the scene, usually after receiving initial
dispatch information (see handling information). There were basically two dimensions to
this property. First, participants used the information that they received over the radio
traffic and other indicators to anticipate the seriousness of the scene. In some cases they
requested additional resources. Secondly, they used the information to refresh themselves
on what they might need to do when they got there, even going as far as visualizing in
their minds the actions to be taken.
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Participants used cues to anticipate seriousness. Mark, a fire fighter captain upon
simply seeing the traffic pattern while responding, began anticipating the worst. He said,
―Traffic backed up, you know, Highway B was basically shut down. Uh, probably gives
you a pretty good indication that you got something bad from that standpoint.‖
The radio traffic surrounding a scene could also be an indication that a call might
be serious. Bill a physician EMS director, who actually responds with the crews he
oversees, spoke about the dispatcher and said:

―And so I can tell that she was getting calls that this was a serious deal. Especially
as we kept you know calling out more and more fire departments…….You know,
it‘s like, okay is this, obviously a number of casualties, uh, initially, or
potentially.‖

One responder stated that when there was reduced radio traffic from those on the scene,
this also might indicate something serious, because those on the scene were too busy to
talk.
When preparing for a particular event or in the midst of responding to an
emergency call, rescuers ran action plans through their minds in order to prepare,
anticipate and avoid being caught off guard. Ed, when responding to a vehicular accident
said, ―I was preparing in my head before I got on scene what to expect.‖ Diane, an EMS
responder, speaking about the time between dispatch and arrival, had this to say,‖ I use
that time to bring everything to the front of my head, what I‘m going to need to do, what
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I might need to do, what resources I might need to utilize when I get there.‖ Diane also
mentioned that she knew some providers who intentionally avoided this type of prearrival planning, because, as she put it: ―some people don‘t even listen to dispatch
information and they just wait to see what they got on scene. ‗Cause a lot of times our
dispatch information is inadequate…or inaccurate I mean.‖
This ability to anticipate events occurred in pre-planning for a larger scale event.
Jane, while planning for a large-scale public gathering said, ―we were preparing for a
mass casualty incident because that‘s pretty much what it was in my mind. It just hadn‘t
happened yet.‖ She was anticipating what may happen.
Perceiving the scene. While anticipating a scene was a critical property of the
category of appreciating context and complexity, responders also suggested that to
appreciate the scene fully, actually visualizing it was critical. The most important
dimension of this property was the initial visual scene size-up. Mark, said, ―initial
assessment is, to me, has always been the most important, because, I mean you, you just
from mechanism of injuries and stuff like that, you can tell. I mean when you get on
scene.‖ He went on to say, ―That, that first, initial reaction, or that first assessment of just,
when you look at what you‘ve got, and you may not be able to see everything.‖ Summing
it up later in the interview he said, ―you know you kinda gotta go based on what you see.‖
Another provider, Mike, confirmed the importance of visualization in his comment:

Uh, again we‘re looking at the damage to the vehicles. Uh, you know, has airbags
deployed, is there side impact, uh, is there passengers where the impact is, uh, you
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know obviously is someone ejected or are people scattered about, or are they all
still in the vehicle. Is anyone getting out of the vehicle, have we went from in the
car to walking wounded, you know? All this is during your initial triage, actually
before my feet actually ever hit the ground, normally getting out of the truck.

He went on to refer to this process as a ―quick scene size-up,‖ and ―establishing that
which lays out your work scene.‖ Finally Frank described it as triage of the scene.
Nurses and other providers often think of triaging patients, but he was actually
visualizing, assessing and sorting the needs of the scene. He said,

So, you know, you would uh, just do sort of a scene triage I guess you would call
it. Uh, very first thing we‘re gonna do is we‘re gonna make sure the people are
gonna be safe, whether it‘s blocking the road with a truck, or you just assessing
what‘s going on around.

Some providers said that visual assessment could be problematic because the
scenes may be very spread out. They also mentioned that visual inspection was difficult
when it was dark or when, for example a car was far off the road, especially when the
patient had already been moved. In this case, one may not be able to visually inspect the
mechanism of injury, which indicates that visual inspection of the ―scene‖ did not take
place.
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Geographic and environmental factors. Final properties of the category of
appreciating context and complexity are geographic and environmental factors.
Visualizing the scene was viewed as critical by most providers. Geographic and
environmental factors were frequently cited as making these assessments, along with
other aspects of situational awareness acquisition and scene management, more difficult.
One of the most frequently mentioned issues in terms of geographic factors was
that a scene may be very broadly spread out or can be in one very small area. Rescuers
felt that scenes that were widely spread out were more difficult to appreciate simply
because of the physical separation of components. Some responders discussed them as
―two different scenes.‖ Physical obstruction was encountered by Frank, a fire fighter
responding to a shooting. When asked what the biggest hindrance was with respect to
knowing what was going on, he said: ―Uh, I guess having two different locations, one
inside and one outside. Would probably be the biggest thing……not being able to see
them both together and being able to put them both together.‖
This separation was sufficient in some cases for rescuers to treat them as two
separate scenes. Jane discussed looking over the large area that she was responsible for
and said:
And, originally when it first happened I remember standing on the hill and I was
looking over at the army tent which was way over there and then I looked down
here at the demolished VIP tents and they were way over there and it really, it was
two separate incidents at that moment.
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Responders also saw environmental conditions as a factor in appreciating
context. Working in the external environment made a difference in one‘s ability to
appreciate the scene. Many factors were mentioned like ―out in a rural area‖, ―muddy‖,
―dark‖ and ―cold.‖ All of these descriptors added to the difficulty in grasping exactly
what was happening on the scene. Jack, a young fire fighter, spoke of dealing with the
environmental conditions himself, yet expressed his empathy for those who fell victim to
the fire to which he responded. He stated; ―It was very smoky, very hot, very, very hot.
So, I mean if I could feel the heat in the gear I was in, I can‘t imagine what it must have
been like with them in the house like that.‖ Four people died as a result of this fire, one of
them a pregnant woman.
Responders appreciated the context and complexity of scenes by acknowledging
that they were dynamic, prone to rapid change and in some cases were quite chaotic.
They anticipated and envisioned what they would find and what they may need to do
prior to arrival. Actually visualizing the scene was one of the most important aspects of
figuring out what was really happening and participants did this while dealing with the
geographic and environmental circumstances of their particular response.
Establishing and Maintaining Control
―Establishing and Maintaining Control‖ was the core phenomenon and the
category around which all other categories revolved and with which they all interacted,
either directly or indirectly. This category is defined as the actions taken to determine the
degree of control, accept responsibility, establish priorities, coordinate efforts and
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decision making. The major components of the definition are the properties of the
category.
Responders must perform many functions from appreciating context and
complexity to managing resources and handling information. However, participants did
all of these things in an effort to control the portion of the response for which they were
responsible. Their area of responsibility was what I have termed the responder‘s
―situational world.‖ This distinction is important because each responder may have an
entirely different function in the response effort. A fire captain may have overall
operational control of a scene and therefore serve in a role that responders referred to as
the incident commander (IC). On the other hand, an EMS provider who arrived after the
fire department may be charged with the care of the most critically injured patient. Each
responder must accept responsibility, establish priorities, coordinate efforts and make
decisions about the situational world with which they were charged.
The degree of control. Establishing and maintaining control included the degree to
which one had control of their situational world. Some scenes were seen as poorly
controlled by the participants. One flight nurse said that they responded to a confusing
scene to find that ―there was no control at all.‖ However, another participant when asked
about what made the scene run smoothly and what improved situational awareness, said,
―a well-controlled scene.‖ When the scene was not well-controlled, participants
expressed that the problem in most cases was the lack of clear leadership.
Assuming control was difficult to some, especially when it involved assuming
control of the overall incident command. One experienced provider was openly
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empathetic toward anyone having to take on this responsibility saying, ―you know, you
always feel sorry for the initial IC because he‘s got anything and everything to do right
there.‖ If the situational world of the participant was overall scene management rather
than simple patient care, the responder felt that it took more effort to accomplish that
level of control than to deal with a single patient.
Some examples of participants‘ words include, ―it takes a while to develop the
multi-dimensions to look at,‖ meaning that those who have IC responsibilities have more
issues to be aware of than someone providing individual patient care. Jane was in an IC
position during a major event and said this about the task of not caring for patients in an
effort to maintain control, ―it took some restraint.‖ She and others suggested that when
providers come up through the ranks, many times they have had years of patient care
experience and that this function could be hard to let go of. Speaking about her role as a
leader she said,

…..in my situation it‘s higher than that. Now it‘s, you know, resources, resources,
research, transportation. It‘s all these things, so you just have to step above that,
that wanting to drop everything and go give Band-Aids and go take care of people
and so you‘re dealing with a bigger issue.

Mike offered this on the subject:
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….if you‘re responding on it, you‘ve usually got a captain or a, or in some cities a
lieutenant, or you got an officer. And, and one thing that you can‘t do is tunnel
vision in and focus directly on the patient. Uh, that‘s what you need to assign your
other personnel to do and let them report back to you. Because there‘s too much
of a big picture from, do I have, is traffic driving around us causing my guys to be
in a situation where we might get hit, uh, are my other resources coming
appropriately. Can I communicate with the communications center. If we have a
lot of patients, making sure that maybe the transport agencies are notifying the
hospitals of the number of patients we have so they know, or if we got anything
that‘s specific looking at that.

Those who had primary patient care responsibilities also felt that the role they performed
was critical.
Accepting responsibility. No matter the task, responders made many references
that indicated that they were accepting responsibility for their situational world. In the
case of accepting responsibility for an entire scene, Mark said, ―as the captain on the
truck, you know, initial, uh, incident command was mine.‖ John, a volunteer fire fighter
said, ―I took IC over, over the one scene.‖ He went on to say, ―So I was responsible for
every aspect of it.‖
Even in patient care situational worlds, responders made comments suggesting
that responsibility had been accepted. Frank, an EMS provider describing to me why he
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took the most critically ill patient simply said, ―I was the paramedic on the ambulance.‖
Accepting responsibility seemed an important decision to these providers.
Establishing priorities. Another important property of this category of
establishing and maintaining control was establishing priorities. Responders indicated
that surveying the scene helped in deciding where priorities existed. These priorities
mainly surrounded patient care and safety. However, some participants mentioned that
establishing priorities meant making sure that resources were well matched to needs.
Another participant mentioned the need to establish priorities, ―so that I could radio in to
uh county fire, that‘s our main radio channel to make sure that all the responding units
had the best picture of it possible.‖
Many participants mentioned prioritizing patient care. Mark, discussing how to
establish scene control said simply, ―it comes down to priorities‖. He went on to offer an
interesting insight. He said that when you have a complicated scene, you start from the
outside and work in and so, ―you start dealing with it as you, as you make it smaller.‖
This comment indicated that you can only prioritize what you can safely access.
Coordinating efforts. An additional property of this category was coordinating
efforts. Many participants provided examples of the cooperation necessary to make a
rescue effort work. John, an EMS provider, said, ―but we‘re fortunate enough here in this
city that we work very well with our, with our fire department.‖ He went on to say,
―We‘re really fortunate in this city that the three agencies work real well together.‖ Mark,
speaking to the importance of coordination said, ―There, there, there are certain, there‘s
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more coordination if nothing else that‘s got to be considered. Uh, for example, uh, you
know I mentioned the fact of multiple units that we had to request.‖
Most participants felt the cooperation with other agencies was very good with one
participant saying, ―99.9% of the time it‘s seamless.‖ This included EMS, fire
department, policing agencies, helicopter services and others. Participants felt they were
able to ―put those egos aside‖ and understand that ―nobody‘s in a turf battle. ―
However, there was at least one episode where a participant felt that the separate
functions of two agencies interfered with each other. John, who was trying to provide
care to patients, felt that he got less than full cooperation from the policing agency with
which he was responding. In discussing the fact that he was providing care and the officer
was merely investigating, he said they had ―two different purposes.‖
Decision making. Finally, a property of this category was decision making.
Decision making is part of the process of SA because as decisions are made and actions
carried out, fundamental changes occur in the situation. This means that new situational
awareness must be obtained from the set of circumstances that are in part, the result of
the decisions that have been made. Decision making impacts and creates SA.
The decisions that must be made in emergency response situations were many
times made rapidly, under a great deal of pressure and with incomplete information. The
decisions involved issues including; deciding on which resources to utilize, how best to
transport patients, which personnel should care for which patients and many others.
These determinations and choices carried very serious consequences. In one case, a
young fire fighter was told not to go back into a potentially unsafe situation to avoid risk
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and to avoid damaging an investigation. He told me of the decision of his superior
officer:

So we came back out and he asked me the condition of the patients inside. Asked
me if I thought they were alive or dead. And I told him that it appeared that they
were dead, but I wasn‘t sure. And he asked me if there are any chance that they
could be burnt. And I said no, that we had the fire knocked down there‘s not
gonna…. be burned. And he told me to leave them in place because of the uh, I
guess when they do their investigation they wanna see where the victims were
found. And uh, because there was probably no chance that they were alive.

The gravity of these decisions can be seen in the words of Mark, a fire captain who said:

I hate hazmat scenes. I hate them. I‘ve never liked hazmat, I‘ve never liked the
fact that you can be standing here and your face melting off and you never, you
never smell anything, see anything, nothing. That‘s always been a problem for
me. So, you take a hazmat situation, if, if you‘re not given any information
whatsoever, that it may be a hazmat scene and you get there, and you make the
wrong decision, I mean within a matter of seconds you could be dead.

Decisions about patient care were always difficult. There was increased difficulty
in those scenes which resulted in many casualties as well. These larger scenes changed
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the way patient care was delivered. Therefore, what would not be acceptable in a
situation in which only one patient was involved became necessary when there were
many. Jason a young EMT said it very poignantly:

And the more critical your patients are you really have to make that hard decision
whether you have to pass that person up and go to the next person that‘s, that‘s
more easily fixed, I guess. Because as your number of patients grow, your viable
patients diminish, I think.

The core category of establishing and maintaining control is one of vast
importance with respect to being aware of one‘s surroundings and in acting to control the
components thereof. The category of establishing and maintaining control is comprised of
the properties of the degree to which one establishes and maintains control of one‘s
situational world, of accepting responsibility establishing priorities, coordinating the
efforts of multiple agencies and persons and by decisions making.
Handling Information
Handling information was one of the most important functions of the rescuers.
Handling information is defined as the sharing and collecting of timely information that
is multi-sourced and relevant to the situation at hand. The major properties of the
category include general information handling, initial information, receiving updates and
communication.
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General information. The use of general information had wide dimension.
Information came from many sources including dispatchers, patients, fellow workers,
bystanders and others. Information was both given and received. At times it was not that
needed information was not available, it was that there was simply too much to deal with,
indicating that the timing of information was important. Mark, commenting on the
availability of information, said sometimes it was not the lack of, but the abundance of
information that was the problem. He said, ―But for the initial first responder, I mean the
information you‘ve got to take in and through the different media is just tremendous.‖
He went on to say, ―you‘ve got to get it everywhere.‖ Jane said this:

but it‘s really difficult to balance three radios and a telephone and a dry erase
board and the information that‘s coming to you from everywhere……So it was
just a lot of information coming and we had to make those decisions very quickly.

Information was changing, conflicting, unclear or intentionally misleading. Firsthand information was seen as very helpful and information received or reported could be
about the scene or about patient care. It was also found, as one participant suggested, on
truck placards suggesting that certain chemicals were potentially involved.
Information was not just received but was also provided and in some cases made
critical differences in plans. Jack, speaking about a report of information he gave to his
commanding officer, which in turn changed their plans said, ―So, I immediately went
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over to my captain and I told him, there‘s a man here saying that the occupants are still
inside. And he told me at the time, well, ya‘ll get in there then.‖
Initial information. Virtually every participant discussed how the chain of events
in a rescue began and it was typically by receiving the initial call. This usually came in by
way of their dispatcher. Most of the participants mentioned ―getting the call‖ or
something very similar like, ―the tones went off,‖ or ―the call came in.‖ They
remembered getting the call specifically and in some cases where they were. It was an
important moment that seemed to set into motion the rush of a new challenge. Mark
didn‘t say he got the call, rather he said, ―I remember getting the call.‖ He actually
remembered receiving it. When these calls came in, it gave the responders their first
glimpse into what they were about the encounter. Diane shared: we were dispatched to a
multi-car MVA, um, out in the county. We were told possibly five to six patients. Um,
initially. With one that uh, radio traffic said 1077, which means that they‘re deceased on
scene already.‖ This opening to her interview set the stage for dramatic events. Mike said
that sometimes emergency calls did not come in like you expected them to and you
simply come across the emergency event, like the one that occurred at the end of the
driveway at his station. He referred to these as ―still alarms.‖
Receiving updates. Another important property of this category is receiving
updates. Many comments were made about the importance of receiving or the detriment
of not, receiving updates. These updates were most commonly associated with radio
updates provided to responders on the way to calls. However, some also were face to face
reports from other on-scene providers such as fire fighters of police officers. These
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updates allowed providers to feel that they were being kept in the loop in terms of the
response effort.
Communicating. One of the most frequently cited and most important properties
of this category of handling information was ―communicating‖. Because communicating
provided critical information, how it was carried out was very important. When data were
analyzed under the property of communicating, many codes and references to those codes
emerged. This suggested its importance.
There were many dimensions of the property of communicating, including factors
that inhibited and facilitated communication. In addition, there were the many types of
communication used in all stages of the response effort. Finally, there were the people
involved in the communication
The first facilitating or inhibiting factor was the proximity of the communicators
to one another. Many participants mentioned being close enough to talk to, or yell at each
other on a scene. The greater the separation, the greater was the difficulty in
communicating. Responders preferred not to use radio communications except where
absolutely necessary. Mike a fire captain described what he liked to do on scenes that
were complicated enough to have several agencies involved. He said this:

…we use, in our response is what you won‘t find in the book but what I call the
wagon wheel theory of you‘ve got a hub of incident command, everybody else
physically stands close enough to talk. Uh, in other words, if I‘m the fire incident
commander and we were on a multi-casualty scene, I want a representative from
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the transport group standing within arm‘s reach or voice reach of where I‘m
standing. I want law enforcement standing within arm‘s reach or voice length of
where we are. We‘re in a circle and we‘re talking.

This quote revealed the closeness in proximity that most preferred in conversing
about scene management. It indicated that the main players involved were in close
proximity to the incident commander; they were equal distance from him/her and no one
was the priority, but all were important. It was the timing and the priority of the
information that gave them audience with the commander and not their simple position.
Likewise, the more separated rescuers were, the less effectively they were able to
communicate.
Other factors that limited communication were, simply being too busy, the lack of
infrastructure to provide common radio frequencies, heavily coded or encrypted
messages and having to focus on too many different things at once. The timing of the
communication was also critical and could be hindering. What may be important
immediately to a dispatcher may not seem to be the priority to an on-scene responder
trying to command the scene, direct personnel and even provide care. This frustration
was clearly seen in the words of a well-seasoned fire captain who was getting so many
requests from his dispatcher for updated information while trying to manage a
complicated scene that it caused him to say,‖ I do recall a problem, you know at one
point, wanting to just take the radio and just pitch it out the window.‖ His link to the
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outside world and the help that he needed had become a major frustration rather than a
help.
Another major dimension of communication was the type of communication.
Radio and face to face communications, hand signals and body language all were used.
They all played an important role in communications.
The most frequently mentioned type of communication was radio communication.
It was the primary means of communicating prior to scene arrival and in many cases
afterwards. However, there were limitations. Radio signals were limited to ―line of site‖
which means that obstructions such as mountains, trees and buildings reduced the
effectiveness in areas where these were present. Frank said when he was responding to a
shooting call, his entire fire engine crew only had one radio. This limited who could talk
and to whom. How important Frank felt that radio was can be seen in his comment about
it. He said it was, ―our link back to help.‖
Other limitations to radio communications included the fact that some responders
were reluctant to say certain things over the radio. Mark said there was,‖ hesitancy to, to
transmit all, information that you need to over a radio.‖ There was also the issue of
overuse of the radio. This overuse meant people talking more than was necessary and
therefore tying up air time. The radios were ―half duplex‖ which meant that only one
person could talk at a time. Bill, a physician who responds to scenes with the EMS
responders he oversees said this about ineffective radio communications: ―You know, uh,
with the multiple, again, I‘m scanning several frequencies at this point, the fire
department and our frequency. You know, and sometimes volunteer fire department
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people tend to scream in the radio.‖ Radio communications were sometimes
intentionally limited. An example was the radio silence required to provide for safety
when landing a helicopter.
Several factors improved radio communications. Using the radio to span distance
was the most obvious of benefits. There were dedicated radio frequencies for use on the
scene that were not used for dispatch. There were other dedicated radio channels such as
ones for hospital or off-scene physician communication. More channels did not
necessarily relate to all agencies being in the loop. Mike said this:

Um, from the fire service, one of the areas we talk about, and I know it‘s a big
buzz word in the response community today is interoperability. Uh, it actually
goes a little deeper than the radio channels. Uh, we have a special channel that we
use, depending – we got four different tactical channels in our organization that
we use that we know what we‘re gonna be on, uh, however, that doesn‘t help us
with law enforcement, or the transporting agency.

It was also mentioned by a fire captain that one could know that a scene was bad
by the volume of radio communication. The implication was that when responders were
busy, radio communication was reduced. Mark said, ―if you‘re sitting at a station whether
it be EMS, fire, whatever, they get on a scene and you think it‘s bad and you don‘t hear a
lot of radio traffic, most times it‘s bad.‖
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A further dimension of the property of ―communicating‖ was face to face
communications. By far most providers preferred face to face communications to radio.
The reasons included being able to be more free with the conversational language, being
able to avoid special radio codes and being able to say as much or as little as one needed
without tying up the radio. Some providers mentioned having to ―yell‖ at each other from
some distance as a means of verbal face to face communication. Eye contact and body
language were also mentioned as being important to face to face communication. Being
able to see and interpret body language was an important method of communication.
Darrell had this to say on the issue:

I like the face-to-face only because again, you get to kind of almost see some
body language of the person giving you the report. And you can maybe see that
they‘re not in their normal stance, or maybe not as relaxed as you‘ve seen them
before, or they‘re out of breath. Because they had to run from where the patient
was because they were so excited to tell you. Or, thought it was so urgent to run
to you. Where on a radio you might not get that, ability to feel them and to sense
that…..impending doom I guess.

He went on to say, ―you can see when they‘re rattled.‖ Finally, another communication
type was the recent use of cell phone pictures to convey the seriousness of the mechanism
of injury to other providers including hospital staff and the use of runners in situations in
which it was warranted.
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On scene commanders had communicative interactions with other on-scene
personnel, other commanders, dispatchers, bystanders, victims, law enforcement officers
and others. Those involved with direct patient care communicated with hospital personnel
and physician advisors. There were very critical communications between ground crews
and air evacuation personnel.
Handling information included general information handling; initial information
through the receipt of the call; receiving updates, typically but not exclusively received in
route to an emergency; and communicating. Communicating included those issues which
facilitated and inhibited communications, the modes of communications and the people
involved in the communications.
Roles and Relationships
Roles and relationships as a category is defined as the roles played by various
people both professional and non-professional, and the pre-existing relationships that
impacted the development and use of SA on the scene of an MCI. The professional and
team roles, the roles of those with whom rescuers interacted on the scene, and
relationships with and among providers, constitute the properties of this category.
Professional and team roles. The professional role and the team role that rescuers
played in an emergency response were primary drivers of the situational world over
which responders attempted to gain control. Because these two roles mostly interacted
with each other, they are viewed together. Professional roles included EMT, paramedic,
nurse, fire fighter and physician. In addition to this professional role however, there was
the role one played on one‘s particular team. A fire fighter/EMT may be the captain of
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the crew and therefore may have responsibility for the IC role. A fire fighter/paramedic
on the same crew may be assigned by the captain acting in the IC role, to do initial triage,
report back and then begin caring for the most critically ill or injured patient. These two
providers were a part of the same crew, but had entirely different situational worlds with
which to be concerned. The professional role, along with the expected and perceived
team role had an impact on what a provider needed to know and do on the scene of an
emergency.
The following are some exemplars of this phenomenon. Kyle a flight
nurse/paramedic, conveying his thoughts on his professional role and the roles of others,
said this.

Inter-facility transports I think bring out more of the nurse in my training and
background, where scene flights bring out more of the paramedic in my
background. Uh, all of our flight nurses are required to be at least an EMT
basic……..Uh, and that is so that the nurse who may have been trained for
example in the CVICU for ten years would be a marvelous inter-facility cardiac
transport nurse, but they may not have much background in pre-hospital
medicine. And at least the training of an EMT basic gives them a perspective.

He went on to say:
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I was trained paramedic first, nurse second. One of our other flight nurses was
trained nurse first, paramedic second. She actually chose to go all the way through
paramedic instead of stopping at EMT basic. And the perspective she keeps to me
appears more that of a nurse. Where my perspective is almost still that of a
paramedic with a transport agency with a nurse‘s training and education and
widened background.

Dawn felt differently; she felt that being cross-trained as a nurse and paramedic
allowed her to use both courses of education equally and that other than a few particular
skills, nursing had just as much to offer as paramedicine to the patients routinely in her
care as a flight nurse. She said this:

But I would say that the care that I provide and the particular situation of the
patient would be for me just as equal nursing versus paramedic. Now there are
certain skills obviously. Like intubation, um, that nurses don‘t frequently um,
intervene in. So obviously, you‘d have to think that‘s more along the line of a
paramedic, EMS background. Um, but as far as basic resuscitation, as far as
seeing that child in that particular situation, you know starting and IV, obvious,
obvious apnea and pulselessness, CPR, common CPR. Um, you know, as a nurse
I was certified in PALS way before EMS. Way before my paramedic days. Um,
so you think about from that aspect, um, routine IV starting or interosseous
starting, in starting, IV fluids, we‘re taught that in nursing. You know, so for me
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personally from that perspective I would say that just as much of my nursing
knowledge, training, and skill went into that as much as my EMS background.

Mike a fire captain/EMT discussed his own role transition in terms of his on-scene
responsibilities. He said:

You know if you‘re a firefighter – and I love it – it was hard for me to go to
driver/engineer because I wasn‘t going in the fire. And uh…. …there‘s a hard part
to saying my job is right here, I can‘t leave the truck. Those other guys are going
in to fight the fire, and the same thing when you move from that to officer, when
you from that up to officer, you‘re looking at, you‘re probably, you may be going
in to fight the fire to help them, or to guide them, but still you‘ve got more
responsibility and you‘ve got to continuously look broader and I think that‘s what
uh, makes that work.

Professional and team roles varied by scene and depended on the demands of the
scene. Ed, a volunteer fire fighter and EMT discussed using personnel in various ways.
He said he was, ―using that other firefighter even though he wasn‘t trained in the medical
field to kind of corral the crowd and keep an eye on everybody until I had additional
assets there especially the sheriff‘s department.‖ Roles and responsibilities depended on
the type of professional, the expected team role and the requirements of the
circumstances. These dynamic situations required flexibility.
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Interaction roles. Other roles came into play in emergency situations. These roles
were mostly non-professional. The media could not be considered non-professional and
in some cases professional healthcare providers were bystanders. These additional roles
included family members, the media, and bystanders and influenced the behavior of the
responders in some ways, in some cases. The uncontrolled MCI scene allowed many to
access the scene. This was a significant issue.
While most participants saw the media as mostly troublesome, at least one fire
captain saw them as helpful in getting information out to the public. He saw the media as
a resource in certain situations. In contrast, Dawn a flight nurse said she and other
providers were ―staying away from the television personnel.‖
There were frequent and diverse references to bystanders on the scenes of
emergencies. The characterization of bystanders varied widely from ―the best help you‘ll
ever find‖ to ―bothersome‖ to obstructionist. This was a particularly interesting finding
because in no other type of healthcare, would completely untrained personnel be asked or
even allowed to assist in any way with patient care. Jason told of a large event where he
allowed bystanders to assist with accompanying patients to care areas. He said:

And the ones that were still there were the ones that were willing to help. And
looking for, or, you know, wanting to help. And they asked, a couple of them
actually asked if they could do anything. And I said yes, you can walk this patient
to there.
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In some cases, it was the spiritual care of patients that bystanders offered. Bill a
physician, speaking about a catholic priest on the scene of a horrific MVA, seemed
genuinely moved by a scene that he described to me. He said:

I remember this particular scene which was quite interesting; there was a Catholic
priest who came up. And we, you know, he just kind of filtered through the
crowd, uh, of, of people, ‗cause again everyone was stopped. Their cars were
stopped so they couldn‘t go anywhere, so a lot of people were wandering up to
see ……what was the excitement. But this Catholic priest came and gave last rites
to one of our patients who died on the scene. And I thought, you know, I didn‘t
mind that. You know I don‘t know if she was Catholic, and, but, it……it seemed
like a nice…He was……that was his role. Right there. You know. And he, you
know, it was very interesting. And you could see the, people who saw this, the
other bystanders, or even the rescuers, you know, really, that was just unusual for
that to occur.

In some cases people milling around the scene were referred to as bystanders, but
when the participants seemed more overwhelmed with the number of people around
them, or felt obstructed in some way, they referred to the need for ―crowd control.‖
Bystanders also had an impact in another way. Rescuers were aware of the presence of
bystanders, and their presence pressured emergency workers to act. This feeling was
summed up well by Mark, a fire fighter who acknowledged the perception of bystanders.
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…perception is there, perception from, from the bystanders, you know, why
aren‘t you doing anything, as soon as you get off that truck, why are you not
immediately running to that vehicle and being the hero?

He went on to say, ―I mean, you, you‘ve got to feel the pressure there.‖
Bill a physician went on to say that he felt that credentialing of bystanders who
claimed to be healthcare providers was especially difficult because of the time constraints
on an emergency scene. So, the roles of both professionals and non-professionals had an
effect on an emergency scene and how professionals determined what was going on and
what should be done.
Relationships with and among professional responders. In addition to the
particular roles of those on the scene, the relationships that existed and were developed
while running emergency calls together and while involved in training sessions
influenced what happened on emergency calls. According to participants, knowing those
with whom one responded either personally and/or professionally, improved interpersonal function and increased cooperation on emergency scenes. The primary
ingredients were familiarity and trust.
Mike related the role he felt that personal and professional relationships had on
the effectiveness of emergency response efforts.
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Uh, we have found that the, the uh, ability to know who you‘re responding with it
enhances, probably doubles, your effectiveness. One, you‘ve already, you‘re
starting out with a good working relationship. Uh, there‘s gonna be time, from
time to time that we all have areas of responsibility that we‘re responsible for.
From time to time we‘re gonna step on each other‘s toes. Uh, if you know who
you‘re dealing with, it‘s not personal. You know that you‘re trying – everybody‘s
trying to meet the same objective, nobody‘s in a turf battle. Uh, maybe if they step
on my toes they‘re trying to get over there, we‘ll just all walk over there together.
We‘ll make it work. Uh, that helps a lot if you know that. Uh, we have found that
like each of our shifts we work 24 hour shifts. Uh, our transport group works 24
hour shifts……….Normally, I mean they will change around from time to time,
but in general, uh, the same groups have their same days they‘re on, same off
days, so when they come to work the same transport that was one last shift for
them is the same one on this time, so they‘re used to, they pretty much know who
they‘re gonna see if they‘re not displaced each time, and it builds that working
relationship. And the same thing for the command level. Uh, from law
enforcement to Ambulance Service A to transport to all of us work really close
together, we work on emergency events, we work on non-emergency events,
planning them, and all that gives us a pretty good feel of where we‘re gonna be
and how we‘re gonna work together. I think it‘s one of the things - I think we‘ve
had some really successful scenes. And I think that contributes more to it than
anything I know of.
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Darrel discussed relationships making scene response smoother because of the
understanding that partners had with each other. He called the unspoken cooperation
between he and his partner a ―choreographed play...or ..dance.‖ Jack a young fire fighter
who fell down the stairs of a burning structure spoke of his partner waiting for him rather
than getting himself to safety. He said:

It‘s, I think it‘s paramount to have some kind of relationship on the fire
department with your co-workers. Because you know, we‘re, you know, there‘s a
kind of like a brotherhood, you know, we – like he wouldn‘t have waited at the
top of the stairs at the house burning like that for anyone. You know, he cared
about me and that‘s why he stood there and waited.

Others mentioned that having a good relationship may bridge differences between
workers and help to resolve conflicts that may occur with respect to scene management.
A fire captain said that working on scenes and training younger fire fighters forced the
development of trust. He said, ―you train them to the best of their ability and you hope
they can handle that situation.‖
Not all roles and relationships were positive. Providing dimensional variation in
the property of the category, one EMS worker told me that a particular transport service
that they worked with was ―not customer service oriented‖, with the obvious implication
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being that they could be difficult to work with. This could change how some emergency
workers responded to them, decreasing efficiency.
The roles that each responder played and their function on their team had an
impact on the scene. The roles of others on the scene also influenced the scene and
potentially the actions of rescuers. The relationships built between different agencies and
personnel for the most part improved response, but could be detrimental when
dysfunctional. This category strongly impacted how the response effort unfolded.
Managing Resources
Another category of the theory that emerged was ―managing resources.‖ This
category is defined as the actions taken by responders to manage the resources of
personnel equipment and time. The properties of managing resources are managing
personnel, equipment and time. The many dimensions of these properties were the
availability and sufficiency of resources, and the activities of assessing, obtaining,
deploying, distributing, calling for, canceling, matching and assessing utilization of
resources. The management of personnel and equipment was tightly intertwined;
therefore they will be discussed together. Time management will be discussed separately.
Managing personnel and equipment. The resources brought to bear on an
emergency situation were part of what must be managed if rescuers were to strike the
right balance between resource needs and provision. The goal was to match the level of
resource response to the needs of the situation. Often it was better to call for or simply
allow additional resources to respond, if there was a question of whether or not they
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would be needed. This was because rescuers could always cancel them later if they were
not needed.
Before resources could be managed they had to be sent. Some responders felt that
agencies always seemed overwhelmed. Mark, a fire fighter and captain of an engine
company said:

I think everybody across the country or world or whatever will probably face this
problem is from a standpoint that you never have enough people. You really
don‘t, especially initially. Uh, you know, and that‘s understandable. You know
cities can‘t, or municipalities can‘t afford, you know, to give you ten people on a
fire truck. You know, that‘s just not common business sense.

Seth, speaking about an incident in which another air evacuation helicopter would
have been useful said, ―And you know, being in air medical service, just like, well, we
can‘t get more aircraft just for this one event. ‗Cause it‘s just not…money‘s not there.‖
More resources may be desired or even needed, but that didn‘t mean they were
necessarily available.
In some cases there were basic resources that were sent based on context, for
example, a house fire or car accident. Mike, a fire fighter said this about the basic
resources that were sent to a scene.
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Well, it, we have an automatic number on, like we send on an initial call, say a
wreck, a wreck with entrapment. Uh, obviously if we talk about a house fire we –
most of our standard events we have an automatic number sent.

Echoing this dispatcher-driven resource application, John, an EMS provider responding
to a shooting said:

…..with our communications center, all of our, all of the agencies, uh, here, the
EMS, police, and fire are all in one room and we use the computer aided
dispatch…..So, the, the call actually simultaneously goes out to, to uh, to the
police and EMS at that time, at that time the fire department here locally did not
respond to EMS calls.

Responders needed to assess requirements and utilization in order to match the
resources to the scene that they were faced with. This was difficult because of the
dynamic nature of these scenes. Mike said that it was important to match the command
structure with the resources and with the tasks that the resources must achieve. But, he
also mentioned the importance of staging resources to avoid duplication of tasks and lack
of supervision. He said:

And they want to do something and if you don‘t give them a task they‘ll start a
task and you will replicate and get, get, uh, task number three in front of task
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number one, and then safety gets involved, and so you‘re actually being nonproductive. It can get to a point to where you‘re non-productive……….One of the
most crucial things I‘ve seen on any scene is actually being able to match the
command feature with the resources with the tasks that‘s got to be done,
regardless of what type of medical call, or emergency it is.

Unlike Mark, Mike felt that you could have too many resources. In fact, using a
humorous analogy, he said calling for more resources without clearly knowing what you
are going to do with them is like ―Custer calling for more Indians.‖
Being a leader could sometimes mean dedicating all of your time to insuring that
those you were commanding had what they needed to provide hands-on care. In a rather
large-scale event, Jane, one of the officers in charge made this point. She said:

But, one must lead the troops and sometimes you just have to bite the bullet and
realize that the best thing you can do from your vantage point is to make sure that
they have all the resources they need and that was my job.

Making decisions about the resources to be utilized could mean having to choose
between some resources while eliminating the option of others. Seth, a flight nurse who
anticipated possibly having to transport more than one patient, something they seldom
did in a helicopter, had to choose to leave equipment behind that might be needed, in
order to make carrying more than one patient possible. He went on to say that when they
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arrived on the scene, the rescuers were, ―so outnumbered that it was, I mean, it was
almost to the point that you know, you had to laugh about it.‖ In fact he reported that they
began transporting patients in the back of open trucks.
Manpower and supplies, including vehicles, heavy equipment and things such as
medical supplies had to be managed. Sometimes the resources were well-matched to the
needs of the providers on the scene. Sometimes resources were overabundant and other
times they were grossly under-represented.
Manpower, equipment and supplies must be managed as part of overall resources
utilization. However, time was also considered a highly valuable resource. The
management of time sometimes impacted what and how other resources were utilized.
Managing time. Time was found to be a key factor in the minds of rescuers. This
was primarily due to the fact that getting patients who were injured to definitive care in
the shortest possible amount of time was critical. Responders were acutely aware of time
during all aspects of response: from response time, to the times spent delivering care on
the scene, to transport times. Kyle said that his unit had, ―I would guess at less than 20
minutes from initial dispatch to at the patient‘s side.‖ Mike discussed the issue of time
globally, saying:

I guess what you base that on, what I based that on that day was knowing how
many, uh, how many units I had pretty close by, I, in my mind quickly, very
quickly, I built in a timeframe…….I‘m thinking, I‘m at point X now in time, I‘m
calling for these units, my transport should be arriving in X number of minutes,
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my uh, vehicle, my unit‘s got the extrication tool should be arriving at X number
of minutes. The best I can do is get two more units in X number of minutes. And
maybe I will need some more, but, uh, you kinda develop a thing of calling for the
resources and evaluating when I, when will I have my second report of progress.

Dawn a flight nurse discussing the time it was going to take to get two critically injured
children to the hospital by air, compared it to ground transport, saying:

I would venture to say, considering the situation, that air transport in this
particular situation was very appropriate. I remember we had a 7 to 8 minute
ETA, to the hospital. And given the aircraft, um, that we flew in, um, approximate
crew speed if you will, is 160 miles an hour. So roughly, it would have taken an
ambulance, by ground, at least 16, 20 minutes or more.

As can be seen from Dawn‘s comments, decisions about where and by what
means patients would be transported was another area in which time was frequently
mentioned. With the increase in air-medical transport, providers were often faced with a
vast array of considerations, not only the criticality of the patient, in determining whether
ground or air transportation was most expeditious. Besides whether the patient was
critical enough to justify its use, the decision of whether or not to use air transportation
almost always had to do with the amount of time it would take to accomplish getting the
helicopter there, locating a safe landing zone, loading the patient, getting them to the
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landing zone and loading the patient in the helicopter. Mark, discussing this very issue
said this:

…with Medical Helicopter is yes, it‘s a good asset for out in the county so to
speak, but, traveling distance from City A to Hospital B is really not that bad. Uh,
you know, it‘s kind of iffy call in that a lot of cases it may take just as long, if not
longer, by the time you get Medical Helicopter en route, having to clear traffic,
land them, so on and so forth…

In some cases the time that rescuers had taken providing care for patients was also
a consideration, as seen here in the words of Dawn, a flight nurse:

They continued resuscitation efforts um, they used a Brazlow just as we had used
to verify all of our care and the equipment that we were using, the drug dosages,
um, they continued resuscitation on that baby for probably another ten minutes.
Um, or so, because actively in the field we had been resuscitating for probably
fifteen minutes total.

In one event that occurred, there was a large gathering of people for an air show.
Emergency responders did not expect any weather problems. When they found out that a
severe thunderstorm capable of producing a microburst and strong winds was coming,
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they were taken by surprise and time became a major issue. Jane, an EMS supervisor
said, ―we got 12 minutes.‖
The management of resources, including human resources, equipment and time
proved to be an important category. Deciding what resources were needed and matching
them to the context of the scene, were important functions of EMS providers. A missmatch could produce insufficient resources to efficiently perform the rescue operations or
produce duplication of services and lack of supervision. Managing time impacted arrival
at the scene, on-scene time, time to provide treatment and affected decisions of transport.
The Human Element
Emergency responders are human beings and as such have emotional reactions
that impact them personally and potentially, the job they do. The definition of the human
element category is the range of emotions experienced by providers in response to
emergency situations and their methods of managing the emotions. These two major
components of the definition became the properties of the category.
Emotions experienced and impact. Responders experienced emotion when faced
with the stress of acting under pressure and the human suffering that often occurred
during emergency events. In some cases they described simply and plainly that they had
experienced a particular emotion. In other cases it was my judgment during analysis that
an emotion had been experienced, based on what the provider said and how they said it.
The difficulty faced in discussing this category is capturing completely in written form,
the emotions that these providers conveyed. Many of the emotional responses expressed,
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were conveyed by many of the providers, thus allowing the communication of the
emotions of many, through exemplars.
First, there was the basic desire, or longing to help; to know what to do in an
emergency situation. While some providers, especially the more experienced ones,
wanted to be able to control the scene, the driving force behind the desire to do that was
the desire to help those who were injured. Examples of what both experienced and
relatively inexperienced providers said are presented. First Jason, a young responder with
a limited amount of experience said this:

Because you see a wreck and you see a bunch of people standing around going oh
my gosh, is he hurt? Well, go see if he‘s hurt! Go see if you can do something.
You know, it just seemed common sense to me to try to help. So, I wanted to do
something.

More experienced providers seemed to deal with the emotion of having to let go
of patient care and perform more administrative and oversight functions, that they saw as
less directly involved in actual care. These responders would say, as Jane did, ―it required
some restraint to stand up on top of that hill and direct the troops and not get personally
involved.‖ She was indeed very personally involved, yet felt less so, because of the lack
of patient care duties. She went on to say, ‖you have to step above that‖, because she was
―dealing with bigger issues.‖
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Mark, describing a similar struggle where he was responsible for the overall
scene, but found himself needing and wanting to provide direct care said,‖ it‘s just human
nature, the closer you get to that fire, the more you become, have tunnel vision on that
fire and that fire only; just like I had tunnel vision on that patient and that patient only‖.
Yet justifying what he was doing, he went on to say, ―I needed to be in there, hands on.‖
The need to do something and seeing himself as having too few caregivers, at least at the
moment, caused him to make the decision to provide care. Right or wrong, this decision
could affect the development and maintenance of SA.
Responders also felt emotions of different types during calls. These emotions
included frustration, shock, empathy and emotional pain. Dawn, a flight nurse caring for
two critically injured toddlers, spoke of her feelings as she saw the parents of the injured
toddlers watching as they wheeled one of them, pulseless and apneic, into the emergency
department:

The parents were there. I remember um, thinking how did they get there so quick,
but they did. And Mom was there and I remember thinking how awful that was to
have to roll that baby by her and her see me doing compressions and bagging that
baby.

Darrell described the emotion of having cared for a fellow emergency responder
who was killed while responding to a call saying, ―that really bothered us.‖ He also said
the call was, ―very emotional for us.‖ Seth was on a scene where he was attempting to get
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the accurate history of an event that led to many critically ill young people. He felt that
friends of the victims were being intentionally obstructionist, because of fear of
prosecution or otherwise getting into trouble. He described his feelings as, ―Just pure
anger. Just distracting. Um, and I knew when I got to a certain point, I‘m like, you know,
this is bad ‗cause I feel this way.‖
Others conveyed a feeling of anxiety based on the pressure that they felt to
respond immediately, and to respond appropriately. Mark expressing empathy because
the IC is under pressure said, ―I think initially when you first get there, you know, you
always feel sorry for the initial IC because he‘s got anything and everything to do right
there.‖
John, an EMS provider conveyed the pressure he felt to provide rapid effective
care to a gunshot wound victim:

He was still awake, he was still talking. But, you know, just knowing that he‘s
got, he‘s got that bullet in his chest, you know, that you know, we, even though
we‘re moving as quick as we can in my mind we wasn‘t moving quick enough.
Because the guy had a bullet in his chest.

It was clear that these two providers perceived the pressure and felt the anxiety imposed
by the responsibility to properly perform their jobs in a timely and effective manner.
Managing emotions. While these providers admitted to feeling emotions and
pressures, a very frequent and well-described dimension of this property of managing
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emotions was the need to compartmentalize the emotions as much as possible during the
actual response, in an apparent attempt to mitigate the impact of emotions on their
performance. Several providers described the emotional detachment necessary, as action
that they needed to take. They said they had to, ―try to block it out‖, that they, ―clicked
into a mode‖, and that they ―just kind of flip a switch.‖ Mark, commenting on why this
compartmentalization was necessary said, ―the closer you become to the actual scene
(emotionally), the less you are in charge of the overall scene.‖ Dawn made this very clear
by saying, ―my philosophy is you cry about it after the call.‖
Having at least attempted to compartmentalize the emotions during the call,
participants suggested that it was best dealt with after the call in some specific ways.
Darrell, discussing the difference in what he felt worked and what did not in terms of
mitigating the emotional impact said:

We all have the raw emotions. And we see this stuff every day, and you have to
learn how to deal with it. ‗Cause it will hurt you. I mean EMS and fire of course
have the highest suicide rates and the highest drinking rates, the highest divorce
rates. So you have to learn how to deal with it. And you know, sometimes ours is
adrenaline pumped stuff…..You know, exercise and there‘s a lot of people who
drink and a lot of people who drink a lot. And I just have never found that to
work.
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Dawn captured the feelings of the after-call emotions; where the provider had time to sit
and contemplate on what had just happened.

I remember being tearful afterwards and thinking – that‘s awful! You know, I
remember thinking, not so much from a judgmental perspective, but I remember
thinking could I ever, could I forget my child in a car? You know? Could I do
that? And like I said, not from a judgmental perspective….but I thought, from a
medical perspective, what that baby, what both babies, but particularly that female
child, 17 month old, what she went through to the point of what she was. You
know. That the exhaustion, the suffocation from the heat in the vehicle…..And
you know, you can‘t help but think about that.

Similar to Darrell‘s comments, she went on to describe how those emotions are dealt
with, when she said:

….there‘s positive ways to deal with and there‘s negative ways to deal with it.
And unfortunately, some of my colleagues deal with it a little bit more negatively
than others. You know, some of them go and drown themselves in alcohol after a
shift. And of course that‘s a negative way to deal with it. Um, others will go and
work out in the gym for a couple hours to release their emotions. And it just, what
works for you…
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Many providers discussed being offered professional ways of dealing with their
emotions such as help lines and professional critical incident debriefing. These
responders conveyed that they experienced a range of emotions during and after calls.
The majority mentioned that management of those emotions during the call meant
deferring their dealing with and in some cases even experiencing those feelings
personally, until after the call.
Insuring Safety
The definition of this category is the safety priorities that rescuers set, the threats
faced by those on the scene and the actions taken to protect the safety of those on the
scene. Properties of this category were the goal and priority of insuring safety, threats to
safety, and actions taken to insure safety. In all types of healthcare one might presume
that providing patient care is the most important aspect of what providers do. However,
responders felt that insuring the safety of all those involved in a rescue effort was the
most important aspect of a response.
Goal and priority of safety. Responders felt that the goal of insuring safety was
very important. It meant going in with the attitude of making sure the scene, the
responders, the bystanders and the patients were as safe as they could be. Stan a young
EMS provider said that scene safety started with dispatched information. He said:

..it starts off with dispatch. You know, depending on what the call is, you know,
dispatch may say there‘s a shooting in progress. Well, obviously the scene‘s not
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safe. They would then not even enter that scene until the policing agencies had
insured its safety.

Once at the scene, Mike said that a priority was ―to look at first of all your safety
for your responders, uh, and for the general public.‖ Diane, an EMS provider went further
and said, ―scene safety is the first priority for anything. Um, it doesn‘t matter if you‘re
responding to a medical call with one patient or a mass casualty incident with fifty
patients. Scene safety is the first priority.‖ She left no doubt that it was the most
important factor.
Mark said that meeting the goal of safety was even more challenging when there
were young responders who were anxious to prove themselves.

…that‘s the tough part for an IC, is not being too quick. You know, you ain‘t
gotta worry about the quick part, because you know, and I‘m sure our
department‘s like most other departments, all I gotta do is turn around and I‘ve
got two firefighters back here that are adrenalin junkies.

Ed said the goal was ―to make sure everybody‘s going home at the end of the night.‖
Frank reiterating this goal said, ―Uh, very first thing we‘re gonna do is we‘re gonna make
sure that the people are gonna be safe, whether it‘s blocking the road with a truck, or you
just assessing what‘s going on around.‖
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Some rescuers also prioritized the safety of those on the scene. Some, such as
Diane, were very pointed about the priority of safety for all and for rescuers. She said:

First of all you look up, you look around, you make sure your scene is safe, first
for you, then your partner, then any by – then any other responders, then any bystanders and the patient last. A lot of people say, well, why the patient last? Well,
because you‘ve already got, that‘s already a patient. You have to make sure that
you‘re not gonna end up with more patients because the scenes not safe.

Threats to safety. Rescuers faced many risks. Participants reported fires from
damaged vehicles and structures, downed power lines, risk of violence for a variety of
reasons, traffic hazards (one participant had actually been struck by a passing car before),
the risks inherent to air evacuation, chemical exposures and others. These were the more
traditional risks for which the rescuers had trained. Flight crews had an increased
sensitivity to the risks involved. Flying, many times at night and landing in and taking off
from hastily formed landing zones was very risky.
An NBC news report on February 23, 2009, suggested that the number of medical
flight services has exploded to over 700 nation-wide (Epstein, 2009). In 2008 alone, there
were 13 crashes of medical helicopters, resulting in the deaths of 85 people, making
medical flight the most dangerous type of aviation in the country. The risks may be
settling in to the psyche of flight crews as the words of Seth, a flight nurse showed. After
hearing about needing to provide safety and good patient care on scenes from several
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other participants, I theoretically asked him about the balance between the two. He
pointedly said:

..there is no balance. The whole, my whole thing is that I‘m gonna take care of
myself, I gotta get there safely. If we crash, if we become incapacitated from that,
then we‘ve created yet another, you know, another whole scene that‘s gonna be
bad.

Unspoken, is the fact that he is accepting a level of risk to go to the scene and
help a patient in need. Participants were willing to accept some level of risk to provide
care to those in need. Kyle another flight nurse discussed how the crew; a pilot, a nurse
and a paramedic determined whether they accepted a mission. They all considered the
situation including the weather and then voted on it. While all three had to agree to go,
the dissent of only one crew member could scrub a mission. He said it this way; ―three to
go, one to say no.‖ Jack a young fire fighter, when faced with entering a fully engulfed
structure fire, struck the balance between care and safety when he said:

How much risk can we incur on ourselves for what outcome? You know, are we
gonna risk ourselves just for, you know, nothing. And just try to put a house out
that‘s already completely lost? Or are we gonna risk a lot to save three or four
people? When we heard the man say that the whole family was in the
house…….we decided that was enough to risk a lot for.

146
Participants also spoke of some of the newer threats to the safety of all of those on
the scene. Many providers saw themselves at risk because of a perceived societal
penchant for violence; even violence against rescuers. Frank an EMS worker simply said,
―I think people are more ready to use, uh, physical force than they would in the past.‖ He
went on to say, ―the times are not the same.‖ Other responders echoed this feeling, with
John saying, ―it‘s a different world today.‖ John went on to suggest that even training has
changed dramatically in response to evolving safety issues in the field.

Uh, it‘s actually, it‘s actually taught when, when, when folks go through their
paramedic training now, one of the – the first things they‘re taught is when they
arrive on the scene is to evaluate the scene and they want to know if the scene is
safe or not. When I took my paramedic training over 25 years ago, it, they didn‘t
teach that. They taught that you just went in and you got your patient and if it was
an unsafe scene you got out of there.

Other more recent problems were the threats posed by newer hybrid vehicles.
When the fire department has to cut into a vehicle, cars that use electricity for propulsion
pose increased risks for electrical shock during extrication procedures. As Mike stated,
because hybrid vehicles are electrically powered, ―that patient can move one foot,
accidently hit the gas and run over you or other responders because there‘s no engine to
make a sound.‖
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Another sign of the times was a comment by Seth a flight nurse who responded to
a scene where there were multiple unconscious people at a party. While considering all of
the possibilities, he knew that if for example, someone had been manufacturing
methamphetamine, it would impact his ability to transport. He stated that it was actually
against FAA rules for him to transport, saying:

It happens, um, the meth, uh, this meth craze that‘s going around has really, I can
think of three cases this summer alone in which we responded and they said yeah,
they‘re burned, it‘s a meth lab explosion. Have you decontaminated them? We‘ve
got them wrapped up. That‘s not good enough. Have you done the steps, has
somebody that‘s certified to do it done it. We don‘t have anybody certified to do
it. We can‘t put them in our aircraft.

These new threats to safety have had an impact on what crews understood about their
own risks, about the decisions that they made and how they protected themselves.
Actions taken to provide safety. Taking action to protect those on the scene, meant
being cognizant of the risks posed by a particular incident and taking action to minimize
those risks. Responders suggested that how their vehicles were parked in a way that
blocked traffic, looking for downed power lines, fire hazards, placards on vehicles
involved, traffic directing, the wearing of reflective vests and personal protective
equipment, were all actions taken to make the scene safe.
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One of the first actions for protection was inaction. Mark said it was important
that they ―don‘t rush in‖ and that what was also important was ―not being too quick.‖ He
went on to say that sometimes you had to refer to professionals outside of the medical
field, saying, ―Well, we‘re not electricians. I don‘t know if there‘s any power in that or
not, so, now you‘re talking about a response from a, from the utility company to make
sure the power‘s off.‖ Mike, a fire captain said what makes the scene safe in some
instances is, ―stopping any further damage.‖ He related the story of a bus that ran over
and was sitting on top of a car with the wheels still turning even though the driver was
out of the bus.

..so our first task in everything that was going on, was to go inside the bus uh,
pull on the air brake and get the engine shut down. To stop, to stop any further
damage of, keep it from coming on into the car where the seriously injured
patients were. Uh, at that time we were able to do that, uh, the patients were
entrapped in the car.

A flight nurse, responding to a scene of unknown mechanism of injury mentioned
that in terms of landing zone safety, how they approached the scene and where they
landed was important ―so we‘d be landing upwind.‖ The safety of a landing zone was
extensively spoken about by every air medical flight responder. It was important enough
that ground crews assigned the locating and securing of a landing zone to an ―LZ
commander.‖
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Sometimes the action to ensure safety was communication with other responders,
such as policing agencies. John responded to a courthouse shooting in which a man killed
or critically injured several members of his family. He received safety information from a
police officer he knew who told him, ―we have the dad in custody.‖
Adherence to policy also provided safety. This was the case with Jack, who
related his department‘s policy concerning entering a burning building, ―Like you have a
two in, two out policy…If you don‘t have a partner to go in with you just don‘t go in.‖
Participants wanted to provide excellent patient care, but they recognized the need
to do that without creating new victims; themselves and bystanders. So then, safety is the
priority and the patient care can only be undertaken if it can be accomplished with a
reasonable risk to benefit ratio. Safety becomes a condition which must exist at least
relatively, before patient care can be provided.
Patient Care
Patient care was an important part of the stories the participants told. Patient care
was defined as the actions taken by responders to triage, care and dispose of patients.
This category resulted in the desired consequences (along with safety) of the response.
The primary properties of patient care were the triaging, caring and the disposition of
patients.
Triaging. Triage revealed itself as an early property of patient care. However, the
order in which patients received care and the amount of care received was at least
potentially altered in multi-casualty scenes. ―Triage‖ was not even necessary where only
one patient needed care. Even on MCIs, where there were sufficient care providers and
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few patients, care was provided very similarly to situations in which there was but one
patient. However, triaging or sorting patients based on survivability and resource
utilization was very frequently mentioned by participants. They reported that the mere
fact that an incident was an MCI, automatically altered how patients were assessed and
treated. This change in procedure was difficult for providers who were infrequently
impacted by its constraints. Diane, an EMS provider who is also a nurse explained it this
way:

….if you only have one, we‘ll say two patients total. Um, you typically can focus
all of your energy and, and, um, attention to those one to two patients. However,
if you have more than two patients, we‘ll say seven at this point, using this
example. You have to look at them, for example we do a start triage, simple triage
and rapid transport. You go up to a patient who‘s obviously unresponsive; they
don‘t have their eyes open. You do the basic hey, hey, you okay? If they don‘t
respond you look, listen, feel. If they‘re breathing, open the airway, if they‘re not
breathing, but you‘ve got five or six other patients you know about, and you‘ve
already done the manual jaw thrust to open the airway and they‘re still not
spontaneously breathing, you have to stop what you‘re doing with them and move
on to the next one.

Mark said this change was necessary so that ―you save the ones you can.‖ In
contrast, a single pulseless, apneic patient, being cared for in a situation where the
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resources were not overwhelmed or even potentially overwhelmed, would receive the full
attention of providers. However, in MCI the amount of care that one may receive was
clearly, in some ways, rationed. John suggested that a provider in this situation cannot
linger and provide definitive care saying; ―You‘ve got to move on.‖ To establish what
should be done and for whom, it was important to know the number and acuity of the
patients. Ed said, ―I tried to assess number of patients and priorities as soon as possible.‖
Rescuers also suggested that when there were multiple patients involved, it was
important to reassess patients frequently. Diane said that initial triage was certainly not
the end of assessment.

And we did that you know, we went back several times and re-checked the
patients. Okay, has anything changed on your patient? No, you‘re still good,
nothing‘s changed, that bleed is controlled, okay, good. And move on to the next
one and re-check them. And that‘s how you do triage.

Therefore, the care that the patient received was decided in brief moments of time, based
on specific triage criteria.
Caring. Caring as a specific property of patient care had many dimensions. The
first was utilizing the mechanism of injury in determining patient condition. This was
separate from triage. Most participants mentioned using an assessment of the mechanism
of injury as an indication of how and to what extent the patient was potentially injured.
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Ed provided an explanation of a basic assessment of mechanism of injury for an MVA
saying:

Typically to identify the mechanism of injury takes about all of fifteen seconds.
You can just walk around, do a visual inspection of the vehicle, uh, look at the
body panels of the vehicle and determine whether there was significant
protrusion, penetration into the passenger compartment which is a big cause of
penetrating injuries, um, whether the airbags were deployed, uh, what the front
end of the car looked like, was the roof crushed, were the seatbelts being worn or
were they frayed, or were they just not being used at all.

John, responding to a shooting, found out that there might be multiple
mechanisms. The scene to which he responded involved a shooting in which three people
were shot outside of a courthouse. Another man had sustained a broken ankle jumping off
of an elevated platform in an attempt to avoid the shooter.
Diane, suggested that the patient may need to be treated and transported based
solely on the mechanism of injury, despite lacking obvious injury or pain. She said:

Due to the mechanism of injury, we convinced him to go ahead and get
transported to seek treatment, make sure he was okay, with the adrenalin and
everything going it was very, good possibility that he couldn‘t feel his injuries at
the time. But he had struck vehicles head-on.
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Mike added, ―Once we‘re normally arriving the, the big thing is looking at that
mechanism of injury.‖ This was important to responders as a first step in providing care.
Assessment of the mechanism of injury was where care began. Patient care was a
very important part of what these responders were doing. However, certain conditions
had to exist for the care to take place (see the category of Safety). Assessing the
mechanism of injury led to anticipating what might be wrong with the patient so that care
could begin.
Participants described caring for victims in several ways. Since these situations
occurred in uncontrolled settings outside of a healthcare facility, in some instances
patients initially had to be located. Multiple participants mentioned having to find
patients. One participant was involved in a large outdoor event where large tents
collapsed creating debris that had to be searched through. Another mentioned searching
for victims in a burning structure fire. Another participant told of victims involved in an
MVA that were hiding in the woods for fear of facing the legal consequences of the
accident.
Providing direct care to patients was very important to participants. One
participant said, ―the care was my primary concern.‖ Another said, ―patient care is always
a priority.‖ This last statement also was important concerning responder priorities. Care
was a priority, not necessarily the priority. While locating patients was sometimes
difficult, even when located, access was sometimes limited. Some patients had to be
extricated from crumpled vehicles before advanced care could be delivered.
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Actual medical and nursing care provided was thoroughly described by many
participants. Patients were assessed beyond simple triage and treated for their injuries.
Some of the descriptions were very dramatic. Dawn discussing her treatment of two
toddlers with severe heat related injuries said,

…my partner and I went right to work. As you do often times in that situation not
thinking about actually what you‘re doing. But we quickly obtained an airway on
the female. Um, I did a quick evaluation. She was apneic. There was no pulse rate
palpable and no audible um, heartbeat. Um, her extremities in quick evaluation
were already stiffening if you will. Her eyes were, pupils were fixed and dilated.
They were already glazed. Of course I‘m looking at all of this and examining this
as I‘m getting my equipment ready.

Others discussed scenes far less dramatic. Jason tells of treating a simple scalp laceration
among many patients who required treatment. He said,

―.. the gentleman and he had a very large triangular shaped laceration on the back
right side of his head, from just above his ear down to the base of his neck. So, we
got as much gauze as we could ......and …held that in place.‖
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Not just the physical care was mentioned. Frank, in the middle of caring for
multiple shooting victims felt it was important to acknowledge family members‘ losses.
He said,

You know, but just our general approach to them and trying to talk with them and
you know, be reassuring that we‘re gonna, we‘re doing everything for them. You
know, you know, what can you say to them? You know, ‗cause they‘ll, you know,
‗cause they‘ll ask you, you know, they‘ll say what, I know she didn‘t survive, you
know, No sir, she didn‘t. I‘m sorry. She didn‘t make it……I mean, you know,
they knew it. And uh, that‘s hard to do sometimes because you know sometimes
people need to hear that…..You know, you have to obviously be a little bit
empathetic with them.

Providing patient care also required other considerations. Care of patients many
times had to be released or transferred from one provider to another, either because of
transport necessity, or because an arriving responder was more highly trained, and
therefore the most qualified to provide the care. Some fire services had paramedics who
responded, even though the department didn‘t have transport capability. This required
coordination of care. Mark related the particulars of this type of situation, saying:

Ambulance Service A may not necessarily agree that we need Medical Helicopter.
So, certainly, which is within their right, which, again, creates another problem,

156
uh, because if you go back and you look at protocol so on and so forth, the initial
paramedic on scene is actually in charge of the patient until he releases that care.
So, you know, actually he‘s got a, if he doesn‘t ride in…

Jason mentioned allowing more qualified personnel to take over. He related the following
story:

I guess, the protocol, I‘m not sure if it‘s even written or not, but when some of the
higher rank shows up there and it‘s your patient, you have the option to give that
patient to the higher rank. And all the Medical Helicopter people are paramedics,
so, when the paramedics, the Medical Helicopter people showed up, I didn‘t
really have a problem with kind of stepping out of their way, ‗cause they had
more of the equipment and, to me it was more foolish to be the one that wanted to
be ―the patient care provider‖ and I didn‘t have all the equipment and I‘d have to
keep going to them to get the equipment. It made more sense to let them step right
in front of me…

Further clarifying this issue was Stan, who is a basic EMT. He relates:

Um, usually we just, you know, we take, we split up. And you know, if I have the
worse patient of the two, or have however many, he‘ll usually go with them and
I‘ll go to the less injured patient. ‗Cause he has the higher level of care……He‘s a
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paramedic and I‘m an EMT basic. He has, you know, advanced life support
capabilities, where mine are basic.

Another dimension of the property of caring also included seeking advice from
facility-based medical and nursing personnel. Many times responders would chose or
were required to contact a facility for orders and to report on the patient‘s condition.
A unique dimensional variation of the property of caring, is the act of
discontinuing care. When multiple patients were involved, not only did triage change, but
in one case, care was discontinued. Bill, a physician, responded to a MVA where a
relatively large number of patients were injured, some critically. Since the manpower was
stretched thin by the demands of the scene, Bill, and another physician who stopped to
help, actually discontinued care that had been initiated. He told the story this way:

Well, the worst one was that particular patient there who had an open skull
fracture with brain, obvious brain injury, but was still, was unresponsive, but was
still breathing. And had a slow heart rate when we finally got her extricated and
so we, you know, intubated her and tried to, you know, but, you know, she
continued to deteriorate even though, after the airway was established. And we,
you know, the other doctor and I, just, decided not to do CPR.

Patient care was a very important part of what responders did on MCI. The care
that was provided affected what rescuers planned for. Patients were triaged and cared for
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by means of assessing mechanism of injury, providing medical and nursing care and
utilizing the most highly trained personnel possible. In some rare cases where resources
were overwhelmed and for the good of all involved, discontinuation of care took place.
However, patient care was not complete until victims were disposed to facilities that
provided definitive care.
Disposition. Patient disposition was another described property of the overall
category of patient care. Disposition included deciding by what means patients were
transported and to what facility. Important factors were the proximity of the hospital and
the capability of the facility.
Early on in the situation, it was important for the responder to begin considering
what transport modalities and facilities might be required. Frank discussed this issue and
said:

…you gotta start noticing location of your local hospitals. Because, if……you‘ve
got more than one hospital can handle, then you gotta start talking about notifying
other hospitals.

In some cases, there were sufficient numbers of patients involved so that a transport area
was established. Jason discussed this issue, saying:

Right about then the emergency responders……decided to set up a transport area
which was behind us and to the right. So it was closer to the emergency response
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vehicles. We then moved our patients that could, well, all the patients at that
point, we moved them all down to the transport area and we had started setting
up….And that was our central location for the transport area.

Transport time to the facility was also an issue. Mark spoke about consideration
of transport time and said:

Especially in given in that, in that where we‘re located. Now obviously if, if we‘re
out here in City T, that may be a different case because it is, it does take longer to,
not only for Ambulance Service A to get there, and when I say Ambulance
Service A, any ambulance to get to our location here, but it‘s gonna be longer
getting them back into the hospital.

The question of transport time along with patient acuity, also led to many
responders to choose the use of air medical services, assuming they were available. Many
factors had to be taken into consideration including the availability of a suitable location
to land the helicopter, the freeing of manpower to prepare the landing zone and man it, as
well as the dispatch and response times of the helicopter. Several providers said that it
was at times a very difficult decision, especially if ground transport was not lengthy.
Mark spoke to this issue and said:
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Trying to make a decision and decide, you know, which is gonna be the faster
route, uh, I think in the end, what wound up making the difference in that was
traffic was backed up that we would have had to land Medical Helicopter far
away anyway, that we would have had to load them in an ambulance and carry
them to it, to the helicopter anyway, which would have been a delay.

It wasn‘t just the receiving facility location that was important. It was also
important to match patient acuity to the capabilities of the facility. Patients who were not
critically injured could request a certain hospital, even if it was not the closest facility.
However, according to John, an EMS provider who was dealing with a multiple shooting
situation, critical patients required transport to the closest, capable hospital.

….the one in his chest, obviously went to the closest and the level one trauma
center. You know, the other two, could have if they would have requested, to go
to another hospital. They could have. But those two, we didn‘t ask the guy with
the bullet in his chest which one he wanted to go to because we could almost see
it from where we were.

Even the helicopter personnel had to decide which facility may be most
appropriate. Kyle, a flight nurse made this statement, ―and we were in the situation where
we were just less than five minutes difference to the two but we were closer to what we‘d
consider our base hospital. So we transported there.‖ In one case in which many people
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were injured in a single vehicle MVA roll-over, those involved were from out of state and
were transported to a hospital with very minor injuries, because as Bill said,

And they didn‘t have any family here. Again, they were from State A, or
something like that. And so, and the mechanism of injuries. So it‘s like
everybody is going even if you just have a scrape, you know, just because, well,
that‘s the only place to go!

In terms of patient care, the properties were triaging, caring and patient
disposition. Triaging assisted personnel in determining what kind and how much care
would be needed. Caring took on many forms from assessing the mechanism of injury
and the patient, to providing direct physical treatment and in some cases psychological
comfort. Disposing of patients required responders to begin assessing early what modes
of transportation and which facilities might be needed, as well as properly matching
patients to transport and facility types based on time and resources available.
Categorical Relationships
In grounded theory it is important to describe the relationships that exist between
categories. This step is what makes grounded theory what it is. The relationships that
emerged are presented here.
The core category was establishing and maintaining control. This category was
the anchor that held the other activities in place. Whether the purpose of a responder was
to provide incident command or to care for the most critically injured or ill patient, there
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was the need to establish some control over the scene, maintain that control and thus meet
responsibilities by managing the other categories involved. Based on its position in the
theory, establishing and maintaining control indirectly connected all of the other
categories in the theory.
Participants were attempting to establish control over their own situational world.
In the theory schema, establishing and maintaining control occupies a central location.
This is because participants revealed that even though the ultimate goals were to establish
a relatively safe environment in which to provide patient care, this goal could not be
achieved until they had established priorities, coordinated efforts and made decisions,
which are the primary properties of establishing and maintaining control.
The following statement by Jane reveals the relationship between the category of
handling information, of which communication was an integral property and the category
of establishing and maintaining control, of which decision-making was an integral
property.

..it‘s really difficult to balance three radios and a telephone and a dry erase board
and the information that‘s coming to you from everywhere……So it was just a lot
of information coming and we had to make those decisions very quickly.

Decisions made and the actions taken, then feed back into the pool of information
of which one must be aware. The following example from a scene where Mark was the
IC shows the centricity of this category. He discussed requesting additional resources,
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because his own crew‘s role was not transporting patients, but that was someone else‘s
role. In addition, he had to establish priorities, coordinate with multiple agencies while
handling information through communicating with dispatch and the additional resources.
And all of this was done to provide safe patient care. He said:

There, there, there are certain, there‘s more coordination if nothing else that‘s got
to be considered. Uh, for example, uh, you know I mentioned the fact of multiple
units that we had to request. Uh, if we would have been transporting on our own,
would, would have been a lot easier process just from the simple fact I get on my
radio and call the station. Call one of the other stations. You know, bring me
another ambulance.

None of the functions of control can be accomplished without communications,
one of the major properties comprising the category of handling information.
Communication is necessary for managing resources, another category. Darrel spoke of
getting to the scene and realizing he needed another paramedic unit. He said: ―We did
that once we got there and saw that we had two, true priority ones, or you know, life
threatening patients, we called for a second unit, and one was already being dispatched.‖
This exemplar reveals that he was making decisions which established control. He was
also managing resources and communication was required to do that. Managing resources
feeds back into establishing and maintaining control as well when responders arrive,
begin performing their functions and report back.
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Experience as a background, affected every category and in turn was altered by
each one. In filling the background, all decisions made and actions taken on a scene were
impacted by a participant‘s response history. In addition, the interval actions, which
included education, training, drills, self-critiques and others, added to experience but less
so than actual responses. However, the interval actions and the emergency response
experience of the individual came together to make up a matrix against which the rescuer
responded and acted. In turn, the scene itself added to the experiential level of the
responder and subsequently contributed to decisions about what occurred in the interval
action.
The core category of establishing and maintaining control was impacted by
experience in that having experience allowed one to have what Mike described as ―a
multi-dimensional view.‖ This view was something that he suggested was only developed
through much experience. From handling information to managing resources, to
recognizing the roles each responder played and the relationships that existed among the
responding personnel, experience changed how one reacted. Sometimes experience
affected more than one other category at a time. Mark discussed how experience in
handling information through communication, increased the ability to appreciate context
and complexity. He said, ―I have experienced, uh, you know when you get on a scene and
you don‘t hear a lot of radio traffic, you know something‘s going on, because people are
busy.‖ Someone with little experience may interpret the lack of radio communications
differently. Experience, or the lack thereof, had a impact on how the process of SA
developed.
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Experience made a difference in terms of creating a safe environment (safety).
Inexperience could create a situation where younger, less experienced responders might
be somewhat hasty in acting, even to their own peril. Mark said it was important that he
take responsibility for the less-experienced responders, which he referred to as ―adrenalin
junkies‖, by making sure that they ―don‘t rush into anything.‖ Experience seemed to
create a more thoughtful, sober-minded approach to safety.
Lastly, experience had an impact on the care that was provided. Bill, an
emergency responder and physician explained how experience could come into play in
patient care:

..what‘s the best way, quickest way, without, you know, jostling the patient too
much. And so experience has a great deal to do with that. And also knowing what
to anticipate. You know, I see this particular injury, or something, um, I may be
looking for a potential complication as opposed to I‘ve, you know, I‘m
inexperienced, I‘m, you know, I see a, you know, a, a head injury, but I didn‘t
think about the neck too.

Experience had an impact on the entire process of situational awareness. It
provided the condition of preparedness of the responders to the incident. It changed the
way participants generally reacted to it. Jack, when asked about how the level of
experience of the responder impacts the scene, said:
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I think it‘s one of the biggest aspects of it all. I think that once you‘ve experienced
certain things and have seen things with your own eyes, and know that may be the
same as what you read in the book, or it may differ. I think it‘ll certainly, um,
change the way you think and react to situations.

Against the background of the provider‘s knowledge and experiential mix,
participants respond to contextually-based incidents. Responders had to begin to
appreciate what type of event they were dealing with and how they would respond. This
created a direct and linear relationship from the category of interval action to appreciating
context and complexity and on to establishing and maintaining control.
Responders used properties of appreciating context and complexity to make sense
out of what was happening on the scene. This not only occurred through the senses of the
responders when they arrived at the scene, but also before they arrived in the form of
dispatch and other radio information. This relationship demonstrated the category of
handling information having a relationship with establishing and maintaining control, but
also an additional diagrammatically depicted relationship with appreciating context and
complexity.
After responders have appreciated, or are at least in the process of appreciating
the scene that they are responsible for, they begin to establish priorities, coordinate
efforts and make decisions, which are the primary properties of establishing and
maintaining control (the core category). Therefore a clear relationship exists between the
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categories of establishing and maintaining control and appreciating context and
complexity.
The core category also influentially reciprocates with the category of roles and
relationships. The controller must know what roles other providers play in terms of
professional discipline and their particular function on their team. Participants feel that
the relationships, both personal and professional, strongly affect rescue efficiency and
effectiveness.
A responder‘s role may be more readily recognized and the personal and
professional relationships that may develop, may be strengthened, as a result of having
responded together before (experience) or by having trained together (Interval action).
So, while roles and relationships may impact an emergency situation, it may be a
responder‘s experience responding with others that has developed that relationship.
Therefore, the relationship between the category of roles and relationships and experience
is very strong.
In a very telling example, Kyle who is a flight nurse/paramedic responded to a
scene where one of the flight paramedics he works with was working on the ground crew.
When describing the scene that was most helpful in terms of receiving the information
that he needed in order to establish SA, he said, ―my comfort, and confidence in the
scene and the information I was being given was the presence of one of our flight
paramedics, working as a ground paramedic.‖ The fact that he knew and trusted the
person based on their professional relationship brought him comfort and confidence.
Establishing and maintaining control also mediated the relationship between roles and
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relationships and handling information, because communications between providers must
take place if efficient action is to be taken.
In the minds of many providers there was a connection between Interval Action –
Ongoing and Roles and Relationships that may in some instances create a bypass
mechanism circumventing appreciating context and complexity. These providers
expressed that if someone that they trusted told them something about the scene, they
would accept it. Those whose situational worlds involved primarily patient care, did not
feel as strongly about this mechanism, and felt that patient care required a fresh look from
them, even if they trusted the person giving report.
Managing resources interacts with the core category directly and with the other
categories indirectly through the core. Establishing and maintaining control is highly
related to the managing of resources, and when they are poorly controlled, providers
either feel over-whelmed or they feel out of control. Requiring and calling for more
resources, involves handling information which is an example of the core category‘s
mediation of the other categories, in this case managing resources.
The category of the human element also interacted with and was mediated
through the core category. Relationships are depicted in the theoretical model between
the human element and establishing and maintaining control because participants said
that when emotion was high, less control was established or maintained. Participants felt
strongly about compartmentalizing their emotions and addressing them after their
responsibilities on the scene had been relieved.
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Finally, establishing and maintaining control meant establishing priorities,
coordinating efforts and making decisions in an effort to do something. That ―something‖
is insuring a relatively safe scene so that competent and adequate emergency care can be
provided to victims of the incident. This involves striking a balance between safety and
patient care. Participants felt that the balance reached had to be in favor of safety. This
was because if rescuers are injured, then they cannot provide care and they become
liabilities rather than assets.
Patient care is very important and a main goal of managing the emergency, but
rescuers recognized the need for safe conditions to exist first. Absolute safety is not the
condition required; it is relative safety. Rescuers acknowledge that a certain amount of
risk is taken to provide patient care in uncontrolled situations. Safety and patient care are
balanced, with safety being weighted more heavily. This balance affects interval action proximal, because how responders perceive that they performed determined the content
of the proximal interval action. In addition, on-going patient care and the establishing of
safety fed back into the core category of establishing and maintaining control. As these
functions were perceived as going well, the responders felt they had more control.
Therefore, the category of establishing and maintaining control anchored and
mediated the other categories. Experience and interval actions created a condition of
preparation, used by providers to respond to a contextually-based incident. They began
handling information and using their senses to appreciate the context and complexity of
the scene. The core category mediated handling information, managing resources
properly and using roles and relationships while experiencing and compartmentalizing
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human emotion, to create a relatively safe environment in which to provide patient care.
The extent to which this occurred drove further interval actions and resulted in new
experience to apply to future responses.
The Substantive Theory
The meticulous development of the categories and the careful appreciation of how
they relate to each other based on the participant‘s words, theoretical sensitivity and
rigorous analysis, led to a substantive theoretical model that continued to unfold and
evolve throughout the research process. The result is the Busby Theory of Situational
Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents, seen in Figure 1. By seeking the answers to
questions based on the paradigmatic classifications recommended by Corbin and Strauss
(2008), appreciating the context of the situations and by acknowledging and illuminating
the process of situational awareness, the theory that was developed will add to the current
knowledge concerning situational awareness. In addition, by accepting the subtleties that
may be present in the situations, the theory while substantive and applying only to MCIs
within the parameters of this study, allowed for the process to be seen through the eyes of
providers from varying professions, with diverse experiential levels and with varying
emergency responsibilities, thereby increasing its utility.
This theory suggests that interval action and experiential history lead to a
knowledge-and ability-based condition, which represents a level of preparedness on the
part of the provider. In response to a contextually based incident, responders begin
handling information in an effort to appreciate the context and complexity of the
situation. By employing the key properties of accepting responsibility, establishing
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Figure 1. Busby Theory of Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents
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priorities, coordinating, decision making, and the degree to which the provider saw the
scene as controlled, the responder began and continued to establish and maintain control
over their own situational world. Establishing and maintaining control falls in the
action/interaction/emotion paradigmatic classification. While interacting with and
mediating the categories of handling information, managing resources
(action/interaction/emotion) and recognizing the roles and relationships (condition),
responders experience and yet in many ways compartmentalize human emotion
(action/interaction/emotion – consequences) in an effort to create a condition of relative
safety in which to provide excellent patient care (consequences). The degree to which
control was established and maintained and the perceived adequacy of the balance
between safety of the scene and level of patient care provided, and then led to proximal
interval actions and to increased experience.
Summary
In this chapter each category of the Busby Theory of Situational Awareness in
Multi-Casualty Incidents has been carefully explicated and justified using participant
words, theoretical sensitivity and insights into analysis. An explanation has been made
concerning the development of categories, properties and dimensions and placement of
categories within the paradigmatic classifications put forth by Corbin and Strauss (2008).
The relationships among the categories have been explained leading to the development
of a new substantive grounded theory, the Busby Theory of Situational Awareness in
Multi-Casualty Incidents. Finally, a diagrammatic depiction of the theory has been
developed and presented.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Discussion, Implications and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to develop a substantive theory of situational
awareness for multi-casualty incidents. Using grounded theory methodology, the Busby
Theory of Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents emerged. In this chapter,
the findings of this study are discussed in light of existing theoretical and conceptual
knowledge. In addition, the developed theory is located within the extant nursing theory.
Finally, implications for nursing practice, education, and research are discussed.
Findings in Light of Extant Theory and Conceptual Models
Theories and conceptual models introduced in the literature review portion of this
study provided a means of informing the research. Theories previously described have
been found insufficient on their own for the purposes of MCI. The newly emerged Busby
Theory of Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents is compared and contrasted
with existing theoretical and conceptual SA literature in order to situate in within the state
of the science in the area.
Comparisons between the new theory developed here and extant theory discussed
in the literature is made to determine points of convergence and divergence. The theory
developed in this study is clearly substantive and therefore applies only to SA in MCI,
unlike most of the conceptual definitions and theories discussed in the literature review.
Most existing SA theories have been applied primarily in aviation.
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Some of the conceptual definitions and theories discussed in the literature review
were formal and very abstract (Smith & Hancock, 1995). Others were middle-range
because they have been applied to several domains. Endsley‘s (1995a, 2000a) theory is
applied to multiple domains. When asked whether she consider her theoretical model of
SA formal or mid-range, Endsley stated that ―it is quite a formal model‖, but went on to
say later in the conversation that it ―has been applied to many domains‖ (personal
communication, February 20, 2009). She obviously feels that it has benefit as both a
formal model of SA and a mid-range theory in that it has multi-domain applicability.
Whether she considered it formal or mid-range seemed to depend on how it was applied.
Smith and Hancock (1995, p. 137) suggested that SA is ―adaptive, externally
directed consciousness.‖ This definition is overly abstract to suit the purposes of
application to a particular set of circumstances such as those presented in this study.
What is useful and applicable however is that the authors explain the importance of
agent-environment interaction. Environment in this case, meaning all external factors
with which one must deal. This was clearly a factor in the theory developed in this study.
Geographic and environmental factors became very important properties of the category
of ―appreciating context and complexity.‖ Appreciating the context and the complexity of
the environment led, in part, to one‘s ability to establish and maintain control of the
situation, which emerged as the core category.
Bedny and Meister (1999, p. 65) are primarily concerned with cognition and
suggest that Endsley‘s model reduces the importance of the ―thinking process‖ without
which ―there can be no meaningful and dynamic comprehension of the situation.‖ This
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focus on the personal cognitive functions of the operator is what Rousseau et al. (2004)
called the operator-focused model. Endsley‘s model and her research over the years has
been designed to measure and explain the product of SA, or the knowledge developed in
a particular situation at a particular moment in time. While Endsley (personal
communication, February 20, 2009) ―integrated many existing theories in the cognitive
literature‖ into her own model, she does not really attempt to explain the cognitive
processes that lead to SA. She makes clear that she feels there is a mixing of process and
product.
The theory generated in this study is committed to process. It is the process of
development and maintenance of SA in MCI. This theory should be considered a
―situation-focused‖ model of SA (Rousseau et al. 2004, p. 5), because it explicates the
overall flow of macro-level processes and not the micro-level psycho-cognitive processes
of the operator personally, though these processes are also involved. However, consistent
with existing theories, I found that process leads to product and product, to the need for
further process in cyclic fashion.
Process and product interacted in the findings of this study. The process of SA in
MCI was discovered in this study. However, product is used during this process.
―Decision making‖ was found to be a primary property of the core category. Decisions
are arrived at because of knowledge (the product of SA) that is developed at a particular
moment in time during the process of SA. Most SA models assume according to Dekker
& Lutzoft (2004, p. 22) that operators are looking for ―correspondence-a match or a
correlation, between an external world of stimuli and an internal world of mental
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representations.‖ This appears to be true among my participants. But even then, that
match is based on the meanings that the information encountered has for the participants.
Dekker & Lutzoft (2004, p. 23) go on to say that this can create problems in terms of ―the
construction of meaning in the head.‖
One finding of this study is that separation of product from process is difficult, if
not impossible. If product is measured, some process led to its development. If process is
studied, the impact of product, somewhere along the way is undeniable. This agrees with
the position of Patrick and James (2004) who discussed the difficulty of separating
process and product. One of the most pointed definitions of SA, ―knowing what‘s going
on around you‖, (Endsley 2000a, p. 5), may be sufficient to describe product, but is
insufficient in describing all that the process of SA is in terms of MCI. SA in MCI
involves conditions, actions, interactions, emotion and the consequences of them all.
Endsley (1995a, p.36) acknowledges that SA is not just arrived at. She states that:

..it is first necessary to distinguish the term situation awareness, as a state of
knowledge, from the processes used to achieve that state. These processes, which
may vary widely among individuals and contexts, will be referred to situation
assessment or as the process of achieving, acquiring, or maintaining SA.

The separation of awareness and assessment in this quote, leaves something to the
imagination in terms of what is done, once one achieves awareness. Endsley‘s model
(2000a, p. 3) which has SA at its core, is referred to as the ―Model of SA in Dynamic
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Decision Making.‖ She clearly accounts for assessment, awareness and action that is
necessary, though not fully explained, especially cognitively. In this study, decisions
were found to be an integral part of SA itself. Therefore, they are not separated from the
process of SA.
SA in MCI is more than awareness of the information surrounding a responder.
Information and resources that are managed, the roles that are played and the emotion
experienced all impacted the effort to create safety and provide care. All of the decisions
made and actions taken represent SA because they constitute new conditions that will
require contemplation, decisions and actions. Therefore the result of SA is itself,
information necessary for SA.
Goals also seem to play a role. The participants in this study clearly had major
goals; they were providing a safe environment and providing emergency healthcare.
Rather than simply happening upon information that they may need, operators may ―go
looking for data to either confirm or deny this assessment or to fill in questions‖,
(Endsley, 2004, p. 319). Smith and Hancock (1995, p. 137) state that the ―behavior that
SA generates must be directed at an external goal and that the ―agent‘s perception-action
cycle supports skilled (emphasis mine) performance.‖ Experience has a strong influence
on goal-directed behavior in the findings of this study.
Some of the major concepts and theories reviewed in this study have components
that do indeed have commonality with the newly developed theory. However, in terms of
the applicability of theory to a particular set of circumstances, the substantive theory
developed in this project, is by design, highly specific to MCI and therefore useful only
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in this domain. It has yet to be studied in any other. Commonalities of the new theory
with other theories and conceptual definitions help to confirm the credibility in areas in
which they agree, and call into question those where they do not. The theory developed
here is in its infancy. More studies are needed to strengthen and refine the theory. I also
acknowledge, in keeping with grounded theory methodology, that the theory provided by
this study represents an interpretation of SA in MCI, not the interpretation.
In terms of literature that discusses field-level incidents in particular, some
findings of this study agree either generally or specifically with existing knowledge.
Augustine (2006, p. 2) states, ―Establishing command requires proper communications,
logistics and utilization of emergency resources.‖ He also states that inclement weather
can and does affect the scene in terms of ―how patients are managed‖ (2006, p. 2). In the
theory developed in this study, the core category of ―establishing and maintaining
control‖ mediates ―handling information‖ (of which communication is a primary
property) and ―managing resources.‖ Also ―appreciating context and complexity‖ has as
one of its properties, ―geographic and environmental conditions.‖ The results of this
study agree in general with Augustine although the specifics about how that is
accomplished may not. Additional agreement is found with regard to Limmer et al.,
(2006, p. 1) who suggested that, ―Of all of the tasks we perform as part of the patient
assessment, scene safety is arguably the most important.‖ The findings in this study do
not suggest that insuring scene safety is ―part of the patient assessment‖, but absolutely
do agree that safety is one of the most important and maybe the most important factor.
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A situation specific definition of situational awareness in MCI can be explicated
from the findings of this study. This definition accounts for components necessary for SA
in MCI.
The definition is:

SA in MCI is anticipating, perceiving and appreciating the multi-source relevant
information pertaining to a particular emergency event or series of events,
thereby producing the ability to establish and maintain a degree of control over
current conditions and/or project future impact, sufficient to facilitate effective
action in planning for and responding to public health and safety needs.

This definition more completely captures the important pieces of what SA is in terms of
the needs of public health with respect to SA in MCI.
The Applicability of Nursing Theory
Though participants in this study included those other than nurses, it was
important to situate this new theory within existing nursing science. In considering the
potential impact of extant nursing theory on this project now and in the future, I was most
struck by the fit between Benner‘s From Novice to Expert theory (1982, 2001) and the
findings of this study.
Benner‘s theory explains the many ways that a nurse goes from a novice to an
expert. Parallels exist between Benner‘s work and the theory developed here, in multiple
areas. They include: the experiential necessity of learning, the critical need for stories and

180
narratives in personal interactions, coordination, the ability to prioritize needs, the
problem solving skills that nurses develop with experience, and nurses‘ ability to
visualize themselves as operating ―outside the boundaries of nursing‖ (Benner, 2001, p.
268). Her descriptions are congruent with the findings of this study, particularly those
which suggest that experience is the background for the actions/interactions and emotions
manifested by the responder.
The theory that has resulted from this study is applicable to those working in
emergency response settings and responding to MCI. It is domain-specific. Deepening
the contextual impact, each time that different rescuers respond to unique situations
(which each MCI is), there are nuanced differences in the context and in the response
effort. Benner recognizes that practitioners learn and grow with each clinical situation
that they encounter. She states (2001, p. vi), ―Practices cannot be completely objectified
or formalized because they must ever be worked out anew in particular relationships in
real time.‖ Not only does this support the Busby Theory of SA in MCI, but in another
way, includes the importance of the role of relationships that emerged in this study which
are ―particular‖ to each unique circumstance.
The use of narratives and story-telling in this study are in keeping with Benner‘s
view on the use of these techniques and their ability to enlighten not only the
circumstances, but the impact of experience on responders. The stories themselves are the
primary means by which the participants in this study conveyed what occurred and the
meaning that it held for them. Stories were also used in debriefings, which then
contributed to experience and knowledge.
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Benner (2001) suggests that coordinating, setting priorities and problem solving
improve with experience. This was true of participants in this study, either revealed in
their own words, or as seen through the analysis of data. Coordinating with other
agencies, establishing priorities and decision making, which may include problem solving
were the major properties in the core category of ―establishing and maintaining control.‖
These functions comprise the core category which interacts with and mediates all other
categories in the theory.
Benner (2001, p. 146) states that nurses may be practicing at the novice or
advanced beginner level before they had ―acquired a sense of salience – of perceiving
that some things were more important than others.‖ In this study, it was clear that those
with less experience were more concerned with their own functioning, than how the
overall scene was going. I think that is what Mike was suggesting when he said it took
awhile to develop a ―multi-dimensional view.‖ Some responders discussed the
importance of avoiding ―tunnel vision.‖
Benner (2001, p. 215) comparing expertise with beginner skill, said:

Expertise depends on a meaningful engagement in the situation. The expert
rapidly grasps the problem by seeing it in relation to past similar and dissimilar
situations and rapidly hones in on the correct region of the problem. The beginner,
in contrast must rely on detached, deliberate considerations of as many variables
as possible.
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The nurse then uses the whole of oneself and all of his or her experiences to come
to a conclusion more rapidly and possibly more accurately, than a novice. These are
complex processes. Even novice nurses do depend on many cognitive and psychological
functions to make decision, perhaps less rapidly. Brooks and Thomas (1997) found that
―the nurse as a whole, perceiving, judging, sensing, intuiting, thinking and feeling person
makes the clinical decision in a clinical situation.‖ Therefore, it is not just the
memorizing of a protocol, or algorithm that makes nurses and other providers what they
are as decision makers, it is experience.
Problem solving, which was not particularly identified, had to have been an
unexpressed part of the decision-making process in this study. In some cases the decision
and assessments were made by experienced providers with such rapidity that they were
almost an afterthought. When I asked Mark, a very experienced rescuer how quickly
some of these very important decisions are made, he said:

almost instantaneously, uh, you know, you get out of the truck and in this case,
you know we couldn‘t see the other vehicle because, as a matter of fact we didn‘t
even know we had another vehicle initially when we got off. Got off the truck.
You know we walk up, you know, initial impression, you know, car‘s just about
ripped in half. I know we, if somebody‘s still in the car, I know we got something
bad.
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Benner (2001, p. 168) discussed intra-facility conditions in which nurses may be
required to act in a way that is marginal in terms of nursing care boundaries when she
said:

Nurses are expected to manage rapidly changing situations until the physician
arrives, but since this puts the nurse outside the usual boundaries of nursing
practice, this skilled area is not formally acknowledged or well studied. Yet it is
the nurse who calls for and coordinates multiple members of the healthcare team,
whether it be by calling the physician or by calling a code blue. It is curious that
we have conducted no studies in nursing about the rapid decision making for
calling a code blue, despite the fact that nurses must make split second decisions
about whether the problem is a simple faint, and artifact of telemetry, or the
beginning of a catastrophic problem.

This study was carried out in an environment that is not traditionally seen as
routinely including nursing care; the field-level scene of an MCI. This is one of the areas
that has been seen as being in the margins of nursing care. Except for those nurses who
are part of flight crews, most MCI are not handled in the field by nurses.
In light of daily MCI and recent large-scale events, the circumstances which I
have written about are those that nurses need to acknowledge as being within our
purview. As Benner (2001, p. 168) suggested functions considered marginal to nursing
care will be increasingly ―required of the nurse in actual practice‖, and because of that
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―more documentation and legitimization of this function would probably improve the
nurse‘s preparation for it.‖
Public Health, Nursing Practice, Education and Research
This study has strong implications for public health and nursing practice,
education, and research. One of the reasons for studying this area was to suggest that
nurses have an important role to play in terms of emergency preparedness. While this
study is designed as nursing research, it is also critical that the results be framed within
the larger healthcare delivery system to allow for the information to be used in an
interdisciplinary manner. Emergency preparedness can no longer be seen as the domain
of only one, or a few types of providers.
Public Health
As MCI continue to occur and as we attempt to understand larger-scale incidents
in the broader scheme of things, it will become increasingly important that healthcare
practitioners from many disciplines come together to better understand how these
situations may be handled more effectively through increasingly complex situations,
requiring common operating pictures. A greater appreciation of the process of SA in MCI
among responders could have an impact on their ability to manage such situations,
ultimately improving the provision of safe and effective care and improving public
health. By attempting to create relationships through education, drills and training
exercises, better cooperation and understanding between responders who may not
commonly work together may produce better understanding of professional and team
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roles and increase cooperative efforts among professional emergency responders and
volunteers utilized during larger-scale events, thus improving overall response efforts.
The suggestion by participants that alcohol use among providers was one of many
coping mechanism could also have an impact on public health. Since some emergency
responders are occasionally ―on call‖, there is the not only the potential issue of alcohol
abuse by providers, but also the concern for impaired providers responding to
emergencies, which may have an impact on safe and competent practice, and may require
additional research and education.
Nursing Practice
This theory could be implemented by nurses and non-nursing personnel alike, as a
possible means of understanding the needs, actions and solutions for safety and care
during MCI response in the field. Although it would not provide a ―key‖ to every
circumstance, it may improve the rescuers efforts by increasing understanding of SA
development, explicating the complexity of the process, and increasing focus and easing
decision making in the field. It may also serve to provide a topic of discussion among
nurses and other providers, which may focus needed attention on the subject and improve
responder and victim safety and patient care in the field.
This project will hopefully increase awareness of the need for SA among nurses
working in the field. Including nurses in the study increased the applicability of the
theory to nurses currently working in emergency response. This was one of the goals.
Nurses may consider using the theory or portions of it that may apply to other areas or
domains of nursing. In this era of evidence-based practice, research evidence emerging
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from the field can inform future practice. Some portions of the theory may be trialed in
emergency departments, intensive care units and other areas where rapid assessment and
action are needed.
Nurses could determine how the theory may or may not fit their needs and alter
response plans accordingly. Some of the categories and the relationships among them
may be isolated to inform practice in situations to which they are seen as applicable. For
example, providers may discuss issues regarding ―roles and relationships‖ to determine
how best to create relationships among colleagues in their area, which in turn may
increase efficiency during actual responses. Roles of providers may also be clarified,
which may in turn improve scene management. Categories such as ―The Human
Element‖ may provide impetus for discussion of how the culture of an organization might
impact critical incident stress debriefing by making it more acceptable and mainstream.
These efforts may positively impact psychological coping among nurses and other
providers.
Therefore, although the categories and relationships emerged as an integrated
theoretical model, portions of the theory may be applicable to certain circumstances in
intra-facility nursing and field-level care.
Nursing Education
Nursing education may benefit from the theory put forth in this study. Nursing
schools may consider using the theory and information developed as a means of
introducing the subject of MCI required SA and management to nursing students and as a
tool for teaching MCI and community disaster modules in basic or advanced practice
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educational programs. Nursing programs may want to use the theory for education of
nursing students for disaster response or homeland security nursing programs. It may also
prove useful in field-level or clinical placement nursing education.
The education of nurses, doctors and EMS providers alike typically incorporates
some type of learning experiences involving actual patient care under the watchful eye of
a trained and seasoned preceptor. The rationale for these clinical experiences is that as the
participants of this study said, actual experience in real situations creates learning which
cannot be carried out or duplicated in a classroom. Benner (2001, p. vii) states that,
―Experiential learning in high-risk situations requires courage and supportive learning
environments.‖ Nursing faculty and instructors must present didactic information and
carefully follow that up with actual hands-on learning. It may be that nursing students
would benefit from a ―ride along‖ with EMS providers. This would expose them to the
uncontrolled environment of the field and to visualizing and partaking in the management
of single patient situations and MCI. Some EMS educational programs require paramedic
and EMT students to spend clinical time in an emergency department. Nursing schools
should consider allowing or even requiring a limited amount of clinical practice time for
nursing students to be completed in the field.
Computer programs now have the capability to simulate situations that may be
seldom encountered in reality. Providing these realistic experiences may improve the
overall functioning of personnel in similar real-life circumstances. Programs such as
Virtual Alabama, which I had the opportunity to be involved in, are tremendously helpful
in terms of simulating conditions which require high levels of SA. I have had the
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opportunity to be involved in and arrange such training opportunities for responders in
my area of the country.
Finally, interdisciplinary education and training should occur among healthcare
and non-healthcare providers alike. It is important for responders from all disciplines to
gain increasing knowledge of the strengths and limitations of each type of response
professional. Those who would be requested to respond to an actual event would
certainly benefit from this type of ―interval action‖ and this educational strategy would
create new and strengthen existing ―roles and relationships‖ within their response areas.
It would be particularly beneficial for nurses to practice acting as part of an
interdisciplinary team with regard to emergency response. It may also increase the
nursing profession‘s credibility among other responders in the area of emergency
preparedness, to conduct and participate in interdisciplinary drills. While this model
provides the process of SA development and maintenance in MCI, it may also provide a
starting point for discussion among emergency responders in terms of larger scale
incidents.
Nursing Research
Additional research should be performed to clarify and refine the theory of SA in
MCI developed in this study. It is recommended that theory testing be conducted on the
entire theory or be focused on more isolated sections of the theory. Portions of the theory
may be well-suited to circumstances other than MCI.
One aim of the study was to acquire a sample representing providers from a wide
range of disciplinary and experiential (though not necessarily geographic) viewpoints.
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This was important since no theoretical models of SA specific to MCI had previously
been developed. Therefore, a relatively broad view of the process was desired and
accomplished. However, since the results of this project do reflect this view, it may be
beneficial to study more narrow experiential and disciplinary groups of providers as well
as more geographically diverse groups. The wider geographic range would increase
transferability and the more narrow experiential and disciplinary foci may fine tune the
theory benefiting specific groups of providers to a greater degree.
Research will also be required to determine if new SA education and practice
implementation is somehow associated with improved outcome measures. On an MCI
scale, this may be more easily accomplished. It will certainly be more difficult in largerscale events. However, it is ultimately important to insure that research impacts practice
and that practice impacts research.
My research trajectory includes expanding SA research to larger-scale events.
Studies should be designed to improve the understanding and application of SA to events
larger than the necessary constraints of this work. SA for larger-scale incidents may not
have the same requirements for information handling, resource management, appreciating
context and many other concepts found to be required for occurrences of the size
consistent with this research project. Roles and relationships would almost certainly take
on another dimension. Many other requirements may be altered in some expected and
some unexpected ways in larger-scale incidents.
It is also important that SA be studied with respect to an emergency manager‘s
hierarchical level. Even among the participants of this study, it was found that some were
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functioning in the capacity of IC, while still others were operating on much lower levels
of responsibility. In larger-scale situations, managers with ultimate responsibility may be
in regional or even national emergency operations centers making decisions based on incoming information, never having been on the scene. The process of SA development in
these situations is expected to be different from the process developed in this study. That
information is necessary. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Management,
Investigations, and Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Larence (2007, p. 16), was discussing major Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) initiatives. In doing so he said one ―major‖ initiative regarding postKatrina recommendations, was developed to ―better share information for situational
awareness and decision support.‖ Offering additional support for this point, in testimony
before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives,
Jenkins (2007), the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues stated that:

..the nation‘s experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforced some
questions about the adequacy of the nation‘s disaster response capabilities in the
context of catastrophic disaster – particularly in the areas of (1) situational
assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4)
search and rescue, (5) logistics and (5) mass care and sheltering.

Based on the lack of research-based theory development regarding SA in MCI and the
obvious deficiencies at the national level, the need for additional research regarding SA is
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crystal clear. Nurses can and should be on the front line of conducting studies, educating
nurses and other healthcare providers and conducting research that will improve local,
regional and national emergency preparedness and response efforts.
Summary
This study used grounded theory methodology along with the supporting
philosophical stances of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism to discover the process
of SA in MCI. Fifteen emergency workers from varying disciplines and experiential
backgrounds were interviewed. The transcripts of the interviews were used as the primary
source of data, along with field notes and memos. Transcripts were coded using open,
focused and axial coding techniques to allow for the emergence of ten overall categories
along with their relationships to each other. The analyses which led to the categorical
development and the relationships were explicated. The result is the Busby Theory of
Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents.
This research project has added to the extant knowledge of SA generally and to
that of SA in MCI specifically. While providing an interdisciplinary theoretical model for
discussion and application, this study has also bridged SA for the first time with extant
nursing theory. It has also provided a theory for practice and education and a launch pad
for additional research.
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Do you know what‘s going on around you?
If you do, then you have ―Situational Awareness‖
If you are an emergency responder (EMT, paramedic, nurse or
physician), have at least one year of experience and have been to a multicasualty scene (2-25 patients) to provide care, then you can tell me what was
going on around you.
I am conducting a research study that is attempting to uncover the
process of situational awareness in multi-casualty incidents and I need your
help! Your experience is important to me. I‘m a former paramedic, now an
advanced practice nurse, current faculty member at UAH and PhD student at
UT performing research.
Your participation would include an interview requiring
approximately 60 minutes of your time and will be conducted at your
convenience at a location convenient to you (not while on duty please).
If you think you have experiences that would be helpful in improving
our knowledge in this area, and would like to know more, please contact:
Steve Busby, University of Alabama in Huntsville
Office (256) 824-2437
Cell (256) 503-0551
Email: busbys@uah.edu
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Research Study Information Sheet
Situational Awareness in Multi-casualty Incidents: Theory Development
from the Field
Principal Investigator: Steven Busby
INTRODUCTION
You are invited to participate in research study that is designed to help the researcher
understand how medical responders in the field develop information about situations in
which multiple people are injured, in order to make decisions about their care and safety.
INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE STUDY
After reading this information sheet, any questions you may have will be answered.
Should you then decide to participate, you will be asked to sign a consent form, and fill
out a short demographic sheet (age, gender etc.). Then, the researcher (Steve Busby) will
interview you for approximately 60 minutes and ask you questions about a particular
event of your choice, to which you have responded, that required the care of more than
one, but no more than 25 people. The interview may last longer or shorter than 60
minutes depending how much time you feel you need to tell the researcher what you
would like him to know.
The interview will be audio taped and then typed and stored on compact discs. As soon as
the typed record of your interview is reviewed for accuracy, your audio taped interview
will be destroyed. Neither your name, nor that of your employing/volunteer agency will
be a part of the typed record. Only the researcher will have a list of the participant‘s
names, and they will be kept confidential. There will be qualified researchers assisting
me with the evaluation of the information in your interview, but they will not be able to
identify you in any way. Your actual words may be utilized in the research findings, but
all referrals to names, agencies and other identifying information will be removed. You
may be asked for permission to be re-interviewed by the researcher at a later date in order
to clarify some information. Agreeing to be interviewed initially, in no way obligates you
to subsequent interviews, and you may refuse to be interviewed later without penalty.
RISKS
The risks to you are minimal. Talking about a situation that was in some way difficult for
them may emotionally upset some people. If you become upset and would like to
discontinue the interview, you may do so at any time. If you would like to continue the
interview after some period, you may. If you would like to completely discontinue the
interview, you may do that without any penalty.
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BENEFITS
Talking about an important situation may be in some ways helpful psychologically to
some people. You also may feel that you are assisting with improving emergency
services by offering to participate in this project. However, you may not realize any
personal benefit from having participated in the research study.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The researcher (Steve Busby) is the only person who will have access to the names of
the participants, other than the transcriptionist who may hear references to identifying
information on the audiotapes. The transcriptionist has signed a confidentiality statement,
and is in no way allowed to discuss any information concerning the study. The names of
the participants, the typed transcripts, and the compact discs containing stored transcripts
will be maintained in a locked file cabinet in the researcher‘s office. Some research
materials without any identifiers may be secured on the password protected office
computer of the researcher. Other researchers who will be assisting the primary
researcher (Steve Busby), will be reviewing the transcribed information, but will not have
any identifying information about you. The typed transcripts will be kept and possibly
utilized in future studies. Again, no identifying information will be on those transcripts.
COMPENSATION
No compensation will be provided to you as a participant. Your participation is
completely voluntary.

PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without
penalty. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at anytime
without penalty and without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you
withdraw from the study before data collection is completed your data will be returned to
you or destroyed.
CONTACT
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the
researcher:
Steven Busby
328 Nursing Building
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Huntsville, AL 35899
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Office - (256) 824-2437
If you have questions about your rights as a participant, contact the Office of Research
Compliance Officer at (865) 974-3466.
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Informed Consent Form

Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents: Theory Development from the Field
Principal Investigator: Steven Busby
You are invited to participate in a research study of emergency responders. The
goal of this study is to obtain information about how emergency responders gather and
process information in emergency situations to determine how they know what is going
on around them on an emergency scene. Hopefully this knowledge will improve
emergency response.
As the principal investigator, I will ask you for your thoughts, feelings ideas and
experiences related to an emergency that you personally were involved in. You will be
asked to participate in an audio taped interview at a time and location of your choice. The
interview will last as long as necessary to allow you to share your experience. These
interviews typically last between 45 and 60 minutes, but may be longer or shorter
depending on what you have to say. You will be asked to share your experiences,
thoughts, and feelings regarding information you found particularly important in handling
the scene and how that information was obtained, maintained and updated. Other
questions will follow based on what you share with me. The interview will be audio taped
in order for me to use your exact words to compare with words of other responders in the
study. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions posed. Your experience, to
the best of your ability to recall it, is what is important to me.
There will be between 12 and 30 responders included in this study. All interviews
will be typed into written form to allow for analysis. Your name will not appear on the
audiotape or the typed copy and will be known only to me. Information in the typed
copies will be kept confidential. All copies, with no identifying information, will be kept
in a locked file drawer in my office. I, or an assistant, may contact you following the
interview to make sure that I understood your comments and thoughts. The information
obtained in this study may be put together with other information for future projects
related to volunteer activities and elder health.

As a volunteer in this study, you will not be paid for your time and effort in
participating in this study. You may benefit from having someone to discuss your
experiences with and from insights gained as a result of discussion.

Participants Initials __________
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You are free to answer or not answer any questions. Your participation in this
study is entirely voluntary. You may choose not to participate or to withdraw at any time
during the study without any penalty or loss of present or future benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. Your audiotape will be destroyed if you withdraw from this study.
Any information you provide will be kept in confidence. Your name will not be used in
any reports although your words may be used to support interpretation and analysis. At
no time will your words be identifiable with your name.
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may
contact the Principal Investigator. Contact information appears below. If you have
questions about your rights as a participant, contact the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville, Compliance Section of the Office of Research at (865) 974-7697, or write
them at 1534 White Ave., Knoxville, TN 37996-1529.
If you have questions about your rights as a participant, contact the Office of Research
Compliance Officer at (865) 974-3466.

Steven Busby
328 Nursing Building
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Huntsville, AL 35899
Office - (256) 824-2437

CONSENT
I have read the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to
participate in this study.

Participant's signature ______________________________ Date __________

Investigator's signature _____________________________ Date __________
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Research Demographic Form
Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents: Theory
Development from the Field
Principal Investigator: Steven Busby
Please do not place any personally identifying information on this form
(name, address employer etc.). You may choose not to respond to any of
these items without penalty.

1. What is your age? __________

2. Are you female ______ or

male ______?

3. What is your ethnicity? ___________________________

4. How many full years of service as an emergency responder? ______

5. Are you a(n) EMT____ Paramedic____ Nurse____ Physician ____

6. Are you a paid _____ or volunteer ______ responder?

7. Are you still working in emergency response? Yes____ No ____
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Transcriber’s Pledge of Confidentiality
Study: Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents: Theory
Development from the Field
Principal Investigator: Steven Busby
As a transcribing typist of this research project, I understand that I will be hearing tapes
of confidential interviews. Research participants who participated in this project on good
faith have revealed the information on these tapes with the understanding that their
interviews would remain strictly confidential. I understand that I have a responsibility to
honor this confidentially agreement. I hereby agree not to share any information on these
tapes with anyone except the primary researcher of this project. Any violation of this
agreement would constitute a serious breach of ethical standards, and I pledge not to do
so.

_____________________________
Transcribing Typist

________________
Date
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Audit Trail for Research Project, Situational Awareness in Multi-Casualty Incidents
Category
Appreciating
Context and
Complexity
―

Focused

Open
good, meaning serious

―
―
―
―
―

accepting tragedy as
typical
acting on speculation
―all this stuff going on at
one time‖
―and when you hear those
words – people are in there
– that changes everyone‘s
mind‖
appreciating the scope
being prepared
being unsure of the
problem
―‘Cause you don‘t expect
to see that in a mass
situation‖
chaos and confusion
concerns for abandonment
dividing attention
―even in that moment of
chaos….everybody
stepped up and did what
was required of them‖
extrication became
difficult
gravity of the situation
high traffic area
―it was nighttime and it
was cold‖
―it was really cut and dry‖
LZ on the scene
many considerations
most common event
never really knowing

―
―
―

not knowing the problem
one size fits all response
―So I‘m sure the

―
―
―

―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

―
―
―
‗`

Paradigm
Action/
Interaction/
Emotion
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Category

Focused

―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Actually
Perceiving
―
―
―

―
―
―
―

―
―
―

―

―

―
―
―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―
―
―

―

Anticipating and
Envisioning

Open
coordinators at that point
knew they had a disaster
on their hands‖
―so many variables‖
―that‘s just the way it goes‖
―the bus driver panicked
and exited the vehicle‖
―they were uh, stressed
out‖
―time gets skewed when
you‘re in the middle of
that‖
unique situation
varying mechanisms
visually obstructed
―we‘re standing on a
muddy hill‖
not being able to see it
anticipating needs
arriving first
―before my feet ever hit the
ground‖
do a quick size-up
do sort of a scene triage
first concentration
establishing that which lays
out your work scene
initial assessment – most
important
initial perceptions
perceiving the scene
perceiving cues
line of sight
visual cues to seriousness
visualizing the scene
―you kinda gotta go based
on what you see‖
―as a time to remind myself
and bring everything to the
front of my mind, that I
need for this scene‖

Paradigm
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Category

Focused

―

―

―

―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
Dynamic
circumstances

―
―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―
―

―
―

―
―

―

―

―
―
―
―
―
―

―
Geographic and
Environmental
Considerations
―
‗
―
―

―
―

―
―

―

―

Open
anticipating critical
situation
cues lead to probable
findings
―I was preparing in my
head before I got to the
scene what to expect‖
cues lead to probable
findings
―it could be ugly‖
―it just hadn‘t happened
yet‖
knowing it‘s bad
planning action based on
report
preparing for arrival
changing circumstances
changing conceptions
expecting the unexpected
―I stood everybody down‖
lack of patient cooperation
needing traffic control
patient doesn‘t want to be
found
patient hiding
pre-planning helps in
dynamic circumstances
―the bus driver panicked
and exited the vehicle‖
the unexpected occurring
being impacted by the
scope
―a crap shoot‖
geographic factors
having two different
locations
it was out in a rural area
―it was pretty dark outside‖
―it was very smoky, very
hot, very, very hot
multiple scenes in one

Paradigm
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Category
―

Focused
―

―

―

―

―

―
―

―
―

Contextually-Based
Situation
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
Establishing and
Maintaining
Control
―
―
―
―
―

Open
out of visual or walking
range
proximity of the patients to
each other
―two locations that very
spread apart‖
―two separate incidents‖
working conditions weren‘t
favorable
1077 (In Vivo, deceased)
―a microburst is a
microburst and there‘s no
control over it‖
car wedged under a bus
―gone postal on us‖
heat related event
involving two toddlers
―I know the people and
they‘re still inside‖
multiple injuries and
multiple ejections
MVA
people passing out in a bar
structure fire
―the bottom dropped out‖
―the call is a MVC with
possible entrapment‖
―we responded to a triple
shooting‖
weather event
accepting responsibility

accountability
assessing the scene
bearing the early arrival
burden
―by them panicking almost
caused us some really big
problems‖
controlling family
empathetically

Paradigm

Condition

Action/
Interaction/
Emotion
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Category
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Focused

Open
―dealing with a bigger
issue‖
developing a multidimensional view
empathy for the IC
establishing command
early
establishing control by
avoiding tunnel vision
establishing two scenes
feeling overwhelmed
giving orders
handling everything early
―I lost SA‖
―it required some restraint‖
―I‘ve always seen incident
command being right
there.‖
lacking clear leadership
lines of authority
maintaining control
multi-level ICs
no clear perimeter
no contact with the IC
―one must lead the troops‖
ready to respond
restructuring staff for IC
scene size-up
setting up the perimeter
setting up care area
shifting command
textbook incident
command is atypical
―the state troopers had a
pretty long response time‖
―the wagon wheel theory‖
―there was no control at
all‖
trying to concentrate on
one thing
trying to determine what
was going on

Paradigm

228
Category
―
―
―

Focused

―

Coordinating
Efforts
―

―

―

―
―
―
―
―
―
‗

―
―
―
―
―
―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―
―

―
Establishing
Priorities
―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―
―
―
―

―
―
Establishment
and Transfer of
Command
―
―

―
―

―
―

Open
unheard of concept
well-controlled scene has a
positive impact
cooperating
dealing with the news
media
―doing his policeman
thing‖
lacking territorialness
law enforcement acting
managing disagreement
news media as a resource
―nobody‘s in a turf battle‖
―put those egos aside‖
seamlessness of the
operation
―two different purposes‖
understanding between
agencies
―you gotta train together‖
scene safety is the first
priority
―you start dealing with it as
you make it smaller‖
acting on perceived
priorities
assessing risk and benefit
changing priorities based
on patient age
establishing priorities
―it comes down to
priorities‖
prioritizing injuries
surveying the scene
assuming control

establishing command
―I had to relinquish the
scene‖
making a determination
organizing the effort

Paradigm
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Category
―
―

Focused
―
Making
Decisions

―
―
―

―
―
―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―

―

―

―
Experience
―

―
Experience as a
Factor
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

Open
transfer of command
―as your number of
patients grow, your number
of viable patients diminish‖
making critical decisions
anticipating decisions
bringing in another
decision-maker
deciding not to divert
resources
deciding on transport
―I‘ve got to go in and get
the rest of these people out
of here quick or they‘re not
gonna live.‖
making a determination
making choices
making choices with
incomplete information
making difficult decisions
―making those decisions on
the fly‖
rapid decision-making
risks of wrong decisions
sees working as action
―trying to make a decision
and decide‖
―we had to make those
decisions very quickly‖
weighing the options

Paradigm

Condition
acknowledging subtle
differences between among
responses
building a frame of
reference
experience leads to
anticipation
―that‘s not something that
you teach in school‖
―you can tell…when
trouble‘s coming‖
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Category
―

Focused
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―

―

―

―

―
―

Experience
Helps
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

Open
―You learn from your
mistakes‖
―you learn something every
time‖
―you try to plug this square
peg in a round hole‖
acknowledging
inexperience
developing a
multidimensional view
early experiences
experience as a
requirement for
employment
experience helps to avoid
tunnel vision
experience not a help
Experience serves as a
guide
lacking experiences
necessity for a particular
type of experience
pattern recognition
relying on past experience
―So, that‘s one thing I put
in the back of mind for
next time‖
―there‘s something new
every day‖
using experience for
comparison

acknowledging differences
in experiences
―double the amount of
education‖
―I think it‘s one of the
biggest aspects of it all‖
―Like a flashover. There‘s
nothing that you can read
that can prepare you for
that‖

Paradigm
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Category
Handling
Information
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Focused
―

Open
―because you‘ve got to get
it everywhere‖
information overload
conflicting or changing
information
confusing updates
considering the
information needs of others
dealing with the news
media
determining detail of
information
digging a little deeper
getting patient report
giving information
Identifying important
information
incomplete information
information from
bystanders
information from victims
information relay time
Information seeking bystanders
initial verbal report most
useful to SA
invaluable information
―it‘s really difficult to
balance‖
loss of information source
misinformation from
patients
news media as a resource
obtaining inaccurate
information
pressuring for critical
information
providing updates from the
scene
receiving updates
reporting an incident
seeing a placard

Paradigm
Action/
Interaction/
Emotion
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Category
―

Focused

―
―
―
―
―
―

Communicating
―
―
―

―
―

―
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

Open
timing of important
information
unclear information
where information is
coming from
―the wagon wheel theory‖
using a runner
becoming separated
busyness reduces
communication
chain of communication
communicating concerning
patient care
communicating to the
receiving facility
communicating nonverbally
communicating through
body language
communicating through
photos
communicating with air
evac
communicating with
patients
communicating with the
hospital
communicating with the
pilot
communicating with the
receiving provider
communication – for better
or worse
communication as a
problem
communication style is
scene dependent
critically communicating
dedicated to
communication
desire for clear language
distance impairing
communication

Paradigm
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Category
―

Focused
―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―:

―
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―

―

―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―

Communicating/
Face to Face
―

―

―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―

Communicating/
Radio
―

―

Open
infrastructure limiting
communication
lack of communication
reducing response
line of sight
multiple means of
communication
no communications
not communicating for
safety reasons
PAR frequency for facility
communication
patient care is priority
communication
physical separation breaks
communication
receiving patient report
receiving report
relayed to the hospital
time limiting
communication
using a landline for
medical communication
using cell phone because of
terrain
using hand signals
working through the layers
of communication
face to face communication
―you see when they‘re
rattled‖
face to face communication
for unusual situation
face to face preferable in
large events
preferring face to face
―too much to say to say it
over the radio‖
radio communication
―wanting to take the radio
and just pitch it out the

Paradigm
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Category

Focused

―
―

―
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―
―

―
―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―
―

Initial
Information
―
―
―

―

―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―
Insuring Safety
―

―
―

―
―

Open
window‖
link back to help
hesitancy to communicate
all information over the
radio
increased traffic, decreased
usefulness
limitations to radio
communications
little radio traffic means a
bad scene
multiple radio channels
one radio per crew
patient care is priority
communication
radio updates
required but frustrating
information
using dedicated scene radio
channel
volume of traffic decreases
awareness
1077

Paradigm

chain of communication
―It was going to go to our
south‖
―it was like a domino
effect‖
receiving initial
information
receiving the call
still alarm (In Vivo, not
dispatched)
the call came in
the tones went off
don‘t rush in
experience impacts scene
safety
safety of all is the priority
―scene safety is the first
priority‖

Condition
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Category
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Focused

Open
―there is no balance‖
―a perfect LZ‖
acknowledging limitations
assessing risk and benefit
careful response
commanding the LZ
considering risks
Considering risks to
providers
de-escalation for safety
designated to find a safe
LZ
facing impaired people
landing upwind
looking for hazards
―make sure everyone‘s
going home at the end of
the night‖
making the scene safe
managing the scene well
pairing up
personnel safety
physical obstacles posing
risks
removing those involved to
safety
risk of violence
risk to safety
scene safety
secure LZ
self protection
stabilizing the scene
starts with dispatch
―stop any further damage‖
taking risks for patient care
―three to go, one to say no‖
―two in, two out policy‖
unusual LZ
―we both knew it was time
to get out‖
―we gotta take care of
ourself‖
―we‘re gonna make sure

Paradigm
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Category

Focused

―
―

New Threats

―

―

―
―
―

―
―
―

Interval Action
―
―
‗

Paradigm

Condition
political ramifications

―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Open
that people are gonna be
safe‖
―we‘d be more at risk if we
pulled up at the scene and
waited before we went it"
―the times are not the
same‖
―the world is not the same
today‖
considering new threats
contaminated patients
―a lot of hybrid cars have
400 DC volts that run
through them‖

―

Interval/
Proximal
―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―you honestly think they‘re
gonna expose a problem
with their cash cow‖
being ready for a busy
night
educating responders
formal education
inter-agency training
pre-action planning
teaching LZ classes
training together
very little training
after-action contemplation
culture impacting
debriefing
culture impacting
debriefing
discouraging younger
responders from attending
debriefing
informal crew training
questioning yourself
encouraging younger
responders to attend
debriefing
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Category
―
Managing
Resources
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
‗
―
―
―

Focused
―

Open
critiquing and debriefing
―I am not a helicopter
advocate myself‖
―like Custer calling for
more Indians‖
political ramifications
arriving resources
assessing resource needs
assessing resources
automatic number of
resources sent
basing resource needs on
visual cues
being dispatched early
being placed on standby
calling additional resources
early
calling on the untrained
cancelling responders
capability affecting
resources
considering medical air
evacuation
criteria checking
criticality of patients
deploying resources
dispatchers aiding with
resource needs
distributing resources
financial implications of
response
following protocol for
response
getting trained
professionals to the scene
help arriving
improving resources over
time
limited resources
limited time and resources
―make sure they have all
the resources they need‖

Paradigm
Action/
Interaction/
Emotion
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Category
―
―

Focused

―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Time
Management
―
―

―

―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―
―

―
―

―
Patient Care
―
―
―

―

Open
manpower usage
match the command
feature with the resources
news media as a resource
obtaining resources
overwhelming the
resources
redirecting resources
requesting additional
resources
resource coordination
resource utilization
assessment
staging of resources
―they were so outnumbered
that…..you had to laugh
about it‖
utilizing all available
resources
varying resource response
―we took it off the aircraft
just to make it lighter‖

Paradigm

―I built a timeframe‖
―time kinda gets skewed
when you‘re in the middle
of that‖
―we‘ve got twelve
minutes‖
―an eight minute flight
comparing transport time
considering time
management
considering transport time
―less than twenty minutes
from initial dispatch to at
the patient‘s side‖
time alteration
Consequences
avoiding tunnel vision
staying on the scene
changing tactics based on
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Category

Focused

―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Patient
Disposition
―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―
―

―
―
Providing Care
―

―
―
―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―
―
―

Open
equipment
concerns for abandonment
criticality creating
insecurity
having tunnel vision
not knowing the outcome
second-hand information
tallying the injured
the emotional toll

transporting patients in a
truck
acknowledging the
proximity and capability of
the receiving facility
considering location relate
to facility
deciding on transport
determining disposition
determining the facility by
air
extraneous factors make a
difference
injuries limiting disposition
matching facilities to
patients
patient transport
considerations
patients transporting
themselves
policy limiting disposition
preparing for transport
acknowledging victim‘s
loss
additional help
assessing the patient
avoid missing anything
being empathetic
care interrupted
changing status of patient
delegating patient care

Paradigm
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Category
―

Focused
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―
―
―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―

Open
determining who is a
patient
difficulty dealing with
victim‘s loss
distraught family
obstructing patient care
determining patient
condition
diagnosing
―do what you need to do‖
documenting patient care
discontinuing care
equipment impairing
patient care
extricating the patients
identifying the location of
patients
initiating care
juggling multiple patient
care considerations
locating victims
medical knowledge of first
responders affecting
subsequent care
mechanism of injury
patient care by the highest
level of training
patient care inhibiting SA
―patient care is always a
priority‖
patient refusing treatment
prioritizing for transport
providing care at a distance
providing initial care
providing reassurance
reassessing patients
recognizing patient care as
a priority
releasing care
seeking medical advice
searching for victims
stabilization before
transport

Paradigm
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Category
―
―

Focused
―
―

―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―
―

Triaging
―
―
―
―

―

―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
―

―
―

Recognizing Roles
and Relationships
―
―
―
―
―

Open
taking risks for patient care
―the care was my primary
concern‖
―there‘s no extra space‖
transfer of care
treating injuries
―to identify the mechanism
of injury takes all of 15
seconds‖
―about as critical as it gets‖
unique triage situation
―you‘ve gotta move on‖
determining the number of
patients
establishing acuity of
injuries
MCI altering triage
number of patients
number of responders
affecting triage
questioning the triage of
other providers
triage and treatment
understanding the need to
triage
using visual cues for triage
―you save the ones you
can‖
―bring out more of the
nurse‖
EMS training enhancing
nursing knowledge
―most of us gonna know
each other on a first name
basis‖
working with those
personally known
improves response
acknowledging the roles of
others
camaraderie improving
function

Paradigm

Condition
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Category
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Focused

Open
commanding the LZ
conditions that change the
priority
conflicting responsibilities
conflicting roles
decreasing efficiency
difficulty identifying
responders
difficulty of being in
charge
doing assigned job
dual role leading to prima
donna attitude
embracing unusual roles
evidence preservation
flight crew responsibilities
hoping they can handle it
―I responded as a group‖
―I think it makes it more
congenial‖
―I was now a witness‖
―it‘s almost like a
choreographed play
or….dance‖
―it‘s kind of like a
brotherhood‖
knowing those you work
with
personnel requirements
policing the media
recognizing the need for
other agencies
―so it‘s not only am I
friends with them, these are
like my extended family‖
―they just try and take
over‖
― I was trained paramedic
first, nurse second‖
trusting the actions of
others
utilizing non-medical
personnel

Paradigm
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Category
―
―

Focused

―
―
―
―

Bystanders
―

―
―
―
―

―
―
―
―

―

―

―

―

―

―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―
―
―

―

―

―
―

―
―

―
The Human Factor

―

Open
varying levels of training
―we know each other by –
on a first name basis‖
―we really truly need to be
robotic‖
working together builds
trust
being suspicious of
bystanders
bystander assistance
bystanders acting alone
Bystanders as a hindrance
bystanders obstructing
information gathering
bystanders will tell you
different things
conditions dictating the use
of bystanders
conflicting information
from bystanders
crowd control
depends on the situation
hesitancy in using
bystanders
perception of bystanders
prayer by a bystander
receiving help from
bystanders
―the best help you‘ll ever
find or bothersome‖
that was his role
threatening bystanders for
information
verifying credentials
―a learned…. skill‖

―
―
―

Paradigm

―a lot of people who drink
a lot‖
becoming angry
―‖Cause it will hurt you‖

Action/
Interaction/
Emotion/
Consequences
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Category
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Focused

Open
―I clicked into a mode‖
―I remember being tearful
afterwards‖
―I tend to
compartmentalize them
until later‖
―it required some restraint‖
―one must lead the troops‖
perception of a hero
―you remember everything
about that patient‖
―you try to block it out‖
acknowledging death
―and you cry a little, um
and then you have the big
debriefing with the chief‖
being offered debriefing
Being uncomfortable with
debriefing
dealing with your emotions
difficult to avoid rushing in
empathizing with family
environmental and social
interaction
establishing detachment
expressing concern
feeling pressure
fighting gut instinct
getting too close
―I needed to be in there
hands on‖
― I remember feeling
shocked‖
―it kind of kicked me into a
higher mode to hurry and
do something‖
keeping an emotional
distance
not being able to do it by
the books
―you‘re obviously playing
mind games‖
―that really bothered us‖

Paradigm

245
Category
―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

Focused

Open
―the human factor to this
certainly was the five year
old‖
―they could hurt you‖
wanting to help
wanting to know
―wanting to take the radio
and just pitch it out the
window‖
―you cry about it after the
call‖
―you have to step above
that‖
―you just kind of flip the
switch‖

Paradigm
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